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ABSTRACT
After Polarity: World Political Systems, Polar Structural
Transitions, and Nonpolarity
By
Nerses Kopalyan
Dr. Jonathan Strand, Examination Committee Chair
University of Nevada Las Vegas
The research question poses: what are the polar structurations of a system after
unipolar transitions, and should a system transition into a nonpolar structure, how can this
phenomenon be explained? In the study of polarity, two deficiencies are diagnosed that
can potentially not only fill a serious gap, but also strengthen the theoretical, conceptual,
and systemic tools utilized within the field. The first gap is the absence of any developed
treatments of nonpolarity. Categorical taxonomy primarily revolves around uni-, bi-, tri-,
or multi- polar structures. The field lacks a coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity,
thus limiting the development of a robust theoretical model that can enrich the study of
polar structures and world powers. The second deficiency is the shortage of systematized
studies of structural transformations, especially the outcome of polar structural transitions
after unipolarity. The objective of this research is to conceptualize, test, and analyze the
power configurations and post transitional patters within world political systems. The
intent is to observe what power configuration unipolar systems transition into, gauge
probabilistic outcomes, and if the ensuing power configuration is defined by nonpolarity,
address whether a discernible pattern may be ascertained vis-à-vis unipolarity giving way
to nonpolarity. Finally, the research attempts to consider the following puzzle: what will
the global political order look like after American unipolarity?
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CHAPTER 1
TOPIC AND RESEARCH QUESTION: AN INTRODUCTION…
Robert Jervis (2009) writes, “Academic analyses are influenced both by events in
the world and by scholars’ political outlooks and preferences.” There are developing
phenomena that will come to shape and influence the global political realm, yet because
these “things are not happening,” they remain puzzles that are “ignored.” So he poses the
question: “Who until the end of the cold war would have written an article on unipolarity
or encouraged a graduate student to work on this topic?” (p. 189). Similarly, one could
ask: “Who until the end of American unipolarity will write a scholarly work on
nonpolarity or encouraged a graduate student to work on this topic?”
Such rhetorical questions concerning the choice for topics and subject matters for
research within the field of international relations (IR) presuppose two extremely
important developments with respect to the very nature of research and inquiry: 1) the
extent to which the study of a subject matter must be justified in order to even consider
undertaking research; and 2) the meta-theoretical considerations that define and
legitimate the very method and nature of inquiry. Methodology and paradigmatic
legitimation, then, have become the structural basis, the scientificity, that is, the
justification, for commencing scholarly research. The extent to which International
Relations, as a social science discipline, is itself considered a science brings about more
questions than answers: is it a continuing attempt to attain scientific credentials for its
knowledge-accumulation, or a stubborn march toward scientificitness that is, itself,
controversial? The broad and intense debate of what science is, and whether IR should or
can be a science, has consumed the discipline in gauging such questions as: what is the
1

nature of theory and concept; what is the nature of inquiry; what is the nature of
knowledge-accumulation; what is the nature of explanation; what is the nature of
causation; so on and so forth (Bull 1969; Kaplan 1969; Reynolds 1973; Waltz 1979;
Ogley 1981; Ferguson and Mansbach 1988; Nicholson 1996; Wendt 1999).
The legitimation for research and inquiry, then, has required IR to justify this very
legitimation by relying on philosophy of science. Namely, since it is the scope of its
scientificity that legitimates mainstream IR scholarship, adherence to the logic and
method of science, itself, must address the concerns of what is science and scientific
inquiry in relation to the social science of international relations. Philosophy of science as
legitimation (Wight 2002), then, has offered a robust and powerful framework in
addressing the two concerns posed above: the nature of undertaking specific topical
research and the meta-theoretical justification for undertaking such research.
Concomitantly, for the research project at hand, in the relationship between the normative
and the empirical, the structural and the historical, the conceptual and the analytical, and
more importantly, between the theoretical and the factual, the following serves an
axiomatic premise: facts are what matter and theory is simply a better way of collecting
them (Gunnell 1975).
Topic and Research Question
Historically, the power configurations of world political systems, structurally,
have been defined by four formations: multipolarity, tripolarity, bipolarity, and
unipolarity. The concept of nonpolarity, however, has never been addressed as a possible
or a potential structural formulation in the nomenclature of world/global political
systems. The reason for this may be as followed. Since considerations of hegemony and
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polarity are generally undertaken by proponents of (neo)realism, or world-systems/world
system scholars who also rely on the traditional taxonomy of polarity, nonpolarity would
create both paradigmatic and conceptual-analytical complications, since the absence of
poles indicates absence of hegemon(s), which either negates positional and structural
considerations inherent to the above specified paradigmatic approaches, or marginalizes
considerations of the balance of power thesis which also necessitates the presence of
polar structures. Concomitantly, paradigmatic approaches that account for system-wide
hegemons, along with scholarly attention to forms of polarity, are not and will not be able
to address and explain the structure of a nonpolar system.
Since the discipline lacks a coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity, which, in
turn, thoroughly limits the development of a robust theoretical model that can contribute
to the study of polar structures and world political systems, the general intent of this
project is to address this puzzle of nonpolarity. The second deficiency in the discipline is
the dearth of scholarly attention to a systematized consideration of structural
transformations, including the structural transition of the system after unipolarity.
Specifically, the field lacks any research that addresses observable and systematized
patterns of transitions between modalities of polar structures (unipolarity specifically)
within world political systems. As such, no probabilistic assumptions may be presented to
gauge the power configurations of a system after unipolar structural transition. The
research presented here is primarily concerned with assessing the structural outcomes of
systems after a unipolar period. In sum, an important puzzle remains to be addressed in
the study of polarity, the structures of system-wide power configurations, and the
subsequent outcome within the system after structural (unipolar) transitions.

3

Specific Research Question: What is the polar structuration (power
configurations) of a system after unipolar transitions? Concomitantly, should a
system transition into a nonpolar structure, how can this phenomenon be
explained and accounted for?
A practical question, consistent with the justificatory and legitimation discourse
presented above, may be asked with respect to this project: does polarity matter? The
answer to this is three-fold. First, polarity matters when attempting to formulate, analyze,
and gauge the short-term policies of powerful actors within a world/global political
system. For example, after the Cold War, the policy of the United States, as the single
system-wide hegemon within the existing unipolar structure, was whether to utilize
American preponderance and preserve the unipolar epoch, or to engage in revisionist
behavior and transition the system into a multipolar structure—such as, for example, the
attempt by the U.S. during the bipolar Cold War structure to position China as a third
pole and balance it against the USSR. The underlying arguments were based upon the
nature and outcome of the different power configurations of the system: if unipolarity is
unstable, then the U.S. should formulate policies that allow other actors to become
system-wide hegemons in order to form a multipolar system, which may be more stable.
If, however, unipolar structures are stable (and relatively peaceful), then U.S. dominance
should be preserved as the only system-wide hegemon. This indicates several highly
distinct and diverse policy stratagems: concentration of power, utilization of resources,
diplomatic endeavors, international obligations, and all other modes of state behavior.
Simply put, policies change in accordance to whether the system is bipolar (a primary
concentration of resources against a single opposing pole), multipolar (a balance of
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resources against or with several poles), unipolar (selective concentration of resources
contingent on outcome), or nonpolar (diffusion of power and dispersion of resources
against or with numerically high actors, where balancing is untenable). Policy
formulation, then, becomes heavily contingent upon the power configurations of the
system.
Secondly, polarity matters because it shapes the policies of other states within the
system that are regional/sub-system hegemons, or potentially rising powers with
ambitions of being system-wide hegemons. For example, European actors such as United
Kingdom, France and Germany, or Asian states such as China, South Korea, and Japan,
would have to articulate policy that is either consistent with U.S. unipolarity, or
hypothetical China-U.S. bipolarity, or a multipolar configuration with the U.S. and few
other actors. So if the system was bipolar (China-US), would Europe continue
bandwagoning (policy in unipolar structure), engage in polarization (join US as policy in
a bipolar structure), attempt to be revisionist (seeking multipolarity), or remain nonaligned? The polar structuration of the system plays a crucial role in answering such
questions.
Thirdly, polarity matters because it allows for the formulation of long-term, grand
strategies, which may be of profound importance to the future peace and stability of the
global system. If system-wide hegemon(s) seeks to preserve or alter/revise given polar
structures, what would be the consequence for the rest of the countries involved in the
system? If states are able to gauge what the potential consequences are to their interests
based on the power configuration that the system might take, how does this affect their
positioning and policy formulations? For example, if China is anticipating a bipolar
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structure, then its policy would necessitate massive concentration of resources against the
opposing pole; but if it is anticipating a multipolar structure, its policies and behavior
would have to be multidimensional; while if it is preparing for a nonpolar system, then its
preparations and strategic endeavors will once again have to be vastly different. Since the
structure of the system is the environment within which a state functions, the conditions
(modality) of this environment (polar structure) is fundamental to the security, economic
health, and positional status of states. Simply put, even when considering practical,
mainstream concerns—not to mention academic theory-building and hypothesis testing—
polarity matters.
Literature Review
The extant literature on polarity within the international/global system finds
extensive concentration on four modes of polarity—unipolarity, bipolarity, tripolarity,
and multipolarity—along with the analytical utilization of the balance-of-power concept.
Kaplan’s (1958) formulation of equilibrium and stability within the system is a classic
and a comprehensive conceptualization of balance-of-power theory, based upon the
works of Liska (1957) and Gulick (1955), and consistent with the traditional realism of
Morgenthau (1993), and the research of Claude (1962), and Wolfers (1962). These
authors consider relations between powerful states as primarily defined by delicate power
balancing in order to sustain the status quo, that is, equilibrium. In his power transition
theory, Organski (1958) focuses on the specific modes of wars and international conflicts
that are produced between declining hegemons and rising challengers, but still relying,
very much like Carr (1951), on status quo satisfaction as crucial for the stability of the
system. Treatments of systems stability is also undertaken by Waltz (1964) and
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Rosecrance (1966), addressing the characteristics and dynamics of different polar
systems, and how given attributes of polarity affect the stability (gauged by warproneness) and longevity of the system’s structure. Deutsch and Singer (1964)
demonstrate that “interaction opportunities” and dispersion of resources decrease the
probability of conflict as the number of poles increase in the system. As such,
multipolarity is deemed more stable and peaceful than bipolarity. Wallerstein’s (1974)
world-systems approach interjects an important economics dynamic into gauging the
global system as a three-tiered structure accounting for the interactions between states
within a hierarchy of material power.
Neoliberalism partakes in the discourse by addressing the role of the world
economy, and how the distribution of economic power and the rules governing
international economic institutions have been vital to the process of international political
change with respect to inter-superpower relations (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane
1984). Modelski (1978) offered a cyclical explanation of power transition, a process
which includes counterhegemonic coalitions, arms buildup, hegemonic war, and system
renewal. Waltz’s (1979) structural realism provides a systemic treatment of polar
positioning, where the behavior of powerful states is constrained and shaped by the
system, thus viewing the multipolar balance-of power structure as the most volatile and
recurring in history, since states constantly counterbalance against other powers and
position themselves accordingly. Rapkin et al (1979) contribute to the debate by
elucidating the conceptual, definitional, and measurement problems related to the
concepts of polarity and polarization, introducing empirical tests that gauge polarization,
or the formulation of poles, as being developed in degrees (high, moderate, or low
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polarization). Gilpin’s (1981) work on change in the international system concentrates on
revisionist rising power(s) balancing and challenging the system-wide hegemon(s) when
the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Once this challenge is materialized, the
equilibrium in the international system is disturbed, with the resulting change in the
system reflecting the new distribution of power and a resolution to the disequilibrium. In
sum, the post-WWII/Cold War era approached research on polarity either through
multipolar vs. bipolar models, conceptual and measurement controversies, or specific
development of systems analysis to account for an international system that has two or
more poles.
The end of the Cold War brought about the expansive debate over unipolarity,
with the debate revolving around modes of counterbalancing (Levy 2003) against the
unipole, ranging from traditional considerations (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993, 2006;
Waltz 2000) to soft-balancing (Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Ikenberry 2002; Layne 2006), to
scholarly disputes over durability/stability (Wohlforth 1999; Waltz 1993; Wohlforth and
Brooks 2008), peacefulness (Kupchan 1998; Ikenberry 2011a; Monteiro 2012), and
structural coherence (Jervis 2006, 2009) of the new unipolar system (Krauthammer 1991;
Ikenberry et al 2011). Layne (1993) contends that the current unipolar system is defined
by American preponderance, where rising powers, instead of engaging in revisionist
behavior, are persuaded to bandwagon (Schweller 1994). These states, however, engage
in “leash-slipping,” where they do not fear the superpower and build their own
capabilities to conduct their own policies (Layne 2006). Such modes of counterbalancing,
along with the differential resource growth of rising power(s) will inevitably give way to
a multipolar structure. Nye (2002), Walt (2005) and Ikenberry (2011a) contend that the
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preponderance of the unipole is not temporary, that contingent on its international
obligations, alliances, and institutional arrangements, system-wide hegemonic status may
be preserved. Wohlforth (1999) joins the critique against neorealism’s assumption that
the unipole engages in “unconstrained” activities (Mastanduno 1997), or that unipolarity
is either temporary, unstable, or prone to return to multipolarity (Waltz 1997;
Mastanduno and Kapstein 1999), arguing that the lack of counterbalancing, continued
international cooperation, and absence of any foreseeable hegemonic rivalry suggests the
continued preservation of the unipolar system. The overarching debate, then, has been
over skepticism toward the stability of unipolarity (Posen and Ross 1997), along with the
contention that a return to multipolarity is inevitable; only to be countered by claims that
the unipolar structure generates fewer incentives for hegemonic status competition,
conflict, and instability (Wohlforth 2011).
Finnemore (2011) holds that the strength of the unipolar system is not only
dependent on material capabilities, but also on the social system that the unipole
constructs, where its values and hegemonic status are legitimated. This is somewhat
similar to treatment of the contemporary unipolar system as being cosmopolitanized
(Held 1996; Cabrera 2004; Appiah 2007), legalistic (Goldstein et al 2001),
constitutionalist, and defined by liberal values (Ikenberry 2011a), where the system-wide
hegemon engages in strategic restraint as opposed to overt aggression (2001). Schweller
and Pu (2011) disagree with these assessments, contending that the unipolar system will
soon transform into a modified multipolar structure, where it will not be defined by
traditional balancing, but rather by shirking. Jervis (2009) portrays the unipolar system as
stable, but not necessarily peaceful (only hegemonic war is absent), indicating that
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outcomes are generated not so much by systemic determinants, but by the (revisionist)
behavior and values generated by the unipole. Walt (2011) emphasizes the utilization of
loose alliances by the unipole to reinforce the system, where balance-of-threat replaces
balance-of-power, and the systemic constraint upon the unipole becomes limited. Posen
(2011) argues that the unipolar system, due to an “undisciplined” unipole and diffusion of
power, is waning, and multipolarity will become the subsequent global structure. Legro
(2011) sums up the debate by holding that the very concept of polarity has been
“overvalued,” that polarity, itself, is a product of state choice, and while it has some
relevance, it is not the “kingmaker of causation” (344).
With the body of research demonstrating a great deal of focus on unipolarity, and
multipolarity as the inevitable structural transition, the extant literature displays a dearth
of work on nonpolarity. Haass (2008) is the first to initiate a discussion on nonpolarity,
contending that the post-unipolar system will not revert to multipolarity, as most claim,
but rather to a nonpolar structure, where power will not be concentrated amongst several
system-wide hegemons, but diffused throughout the globe, which may include dozens of
centers of power. Schweller and Pu (2011) touch upon nonpolarity as a possible outcome,
but prefer multipolarity and shirking. Wilkinson (1987, 1999b) includes nonpolarity as
one of possible structures in his taxonomy, yet refrains from conceptualizing a systemic
framework (2004). Utilizing the concept of entropy, Schweller (2010) contends that the
random and indeterminate nature of the current unipolar system will come to be defined
by the system’s process, as opposed to its structure, relying more on specific unit-level
characteristics as opposed to structural determinants. Due to the absence of constraint on
the unipole, the global system will witness increased randomness and disorder. As the
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system attains maximum entropy, power capabilities will be diffused into a multipolar
structure, but one where none of the actors will have any incentive to alter their
condition. Schweller’s conclusion, then, is a modification of multipolarity as a diffused,
disordered (non-hierarchic) structure, yet not one which can be classified as nonpolar.

Composition of this Work
The main objectives of this project may be deemed to be three-fold. First, to
engage in knowledge-accumulation by undertaking original research through a
systematized consideration of structural transformations, especially during unipolar and
post-unipolar periods. Second, to discover new findings by observing probabilistic
outcomes vis-à-vis the power configurations of a system, and assessing how this can
contribute to practical policy formulation or have policy implications. And third, to
contribute to the discipline by introducing an original conceptualization of nonpolarity,
which, in turn, may contribute to the development of a robust theoretical model that can
enrich the political and scientific study of polar structures and world/global political
system(s).
As the body of literature suggests scholarly attention on the subject matter at hand
remains extremely limited, and the discipline remains absent of the tools necessary to
address possible anomalies and puzzles should the existing unipolar epoch come to an
end. The originality of this project has both academic implications as well as practical
implications. Academically, studies of polarity and power-relations will be introduced to
findings that have never been undertaken, thus presenting new data and knowledgeaccumulation for the discipline. Practically, considerations of long-term and short-term
state policy may be more coherently formulated by hinging such policies upon
11

probabilistic assessments and possible predictions based on historic evidence and
statistical findings.
The composition of this project will begin with an introduction to the underlying
logic for undertaking this research, explaining and elucidating the main research
question, the relevance of this research to the field of study concerned, and how the
anticipated findings will contribute to future debate and research. An extensive literature
review is also incorporated within the relevant themes being addressed in their respective
chapter, thus providing exposure of how this project fits within the larger picture.
Chapter 2 provides explanations, clarifications, and in-depth analyses of the
overarching conceptual models that will be utilized in this work. Definitional
considerations of polarity, hegemony, system-wide and sub-system hegemonic actors,
and unipolarity are addressed. This is supplemented by a comprehensive treatment of
how each conceptual framework fits into the general argument, and how it further
strengthens the overarching theoretical model. This chapter also includes a discussion on
nonpolarity, defining, explaining, and elaborating on the conceptual models that are being
proposed.
Chapter 3 discusses the methodological design of this project, how it fuses
qualitative, semi-quantitative (descriptive statistics), and analytical methods in testing
and gauging the coherence of this research project. Historic systems analysis, political
history, selective process-tracing, and the operationalization of the case studies through
descriptive and semi-quantitative analysis will be addressed. This introduces the reader to
the original categorization of world political systems, explaining what qualifies and
constitutes a world system in this work. Furthermore, it explains how potential
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controversial or non-obvious observations utilized for specific cases will be resolved in
order to refute competing hypotheses, while providing explanatory and conceptual clarity
to the interpretations presented. This chapter will then proceed to demonstrate the multitiered data gathering process.
Chapter 4 will begin the data collection portion of the research by addressing the
cases through historic system’s analysis and the historiographical method of
macropolitical history. This chapter will cover the Far Eastern World Political System.
The power configurations of each polar epoch, within this world political system, will be
categorized and assessed, contributing to the collection of data on unipolar and postunipolar periods. Extensive descriptive statistics will be provided after the conclusion of
the case studies for each world political system. This will include bars, charts, diagrams,
and other visual tools. The data will then be analyzed, assessing trends, probabilistic
patterns, non-obvious facts, and possible new findings.
Similar to the same organizational and structural approach of the previous
chapter, Chapter 5 continues the collection of data on polar structures by undertaking a
case study of the Near East-Middle Eastern World Political System. Chapter 6 further
continues the data collection process by covering the Indic World Political System. This
is followed by the Mediterranean World Political System in Chapter 7 and the Global
Political System in Chapter 8. The Middle East-Near Eastern System and the
Mediterranean System follow each other to allow for the observation of a system’s
absorption, separation, and re-formulation within a specific geographic region, yet during
different and continuous historic periods. Similar to the methodological treatment of
other world political systems, the Middle East-Near Eastern System and the
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Mediterranean System will be studied through historic system’s analysis and the
historiographical method of political history, along with selective utilization of process
tracing. Extensive descriptive statistics will be provided for each world political system,
allowing for the analysis of trends, patterns, and probabilistic considerations.
Chapter 8 concludes the case studies of world political systems by addressing the
European System from the 1500’s and how its expansion provides for the formation of
the Global Political System. These systems are synthesized in this chapter to allow for the
observation of absorption and continuity, since it was the expansion of the European
powers that gave way to a globalizing world. The formulation of the European System
during the early Middle Ages, as the historical and systemic consequence for the
establishment of a Global Political System, is not addressed in this work, but rather, the
European System of the 1500’s is incorporated in the Global Political System. Consistent
with the methodological framework of this project, historic system’s analysis and
political history (and process tracing) is utilized, along with descriptive statistics and
analysis of the data.
Chapter 9 concludes this work by displaying all the findings of this research
project, specifically the number of unipolar structures that were observed in all the world
political systems, the subsequent structure that the system took after transition, and the
extent to which nonpolar systems are found. The aggregate descriptive statistics are also
displayed, demonstrating the probabilistic outcomes, and the relationship between
unipolar structures and the power configuration that the system subsequently formulates.
This chapter also offers guidance for future research on the topic, addressessing the
concepts of interaction opportunities, dispersion of resources, and entropy to

14

systematically observe how the nonpolar systems functions, what the specific structural
attributes are, and how well will the applied concepts hold when faced with the empirical
facts from the historical evidence. This chapter will then conclude by probabilistically
suggesting what the post-US unipolar system might look like, what the attributes and
characteristics of the system may be, and what policy implications this may have for the
United States as it prepares for a world after polarity.
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CHAPTER 2
BETWEEN THE CONCEPTUAL AND THE METHODOLOGICAL: THE
OVERARCHING ARGUMENT
As the literature review in the previous chapter suggests, the vast body of research
on structural, systemic, and even reductionist (intra-polar) studies of polarity, hegemony,
superpowers/world powers, or any other conceptualization of system-wide dominant
actors, primarily revolves around four distinct modes of analysis. The first mode of
analysis relies on the tenets of neorealism, addressing state behavior in relation to the
system and how the structure of the system shapes and predicts behavior, thus attributing
structural consequences to the very characteristics of the structure. Examples of this
mode of analysis include considerations of how states behave in bipolar, multipolar, or
unipolar structures in relation to positioning, balancing, and distribution of resources
(material capabilities). The second mode of analysis, contemporary in nature, addresses
the post-Cold War unipolar structure, either suggesting the coherence and durability of
this system, or its inevitable instability and decay. It includes much attention on strategies
of resistance or insulation with respect to the unipole’s overwhelming power, alliances
and alignments, and the use of international institutions. The third mode of analysis reconceptualizes the Global Political System as evolved and distinct from the previous
systems, thus deeming American unipolarity as liberal, constitutionalist, and therefore,
consistent with peace and longevity. The fourth mode of analysis is primarily
reductionist, addressing not so much inter-polar and structural considerations, but rather
the internal dynamics and characteristics of the given system-wide hegemon. This
approach is broadly incorporated into systemic, cyclical, and transitional treatments of
the structure and modalities of polarity. In sum, the majority of scholarly treatments of
16

polarity, hegemony, or world power(s)—this project uses the term system-wide
hegemon—are primarily concerned with either the behavior of actors within a structure,
the attributes of the system under different structures, and more recently, the nature,
scope, and structuration of unipolarity.
Concomitantly, two deficiencies are diagnosed within the study of this field that
can potentially not only fill a serious gap, but also strengthen the theoretical, conceptual,
and systemic analytical tools utilized in the study of polar structures. The first gap in
scholarly research is the absence of any developed treatments of nonpolarity as a
structural mode within a system. Categorical taxonomy primarily revolves around the
obvious structures of uni-, bi-, tri-, or multi- polar considerations. The field lacks a
coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity, which thoroughly limits the development of a
robust theoretical model that can enrich the study of polar structures and world political
systems. The second deficiency is the shortage of scholarly attention to a systematized
consideration of structural transformations, especially the outcome of what the structure
of the system transitions into after unipolarity. Specifically, previous studies have not
examined patterns of transitions between modalities of polar structures (unipolarity
specifically) within world/global political systems. As such, no probabilistic assumptions
can be presented that gauges the power configurations of a system after unipolar
structural transition. Some research, for example, explains why great powers rise and fall,
how the structure shapes and restrains this process, how stable, peaceful, or durable a
given polar structure is, and what the characteristics, dynamics, and attributes are of
given structural systems. There is no research, however, that observes and attempts to
explain historical patterns in such structural transitions, what the likely structural
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outcome may be after a unipolar period, or the number of unipolar periods that all the
world political systems in history have formed and what the consequent systemic
structure has transitioned into after the unipolar period.
Lacking any research on the above-posed questions, there is a serious gap in
evaluating and determining transitional patterns and probabilistic outcomes. Related to
this is the absence of a theoretical framework that explains, assesses, and methodically
conceptualizes the structure of nonpolarity. As such, there are no conceptualizations of
any periods within world political systems that have had nonpolar epochs. Furthermore,
one cannot assess after which structural mode of polarity the nonpolar system forms, and
what the characteristics and dynamics are of a nonpolar structure. While the research
question here is primarily concerned with what the Global Political System looks like
after a unipolar period, the scholarly realm, however, remains analytically inept and
limited should the systemic consequences be of nonpolarity. To this end, important
puzzles remain to be addressed in the study of polarity, the structures of system-wide
power configurations, and the subsequent outcome within the system after structural
(unipolar) transitions. In short, what happens to international systems after polarity?
Research Design
The research interest of this dissertation is to conceptualize, test, and analyze the
power configurations or systemic political structures of the given world political systems,
specifically selecting moments within such systems where unipolarity was formed and
the subsequent power configurations and systemic structures that were formulated after
the end of the unipolar period. The objective is to observe what power configuration the
end of the unipolar system transitioned into—unipolarity, bipolarity, tripolarity,
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multipolarity, or nonpolarity—and if the ensuing political power constellation is defined
by nonpolarity, whether a discernible pattern may be ascertained through the observed
historic epochs where unipolarity gave way to nonpolarity.
Case Selections
The criteria for case selections will be two-fold, as the discussion below will
provide further elaboration on the methodological approach. First, the over-arching case
study will be a specific world political system within a given historic epoch (the period
from the system’s inception to its end). Since the intent is to include all world political
systems throughout history for which data exists, the selection of these overarching case
studies will be expansive and robust, mitigating concerns of selection bias. Second,
within the overarching case studies, the primary concentration will be on historic
epochs/periods within world political systems where the power configurations of the
system were defined by unipolarity. In this sense, case selection will be determined by
the unipolar structuration of the given world political system. Epochs during which the
system is defined by bipolarity, tripolarity, or multipolarity will also be included, but with
limited attention with respect to in-depth analysis, since the objective is to observe the
consequences and the developments within world political systems at the end of the
unipolar structure. Fundamentally, since this project is concerned with finding patterns of
polar structures after the end of unipolar periods, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar systems
will be considered only to the extent to which such factors contribute to the scope and
interest of the research question at hand.
This criteria-orientation for case selection naturally brings forth the ubiquitous
meta-theoretical concern of the agent-structure problematique. To alleviate the

19

problematique, a three-tiered explanatory framework is proposed. First, the
conceptualization of system is designated to the given world/global political system
under consideration. In this sense, the explanatory framework presupposes the system as
being any of the given world/global political systems being studied. Second, the structure
remains the given configuration that takes place within the system, that is, its power
constellation/polar configuration. The formulation of the set power configurations
constitutes the structure within the system under consideration. Third, the agent, then,
within the proposed framework, is the political unit/actor under consideration, that is, the
system-wide (rising sub-system) hegemon(s) whose behavior gives way to the
formulation of the structure itself. The agent-structure problematique, then, is addressed
through the power configuration (structure) of the political system which, as stated, is
shaped and formed by system-wide hegemon(s) (agent). Contributing to this explanatory
framework is the infusion of temporal and chronological observations through the notion
of polar epochs. Polar periods, in this context, are the power constellations (structure) of
the system during a given time-period in the history of the given world/global political
system. To this end, the two-tiered criteria for case selection relies on the proposed
explanatory framework to account for the system (the world/global political system as the
over-arching case study), the power constellations/configurations as the structure (case
study within the system), the system-wide, or rising sub-system, hegemon(s) as the agent,
and the polar epochs/periods as the chronological historic phases where the agent
shapes/alters/defines the structure within the given system.
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Methodology
A four-tiered methodological approach is utilized in this project. Each method
will lexically follow the other, for the coherence and tenability of the second approach is
based on the first, and the operationalization of the third approach is based on the first
and second methods.


Historic political systems analysis



Political history method within-cases



Descriptive statistical analysis of polarity structuration, formation of unipolar
systems, and subsequent nonpolar structures.



Probabilistic calculations of the findings.

Historical Systems Analysis.
Loosely noting the works of Wilkinson (1987,1995, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2004),
with attention to Chase-Dunn et al (2000), Cioffi-Revilla and Landman (1999), and
Thompson (2002), along with much appreciation for Wallerstein (1989, 1992) and Frank
and Gills (1996), historic systems analysis will be utilized to provide criteria and
analytical space in categorizing world political systems and the historic epochs that the
system goes through, with specific concentration on the unipolar epoch and the
subsequent structure of the given world political system during and after unipolarity.
While these authors use comparative-historical systems analysis, which is consistent with
both world system and world-systems approach, the approach presented in this project
refrains from basing its research project on such foundations. Namely, the unit of analysis
is the structure of the system, third level imagery. The approach, however, does not
follow the systemic approach of either world system or world-systems analysis. The
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criterion of what constitutes a system fundamentally differs, as does the categorization of
world political systems and historic epochs. This is why this project uses the term world
political system(s). This given approach, however, does draw insights from their
concentration on historical case studies and the presence of distinct historic systems
(although it offers distinct categorizations as this project will demonstrate).
Paradigmatically, “world-systems,” “world system,” and “world political
systems” are conceptual terms that categorize spatial-territorial dimensions of human
history within specified and criteria-oriented designation of geo-political, geo-economic,
and civilizational structurations. The “world system” approach, for example, conceives
the entire history of socio-economic interactions between politico-economic units as a
single world system, and as such, it conceptualizes a single world system in the history of
humanity. By virtue of concentrating on economic interaction, trade, and accumulation,
regardless of magnitude or the existence of political attributes, categorization of a system,
as a world system, is confined into a single, continuous world system throughout the
history of organized human activity. Within this paradigmatic approach, there are no
world systems (that is, several world systems in history), or world-systems, but rather, a
single world system throughout the entire history of organized human economic activity
(Gills and Frank 1996; Frank and Gills 1996).
Operationally, this world system approach is limited and incompatible with the
conceptual framework of this project for three reasons. First, by virtue of gauging
criteria-orientation on material and economic attributes (primarily trade), thus
minimalizing the political, treatments of power configurations become fundamentally
marginalized. Second, by presupposing a singular world system, analytical space for
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categorizing geo-political and civilizational developments of non-connected parts of the
world remains inapplicable. Third, by virtue of the first two limitations, it becomes
impossible to analyze the formulation of world political systems and the power
constellations of such systems, since analytical reductionism becomes confined to a
single world system and its inchoate, yet marginally connected, economic activities.
Contrary to this uni-dimensional approach, the research at hand conceptualizes different
world political systems contingent on the spatial-territorial dimensions of the geopolitical and inter/intra-civilizational structures of each system. Furthermore, to offer
more robustness to the criteria at hand, mere economic/trade connectedness between
systems is expanded by analysis of the absorption of one system by another, thus
providing a more coherent and inclusive model for system’s analysis. The notion of a
single world system, however, is not rejected. The counter-argument presented here is
that a single world system, termed as the Global Political System, came into being after
all the world political systems interacted and became absorbed into a single Global
Political System. Not, as the world system approach holds, that a single world/global
system existed from the very outset. In this sense, the world system approach
presupposes a single Global Political System throughout human history, while this work
rejects that assessment, contending that multitude of world political systems existed
throughout history, and a single Global Political System came into being only when all
the world political systems were continuously absorbed into a single global structure.
The world-systems approach, on the other hand, is distinct from the world system
approach, and while its designation criteria is somewhat similar to the world political
systems approach presented here, the criteria-orientation and analytical categorization of
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what constitutes a world-system sharply differs from world political systems. The
distinction between the world system and world-systems approach is articulated by
Wallerstein (1996):
They speak of a “world system.” I speak of “world-system.” I use a
hyphen; they do not. I use the plural; they do not. They use the singular
because, for them, there is and has been one world system through all
of historic time and space. For me there have been very many worldsystems…My “world system” is not a system “in the world” or “of a
world.” It is a system “that is a world.” Hence the hyphen, since “world”
is not an attribute of the system. Rather the two words together constitute
a single concept. Frank and Gill’s system is a world system in an
attributive sense, in that it has been tending over time to cover the
whole world. They cannot conceive of multiple “world systems”
coexisting on the planet (294-295).

The categorical stipulation of several systems having existed in the world as
opposed to a single continuous system remains a consistent theme between world-systems
and world political systems. The distinction between these two approaches, however, is
four-fold. First, world-systems theorists, when speaking of world-systems, are in essence
speaking of world economic systems. The criteria-orientation of what constitutes a
system is fundamentally hinged on the economic structure (division of labor, etc.) of the
formulated system at hand. Second, consistent with the Marxist tradition, world-systems
reduces treatments of system’s analysis to an economic genesis, and as such, the
conceptualization of the system presupposes the political as an extension of the
economical, as opposed to vice versa. Third, designation of what constitutes a system is
framed within the framework of material trans-civilizational exchanges, where division
of labor incorporates peoples and societies into the world-system. This ignores the
political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for systemwide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the given system.
24

Namely, competition is over economic power, not political power. Fourthly, whereas the
world political systems approach presupposes the fusion of political and economic
attributes as a singular power framework that accounts for the hegemonic actor(s)’
rationale for dominance, the world-systems approach gauges structural hierarchy within a
center-periphery complex. This latter approach, also consistent with the world system
approach, presupposes economic hierarchy over political hierarchy, as opposed to
conceiving a dialectical synthesis between the two: attainment of power (and not just a
myopic consideration of economic power). In sum, great distinction lies in the economicsociological approach of world-systems analysis, where analytical depth is provided
toward conceptualizing the division of labor at the systemic level, as opposed to power
configurations in relation to political hierarchies. As such, whereas a system, within
world-systems analysis, refers to a socioeconomic system; this project, categorically,
considers the political, or macro-political, structures of a system, and thus defines a
system within the context of political and system-wide hegemonic dynamics within a
synthesized conceptualization of power.
Until the 1600’s, a coherent conceptualization of a single world/global system
does not exist, for interaction between civilizations, world political systems, and different
system-wide hegemons was either rare or almost non-existent. For example, the
Mediterranean World Political System, historically, does not define the known world, it
is not the only world/global system, and as such, structural treatments of the
consequences of a system after unipolarity cannot be limited to Eurocentric historicism.
Specifically, prior to the formulation of a Global Political System, where all the powerful
countries of the world had knowledge and political, diplomatic, economic, and even
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military interaction with one another, world political systems existed with its set of
civilizations, political actors, and power configurations. This system delimited their
conceptualization of the world (this was their political world); as the Mediterranean
civilizations conceptualized Europe, and then the Near East-Middle Eastern System, after
its absorption, to be their known world (Chapter 5). The objective is to categorize world
political systems that were isolated or had limited interaction with other world political
systems, where each system had its own specific inter-civilizational interactions, system
of independent political entities (states, kingships, empires, etc.), and power
configurations, where which given political entities within the system served as units
seeking to restructure the existing system by positioning themselves as system-wide
hegemons.
As an example, the Middle East-Near Eastern World Political System may be
considered, with its historic epoch from 2600-300 B.C. This world political system did
not define the known world, yet it was a coherent world political system in and of itself,
separate from, for example, the Indic World Political System in South Asia, or the rising
Mediterranean World Political System of the Greece-Balkan-Asia Minor region. Historic
systems analysis allows for the categorization of different world political systems during
different historic epochs, separately observing and diagnosing the structural transitions
and modes of polarity for each given world political system. Thus, during this historic
epoch, the Mediterranean System was in its infantile stages of forming a world political
system of independent political actors and structural power configurations, while the
Middle East-Near Eastern System already had system-wide hegemons in the forms of
Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Hittites, etc., with its system’s structure shifting from

26

multipolarity, to bipolarity, to unipolarity, and as analysis will demonstrate, to
nonpolarity. Thus, to limit the analytical scope to the Mediterranean World Political
System, for example, as the only world system, would be inherently myopic and
historically blind, while to view the Middle Eastern-Near Eastern System as the only
world/global system for this given historic epoch (ignoring, for example, Indic and Far
Eastern world systems) is equally problematic. To this end, a concerted effort will be
made to analyze all the world political systems for which historic data exist, categorizing
each system within the historic epochs that it existed, and observing the formulation of
poles as structural political configurations within each system, with specific
concentration on the periods of unipolarity and the structural consequences for the system
after the end of unipolarity. In this sense, since formulations of polarity are structural
developments within a system, to coherently gauge what the consequences are for a given
system after the end of unipolarity, research cannot be limited to a single world political
system, but must rather consider the entire historical context. The analytical scope,
however, will revert to a systems analysis that encompasses the entire globe after the
1500’s, where the different world political systems had come to interact with one another,
thus creating a single Global Political System.
A system primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra civilizational
relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between political
units/entities/actors within the region that the given world political system encompasses.
This fundamentally presupposes a group of political units/entities/actors having relations
that are, to a strong degree, permanent or continuous with one another. Spatialterritorially, a system covers a specific geographical area, but to specify set regional and
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territorial boundaries in absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political
system will obscure the reality of the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be
flexible, with political entities at the periphery at times being incorporated in the system,
and at times being absent from the system. System’s classification, then, does not
specifically rely on establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering the
political contacts, interactions, and power configurations of system-wide hegemons that
function within the region that the given system encompasses. The following example
will provide more clarity.
The Indic System World Political System primarily refers to the political
interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide
hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region of the Indian
subcontinent, or the region of South Asia. Its regional boundaries tend to be flexible, as
political entities on the periphery or external to the system may encroach into the system,
thus creating temporary contact (political contact as it pertains to power relations)
between world political systems. For example, Afghanistan tends to be on the periphery,
yet it is part of the Indic System, while Persia, bordered on the periphery, is considered to
be part of the Middle East-Near Eastern System. In cases where the Persian Empire
encroaches into the Indic System and becomes a system-wide hegemonic actor, it is then
considered to be part of the power configurations of the system. As such, from time to
time, encroachment by external actors into the system is anticipated. Yet this remains
ephemeral and does not indicate the absorption of one system into another. The case of
Alexander the Great’s conquest of Bactria (modern Afghanistan and Pakistan) is a case in
point. This was a temporary infringement by the Macedonians, and did not lead to the
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incorporation of the Indic System into any other world political system. As such, for the
sake of historical accuracy, the infringement of powers outside of the system into the
system will be taken into consideration. But this will be treated in two ways: either the
system is conquered and absorbed into another system, thus ending the given system
(such as Britain’s colonization of India and the absorption of the Indic System into the
Global Political System), or outside power(s) become absorbed into the given world
political system and remain part of it as one of its poles (Mughal system-wide hegemonic
status and its absorption into the Indic System). To this end, systems analysis utilized in
this project considers the temporal, spatial, and conceptual formulation of what
constitutes a system, fundamentally relying on macro-political developments, power
configurations, and the structural transition that the system undergoes.
The Methodology of Political History and Selective Utilization of Process-Tracing
Political history is a historiographical method that refers to the study of political
events based on narrative, critical analysis, evaluation, and empirical examination of
historic facts, developments, and outcomes. The objective is to articulate an objective and
logically-consistent narrative that accounts for and explains historical developments and
outcomes of specific political phenomena in given historic periods (Elton 1967, 1970;
Pocock 2005; Fielding 2007). The specific concentration of this historiographical
approach is on the political dimensions of history (Trevelyan 1978), for political history,
among other things, is the study of the organization and operation of power (Burke 1985).
Since the purpose of this project is to observe centers of power, system-wide hegemons
within given world political systems, the historiographical method of political history will
serve as a method in describing, explaining, and accounting for the modes of polar
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structures within given systems. As such, for the purpose of this project, specific attention
will be applied to macro-political developments and outcomes. In this sense, the political
historic approach will be elevated to third level imagery. This approach is consistent with
the qualitative method of “thick analysis:” interpretive and descriptive work that places
great reliance on detailed knowledge of cases (Collier et al 2010). Concomitantly, the
scope of this project anticipates a large-N, since perhaps hundreds of observations will be
formulated based on qualitative/narrative analysis. This is consistent with the works of
Tilly (1993) and Collier (1999).
Process-tracing will be utilized as a supplemental approach for specific periods
within given world political systems where controversial or alternative explanatory
hypotheses exist. Process-tracing is “the examination of diagnostic pieces of evidence,
commonly evaluated in a specific temporal sequence, with the goal of supporting or
overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses” (Collier et al 2010, 201). Process tracing
inherently analyzes trajectories of change and causation where the phenomena observed
at each step in this trajectory are adequately described and accounted for (Collier 2011).
Since many of the historic epochs and the power configurations within the given world
political systems will not present non-obvious, controversial, or alternative hypothesis or
interpretations, process-tracing will not by utilized as a supplemental approach to the
political history method. Only during cases where such concerns of controversy are
present will process-tracing be implemented to account for the formulation of unipolarity
(or nonpolarity): relying on causal-inferences (Bennett 2010) and sequences (Mahoney
2010) within the tracing process to account for the subsequent outcome of the world
political system’s structure upon the end of the unipolar epoch.
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Thus, for example, the selected historic epoch and world political system is the 4th
century B.C. Mediterranean World Political System, where the historiographical method
of political history, elevated to the macro level, will be utilized to account for the
formulation of Macedonia as a system-wide hegemon, explaining the systemic structure,
inter-subsystem and system-wide hegemonic conflict, and the ultimate positioning of
Macedonia as a superpower. This will, in turn, lead to consideration of the bipolar system
dominated by Macedonia and the Persian Empire, after which Macedonia, through a
series of wars, establishes itself as the system-wide hegemon, hence altering the systemic
structure into a unipolar system. Subsequently, the systemic consequences of
Macedonia’s decline as the system-wide hegemon and the transition from the end of
unipolarity to the new power configurations of the system presents controversy and
competing hypotheses. To gauge the tenability and robustness of the process-tracing
method being implemented, counterfactuals (King et al 1994) will be utilized to test the
conclusions and assumptions reached in the case study. Continuing with the aboveexample, does process-tracing and counterfactual analysis reject Macedonian status as
system-wide hegemon, or does the political history analysis hold against counterfactuals?
Namely, does the contention, that the post-Macedonian unipolar system gave way to
nonpolarity, hold, or do competing assessments deem the post-unipolar system as
multipolar? Essentially, was the Wars of the Diadochi a case of inter-hegemonic conflict,
or, as the nonpolar interpretation suggests, that neither of the units in the conflict were
system-wide hegemons? Simply put, in cases where controversy and competing
hypotheses/explanations are present, the analytical and causal inferences presented
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through process-tracing will be tested against counterfactuals to gauge the tenability and
explanatory strength of the conclusions reached in the analysis.
Semi-Quantitative Descriptive Analysis and Probabilistic Assessments
Semi-quantitative methods will be utilized, along with the qualitative tools
specified above, in attempting to observe the formulation of potential structural patterns
in world political systems vis-à-vis unipolar systems and the subsequent structure of the
system after unipolarity. The structural power configurations of world political systems
will be employed to generate feasible modalities of coding. Since the objective is to
observe unipolar periods in world political systems (overarching unit of analysis), each
unipolar period will serve as the unit of analysis during this phase of the research design.
The initial intent, then, will be to observe the number of unipolar periods that each world
political system has had throughout its existence. Thus, for example, if observing the
Mediterranean World Political System, with its historic epoch lasting from 2300 BC –
400 AD, it may tentatively be suggested that there were approximately 3-5 periods where
the structure of the system was unipolar (examples: Mycenae, Macedonia, Rome). This,
of course, would already be determined and substantiated through the second
methodological approach. This same data gathering method will be utilized for each
world political system within the dataset. The underlying aim is to collect the number of
unipolar periods for each system, and then aggregate this into the total number of
unipolar periods in the history of the world.
Data will be collected on the subsequent polar structures following unipolar
periods. Thus, after having data on the total number of unipolar periods in history, the
dataset will also have data on the different modes of polarity that were formulated after
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the unipolar structure. This will, finally, allow for the coding of the data and the
observation of patterns and structural developments with respect to post-unipolar
transitions.
Sample Coding for Modes of Polarity:






Unipolar structure: single system-wide hegemon/superpower
Bipolar: two system-wide hegemons/superpowers
Tripolar: three system-wide hegemons/superpowers
Multipolar: four to six system-wide hegemons
Nonpolar: no system-wide hegemon, constellation of sub-system hegemons (more
than seven actors in the system)1
In relation to the methodological approach and research design presented above,

the analytical operationalization of the data will allow this research to answer some
important questions that can potentially solve the puzzle being addressed.
1. After each unipolar period, what power configuration did the structure of the
system take?
2. Did the system become bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or nonpolar?
3. Which polar structure has numerical advantage of becoming formed after
uniplority?
4. What are the probabilistic relations between each possible mode of polarity after
unipolar periods?
5. Can consistent patterns be observed that produce non-obvious facts and
observations into the historic process of polar structuration after unipolarity?
6. Based on the potential quantified results, can it be predicted, even
probabilistically, what the post-unipolar American global system will look like?
7. Consistent with the standards of philosophy of science, can this project generate
knowledge-accumulation, and can the produced knowledge be adequately
evaluated through hypothesis-corroboration?
Data Collection
Historical systems analysis will provide the conceptual, theoretical, and analytical
basis of categorizing and qualifying what constitutes a world political system, the spatialterritorial location of the system, and the historical period within which the system
1

For a thorough discussion on the attributes of nonpolarity, especially on the numerical considerations of
poles, see pp. 45-49.
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endured. Concomitantly, the process of compiling the various world political systems
throughout human history has led to the designation of five systems. Since world political
systems ceased to exist after the 1800s, where a single Global Political System
encompassed all the world political systems, this project is interested in categorizing the
time period that a given system existed in, whether it was absorbed into a neighboring
system, or whether it was thoroughly conquered and ceased to exist. The categorization
of world/global political systems and the time periods that measure their existence are
provided in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 LIST OF WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEMS

World Political System

Beginning
Year

Ending
Year

Historical
Event/Reason

Middle East-Near Eastern
System

2600 BC

300 BC

Mediterranean System

2000 BC

400 AD

Far Eastern System

1000 BC

1850 AD

Indic System

500 BC

1800 AD

Roman Expansion,
Absorption into
Mediterranean System
Collapse of Roman
Empire
European/American
Intrusion, Absorption
into Global System
British Colonialism,
Absorption into Global
System

Global System

1500 AD

Present

Upon formulating a dataset based on world political systems, the intent will be to
compile data on the number of unipolar structures each system formed. The number of
unipolar periods for each world political system will be combined with the number of
unipolar periods for all of the systems in the dataset. This will provide, based on the
criteria set forth, the total number of unipolar periods in the history of the world. The
primary objective is to gather data on the total number of unipolar periods, which will
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then be utilized to observe what a system transitions into after each unipolar structure.
Namely, for each unipolar period, further data will be compiled on the subsequent
structure of the world political system. The objective is to collect data on post-unipolar
periods. This will provide information as to whether the post-unipolar periods transition
into bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or nonpolar structures. As such, data will be gathered for
different modalities of polarity following unipolar periods.
Selection of Sources
The accumulation of the data for the polar configurations fundamentally rely on
the historic evidence, culled from the vast body of historical research undertaken by
scholars that have established mainstream consensus in relation to the substance and
accuracy of the information provided. Scholarly consensus, then, remains the criteria for
selecting historical works as sources when formulating evidence in support of data
compilation. Since the attainment of historical evidence can never be absolute or
presuppose unquestioned certainty, the overarching assumption concedes that some
degree of bias is inevitable when relying on secondary sources for histiographical
research. This bias remains an inherent truism even when accessing primary sources:
historic documents defy objectiveness, for they must, by their very existence, support
some culture, society, leader, or power structure. To this end, the approach at hand
remains vigilant in gauging historic developments at the macropolitical level, and thus
refraining from making controversial or unsubstantiated claims based on secondary
interpretations as sufficient evidence. What constitutes historic knowledge, then, is
qualified by virtue of the existing evidence in support of general claims, as opposed to
minute or specific claims that remain outside the data collection scope of this project.
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CHAPTER 3
BETWEEN THE CONCEPTUAL AND THE ANALYTICAL: DEFINING AND
EXPLAININT THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
“We give different labels to the same structural phenomena because we lack a
consensus on how the structural phenomena should be conceptualized” (Rapkin et al
1979, 262). As such, some definitional and conceptual clarifications will be necessary to
both alleviate confusion and bypass much scholarly controversy over given concepts and
assumptions. This will include some specific considerations of paradigm-building and
theory development to formulate robust, logically consistent, and analytically coherent
conceptual models. First, however, it must be noted that the vast literature on polarity
demonstrates not only lack of consensus on how to define, measure and operationalize
polarity, but also contradictory findings (Singer 1981), along with different research
designs and different attempts at measuring the independent and dependent variables and
quantifying modes of polarity (Vasquez 1987). For example, different scholars utilize
different criteria to define and conceptualize hegemony (Wilkinson 1999b), hegemon
(Gilpin 1981), polarity (Waltz 1979), unipolarity (Layne 1993; Ikenberry, Mastanduno,
and Wohlforth 2011; Jervis 2009), polarization (Rapkin et al 1979; Bueno de Mesquita
1978), and the distribution of power as distinct from polarization (Wayman 1985).
The problem of measurement is further compounded by the use of vastly
different variables, criteria, and even proxies. Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth
(2011) argue, for example, definitional treatments of polarity (specifically unipolarity)
must be based on distribution and concentration of material resources. They separate
hegemony and empire from unipolarity because their conceptualization of unipolarity is
primarily reduced to the distribution of material capabilities. Wilkinson (1999b) argues
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that a dominant state may be a unipole, but this need not suggest that hegemony is
present, thus formulating the concept of unipolarity without hegemony. Gilpin (1981)
utilizes hegemony within the context of a dominant state in the international system, thus
referring to powerful states, or poles, as hegemonic actors. Waltz’s (1979)
conceptualization of polarity fundamentally relies on distribution of resources, yet it also
discusses sheer dominance, might, competence, and even population size. Rapkin et al
(1979) provide distinct analytical models to polarity and polarization: the former is the
system’s distribution of power (the number of roughly equal major actors in the system),
while the latter is the tendency of actors to cluster around the most powerful states in the
system. Wallace (1973) provides no distinction between polarity and polarization,
measuring and operationalizing the concepts as a single phenomenon. Bueno de Mesquita
(1978) looks at entire blocs or clusters (for example, NATO as a single pole) and finds a
relationship between increased polarization and war, and decreased polarization and
absence of war. This is supplemented by his analysis of increasing number of poles in the
system contributing to uncertainty and instability. Wayman (1985) measures polarity
based on both distribution of power and polarization, showing that wars in multipolar
structures are at a much higher magnitude than in bipolar structures. This, however,
creates controversy with respect to Rapkin et al’s warning of not conflating polarity with
polarization. Ikenberry (2011b) relies on distributive considerations of resources to
define polarity, but introduces the concept of “hubs,” similar to clusters and to Rapkin et
al’s notion of polarization, to account for the organizational and functional capabilities of
the given pole(s). Posen (2011) illuminates the conceptual limitations of operationalizing
polarity: what constitutes resource, capability, power, or modes of distribution?
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Furthermore, how is dominance gauged, when measurements are not always consistent
with the reality of power relations between states? Buzon (2004) offers the best
explanation of the vagueness and flexibility of polarity:
Polarity can be used to move forward into realist assumption about
conflict of interest, balance of power, and war, but it can just as easily
fit with international political economy concerns with leadership and
the provision of collective goods, Gramscian ones about hegemony,
globalist ones about a dominant core, world system ones about world
empires and world economies, and English school ones about great
power management and international society. (32)
To avoid controversy, and not fall into the measurement trap,2 this project’s
conceptualization of hegemony, hegemonic states, and modes of polarity will rely on the
concept of system-wide hegemon, which will hopefully avoid criticisms of having narrow
or arbitrary criteria. By providing a broad and inclusive definition of these concepts, the
depth and scope of the analysis will be far more extensive, as opposed to providing a
minimalist definition for the sake of theory conformity. Furthermore, measuring polarity
is necessary if engaging in intra-polar research, such as polarization, durability, stability,
conflict severity, and so on. The objective of this work, however, is to merely diagnose
and observe what the power configurations of the system are, as opposed to disqualifying
analytical depth by virtue of measurement criteria that remains inapplicable when
formulating the nomenclature for polarity. For example, of the various measures utilized
by different scholars (with different and contradictory results), one may hypothetically
apply one of the more parsimonious formulas. GDP and military spending is the simplest
formula used to measure resource/capability, and as such, the concentration of power

2

The term measurement trap is utilized to sum up the extensive debate and lack of consensus on how to
measure polarity, or the attributes of polarity, and how this problem creates inconclusive and controversial
results, thus illustrating the limitation, or the trap, of utilizing measurements that create more questions as
opposed to offering answers to the puzzle at hand.
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within a system, hence qualifying status of being a pole based on the operationalization
and quantification of such measurements. The distribution of capabilities/resources, as
measured through the criteria of concentration, determines the mode of polarity that the
system takes (Mansfield 1993). In this overly simplified example, power configuration is
categorized and defined by measured and quantifiable variables. The problem with this
approach, however, is quite obvious: it is not consistent with the reality of the power
configurations of the given world political system. Three historical examples can
demonstrate this point.
When considering the power configurations of the Mediterranean System leading
up to and during the Peloponnesian War, from approximately 460 BC to 400 BC, the
operationalization of the above-mentioned measurements would suggest a unipolar
system. Based on GDP and military spending (while specific data does not exist, there’s
overwhelming historical evidence on Athenian wealth in relation to Sparta), Athens
would measure much higher than Sparta, thus demonstrating a unipolar concentration of
power. Athens at this point was an empire, with new silver mines, extensive trade and
commerce, developed colonies, and military spending (especially on its navy) that was
unmatched within the Greek world. Sparta, on the other hand, lacked coherent trade or
commerce, had an underdeveloped monetary system, and was relatively, and
fundamentally, a poor society. Based on quantified measurements of capability and
resource distribution, Sparta would not qualify as a pole. The reality, however, is quite
different. Not only was the power configuration of the system bipolar, but Sparta ended
up defeating the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War. Even if other variables are
included in the measurement of polarity (population size, innovation, technology, etc.),
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Athens will still demonstrate numerical superiority in magnitude. This creates an
anomaly, a misrepresentation of reality.
The case of the Global Political System in the eighteenth century is also quite
telling, demonstrating that crude determinism based on measurements of economics,
GDP and military spending create a severe disconnect from the reality of macropolitical
developments. The United Provinces, for example, were the richest and one of the more
developed political units in the system, while Russia was one of the poorest and least
developed. However, the Dutch failed to attain system-wide status, which the measured
indicators would suggest otherwise, considering Dutch capabilities. Russia, on the other
hand, which measured indicators would reject as a power, rose to system-wide presence.
This aporia present within the measurement trap creates more analytical problems than
solutions, thus limiting the capacity for knowledge-accumulation and the probability of
attaining non-obvious facts in order to solve the given puzzle at hand.
A very similar problem presents itself when attempting to categorize the structure
of polarity during the Cold War. Based on concentration of power/resource/capability
measured and defined by GDP and military spending, the distribution of resources, and as
such, relative capability between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, or if viewed through the
lens of polarization, NATO countries and the Warsaw pact, would be so disproportionate,
that the power configuration of the global system will have to be defined as unipolar.
This, however, was not the political reality of the Cold War. To deny the presence of a
bipolar structure based on given criteria and measurements is fundamentally problematic.
For these reasons, this project refrains from utilizing different modes of measurements
for polarity when categorizing and defining the power configuration of given systems.
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Reliance is rather placed on the conceptualization of system-wide hegemon(s) as a more
applicable analytical tool when operationalizing polarity and gauging polar structures. As
Vasquez (1987) so accurately articulates, “the classification of periods as unipolar,
bipolar, and multipolar is based on historical judgment rather than on precise and
replicable measures” (131).
System-Wide Hegemon and Polarity
To bypass the exhausting debate in the international relations literature on
hegemony (Higgot 1991), the concept of hegemon, in this work, is conceptualized in twotiers: sub-system hegemon and system-wide hegemon. The former is generally a regional
actor, while the latter is a world/global actor. A system-wide hegemon is generally a
“superpower,” or a dominant actor within the system, for the scope of its political,
economic, and military power surpasses sub-systemic structures and positions itself at the
system-wide level. Sub-system hegemons maintain status and power in relations to their
neighbors, but lack the scope and capability to influence, dominate, and coerce actors at a
system-wide level. Given regions/sub-systems may have more than one hegemon, and
regional inter-hegemonic behavior does not presuppose conflict, tension, or competition.
To this end, hegemon is defined as a dominant actor in relation to other actors, and this is
further qualified as a powerful actor within a sub-system setting, or a powerful, dominant,
hegemonic actor at the system-wide level. Concomitantly, a sub-system hegemon cannot
be a pole, for it does not have the structural positioning at the system-wide level, and as
such, pole structuration is only undertaken by system-wide hegemons.3 Sub-system

3

While some literature exists on sub-system polarity (Ross 1999), this concept is disqualified as
problematic and analytically conflicting.
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hegemons, however, as secondary states, may position themselves as aligned to a given
pole, or if capable, maintain status of non-alignment.
Traditionally, hegemony is primarily conceptualized within the confines of
political and military power, rather than economic power. Concomitantly, systemic
treatment of hegemonic actors has either been transitional or successive (Gilpin 1981;
Kennedy 1987; Modelski 1987; Toynbee 1946; and Wight 1978). As such, robust
understanding of great powers seeking status within given systems has required scholarly
attention on hierarchies of power, the endeavor to attain such power, and the positioning
of given actors within the hierarchy itself. These structural considerations, however,
remain analytically limited in their explanatory capacity as long as the rationale for state
behavior is presented in a uni-dimensional fashion. In this sense, hegemony cannot only
be about military power, especially naval power (Modelski and Thompson 1988), or
economic processes (Wallerstein 1974, 1980; Frank 1978), or ideational norms (Cox
1981, 1983; Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 2011). An overarching treatment of a powerframework that cogently synthesizes all these attributes remains the more preferable
criteria of analyzing hegemony. Namely, since economic, ideological, military, and
political considerations always intertwine and interact, the mere act of separating, or
suggesting that one variable is a preferable unit of analysis, or a preferable explanatory
variable, obfuscates the empirical reality of hegemonic actors. Kennedy’s (1987) work on
the interdependent relationship between military power, political power, and economic
power in the rise and fall of great powers excels in demonstrating this point.
Concurrently, system-wide dominance, whether this dominance is economic,
military, political, ideational, territorial, or, realistically, an orchestrated fusion of all
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these variables, is, in essence, the rational drive of every rising sub-system actor seeking
system-wide hegemonic status. Similarly, preservation of system-wide hegemonic status
remains the rationale for the continued safeguarding of the existing power configurations
of the system. Thematically, then, the underlying framework that clusters all these
variable into a singular explanatory variable is the notion of power, that is, the systemwide hegemon’s capacity to control and dominate the system by virtue of exercising, or
seeking to exercise, military, territorial, economic, political, and ideational
preponderance. Consequently, configurations of power, that is, the hegemonic actor’s
drive for power as a mechanism of survival in the system, remain the most important
variable in gauging the rationale of system-wide hegemonic dominance.
It is crucial to specify the difference between hegemon and hegemony. For a
hegemon to establish hegemony, it must not only be relationally the most powerful actor
within the given system, but must also dominate, either through direct control or sphere
of influence, a preponderance of the system. In defining these concepts, then, hegemon is
understood as a dominant actor in relation to other actors in a system, while hegemony is
the complete dominance of the system itself. A system-wide hegemon may have
hegemony over an entire sub-system (such as Soviet dominance of the East
European/Eurasian region), which distinguishes it from a sub-system hegemon, but in
order for there to be hegemony, the system-wide hegemon must dominate the
macropolitical system itself. Thus, Brazil may be deemed a sub-system hegemon, but it
has not established hegemony through South America (for if it did, it would potentially
rise to the level of system-wide hegemon). Similarly, the United States is a system-wide
hegemon, but it has not established global hegemony. Neither hegemon, in their
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respective levels, have established dominance over the system or subsystem in which
they engage in. As such, the concept of system-wide hegemony will generally not be
utilized in the proposed theoretical model, since it is conceded that in the existing Global
Political System, the concept is not applicable; while in previous systems, qualifying
system-wide, world hegemony is controversial and problematic.
The concept of sub-system hegemon will be utilized in the analysis to
demonstrate two things: how powerful regional actors differ from the system-wide power
actors, and to serve as a mechanism in the historiographical analysis of accounting how a
state becomes a system-wide hegemon. Specifically, in order for an actor to become a
system-wide hegemon, it must not only be, initially, a sub-system hegemon, but must
also establish some form of hegemony over the given sub-system.4 While this is not an
absolute prerequisite for system-wide hegemonic status, it does provide an important
analytical demarcation between the regional and system-wide spheres. Hegemonic
dominance of a sub-system elevates an actor from a sub-system, regional hegemon, to a
system-wide, world/global hegemon. In addition, in order for a sub-system hegemon to
qualify as a system-wide hegemon, it must be able to counter-balance or display relative
strength in relation to other system-wide hegemon(s). In this context, China, for example,
while at this current stage a sub-system hegemon, might potentially usurp Japan and
establish sub-system hegemony. However, unless it is able to counter-balance, or
challenge, the other system-wide hegemon(s) (in this case there is only the unipolar
U.S.), it cannot be qualified as a system-wide hegemon, and remains a sub-system power

4

Macedonian hegemony of the Greek sub-system, within the wider Mediterranean World Political System,
is an example.
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until it is able to elevate itself in relation to the other system-wide hegemon in the global
structure.
With respect to this analytical and conceptual approach, in order to avoid the
same problems that Rapkin et al (1979) address, this project will use the concept of
system-wide hegemon interchangeably with the term pole or polarity when referring to
structure(s) (poles) within the system which the system-wide hegemon(s) forms.
However, when this process is formulated through the alignment of members, the term
polarization will be used. Within this context, there can be multitude of powerful
hegemonic states that position themselves structurally as poles within the system, yet
polarization does not take place. Specifically, then, pole formulation may take two forms:
through the system-wide hegemon(s) positioning as a pole within the system, or through
polarization, where secondary states position themselves within a pole led by a given
system-wide hegemon. Measuring the magnitudes of polarity (high to low) is bypassed,
since gauging the degree of polarization is secondary and outside of the scope of this
project. Degrees of polarization are not vital to the conceptualization of the structure of
the world/global political system. The primary concern is with systemic observations of
inter-polar relations and structural outcomes, as opposed to intra-polar variables and
characteristics. Thus, for example, if there is a bipolar system, two assumptions are made:
one, that two poles are structured within the system by two system-wide hegemons, and
two, given the context, polarization either occurred or did not contingent on the
formulation of a bloc with aligned members. As such, the level to which the aligned
members are polarized is not relevant to the analysis. The same holds for a multipolar
system: the intent is to substantiate whether more than three poles have been structured in
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the system, and whether the poles are polarized through bloc formation and member
alignment, or polarization did not take place and a system-wide hegemon singularly
occupies the pole. To this end, measurement of polarization, as an intra-polar unit of
analysis, is outside the explanatory and conceptual purpose of this model.
It is suggested that polarization is one method of pole formulation within the
system, while the positioning of the system-wide hegemon(s) is the other. A pole, then, is
defined as a structure within a given world/global political system, where a system-wide
hegemon, via polarization, is the center of a coalition (secondary actors within this
system are obliged to position/align themselves in relation to a given pole/bloc), or absent
polarization, is the singular actor, that is, it is the pole itself. Variables such as
distribution of resources, relative power capabilities, counter-balancing, positioning,
norms, and other system-wide factors are presupposed as being inherent to the analysis of
polarity. This consideration, however, stops short of measuring these variables, for as the
above-discussion of the problems of measurement trap demonstrate, any attempt to
provide consistent measurements to all such variables either become arbitrary, or
inconsistent with the reality of the political system. Namely, to limit polarity as being
only defined and measured by distribution of material capability is to limit the scope and
depth of the concept with respect to systems analysis (not to mention the fact that
quantifiable data, prior to 1815, is very scarce). A broader, more inclusive definition of
polarity, such as the conceptualization of a system-wide hegemon, is more robust and
analytically applicable to the proposed systematized analysis of world political systems
throughout history.
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The overarching analysis assumes conflict behavior as concentrated between the
poles and cooperative behavior as concentrated within the poles. States with the
capability to abstain from having to position themselves with a given pole remain nonaligned. This process of alignment is deemed to be the polarization process, where a
system-wide hegemon orchestrates a coalition in opposition to the polarization
undertaken by another system-wide hegemon. Polarity, then, is a reference to these
formed coalitions (poles), while polarization is a reference to the alignment process.
Since poles tend to be defined in relation to the system-wide hegemon that dominates it,
it is preferable to use the terms interchangeably. Thus, in the Cold War, both the US and
the Soviet Union were poles as well as system-wide hegemons. Regardless of
polarization, both system-wide hegemons will still have been positioned, structured, and
categorized as poles.
The concept of polarization is somewhat disregarded when observing the unipolar
structure, for in this system, polarization is a moot point, since no opposing poles exist,
and the polarization process, if it had taken place, occurred either during a previous
bipolar or multipolar system. In this case, the remaining unipole sustains its status, and
the aligned members either leave the bloc (since the system-wide hegemon’s position in
the pole does not necessitate the positioning of secondary states), or they bandwagon.
Within this context, alignment or coalition characteristics within a unipolar system serve
marginal analytical relevance: opposing polarization is absent. To this end, because the
intent is not to study the polarization process, but rather after polarization has taken place
and the pole(s) is formed (thus functioning at the macro, systemic level), the givenness of
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the pole is taken as it exists. Analyzing and gauging the internal process of polarization is
outside the scope of this study.5
With respect to unipolarity, it is defined as a structure in which one state's/actor’s
capabilities are unmatched and too great to be challenged or counterbalanced, thus
preserving the system-wide dominance of the given hegemon. Capabilities include all
resources that reinforce and preserve the given actor’s power and structural position:
economic, military, technological, geopolitical, ideational, and institutional. To avoid
controversy over growth differential, measurement of resources, quantification of
capabilities, assessments of relative strength, or other measurement criteria that may be
deemed subjective,6 it is preferable to assess whether observable and verifiable patterns
exist with respect to potential/possible rising poles within the system, and how the
determination of the systemic structure, that is, the mode of polarity, is defined in relation
to the challenges and balancing acts undertaken by such revisionist actors. In this sense,
the unmatched capabilities of a given state do not suffice to qualify the system as
unipolar, since system-wide hegemonic status has not been attained. Qualification for
unipolarity must be verified by the absence of challenges and counter-balancing against
the system-wide hegemon. As the previous examples demonstrate, if gauged primarily on
relative capability, U.S. capability was far superior, perhaps even unmatched, by the
Soviets in the mid-1980’s. Yet to classify this period as unipolar simply based on the
5

The rationale for excluding analysis of polarization is two-fold. First, cases of polarization do not present
much affect upon a system-wide hegemon, since a system-wide hegemon dominates a given pole, and the
aligning members remain reliant upon the dominant actor within the pole. Second, since the objective of
this project is to observe the power configurations of world political systems, the intra-polar characteristics
are not relevant to the analysis at hand. Namely, the intent is to observe the polar structure and the systemwide hegemon that dominates the pole. How the pole is formed, and which secondary states are part of that
given pole offer no analytical depth or substantive value to the research process at hand.
6
For example, traditional calculation of state capability utilized GDP and military spending, only to be
modified by the addition or subtraction of other variables, ranging from population size to technological
advancement, thus creating much controversy over how to measure polar characteristics (Posen 2011).
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differential in capabilities undermines characteristics within the system. The fact that the
Soviet Union, at the systemic level, was able to challenge and counter-balance the United
States (even if inferior in absolute capability), demonstrates structural positioning within
the global system that is consistent with bipolarity. To this end, in a unipolar system,
aside from dominance in capabilities, a given pole must have no challengers or counterbalancers at the structural systemic level: “A unipolar system is one in which a
counterbalance is impossible. When a counterbalance becomes possible, the system is not
unipolar” (Wohlforth 1999, 29).
Nonpolarity: As Analytical Tool and Conceptual Model
The lack of a well-developed conceptual model for a nonpolar system in the
literature necessitates the formulation of a robust framework that can be consistently
applied when assessing the world/global political system in the absence of polar
structures. The intent of such a model is not to suggest or predict how states behave in a
nonpolar system, or what the characteristics of the system are in relation to the multitude
of actors interacting in the global structure. The objective, rather, is to explain what the
structural attributes of a nonpolar system are, as opposed to the causal consequences of
the system upon state behavior (these are possible issues for future research). For this
reason, the conceptual model for nonpolarity that is presented here primarily explains
what a nonpolar system looks like, what its structural characteristics are, and how it
differs from the other forms of polarity. Since the objective of this project is to observe
nonpolar periods in world political systems throughout history, the intention is to
construct an identifiable structure that can be classified as nonpolar. To this end, the task
at hand is to articulate what a nonpolar system is, how a system may be identified as

49

being such, what its attributes are, and how it can be differentiated, for categorical and
analytical purposes, from the other modes of polar structures.
Nonpolarity vs. Multipolarity
The attributes of a nonpolar system may be best expressed by contrasting how it
differs from a multipolar structure. Whereas unipolar, bipolar, and tripolar systems have
system-wide hegemons in accordance to a numerically described structure, multipolar
systems have up to 6 system-wide hegemons (Concert of Europe presented the most
number of poles that a multipolar system has, which fluctuated between 5 to 6 actors), as
polarization and alliances shrink the number of poles, while the breakdown of alliances
increases the poles. A multipolar structure has never witnessed more than 6 system-wide
hegemons, for the increased number of so many poles make balancing, counterbalancing, and considerations of distribution and concentration of capabilities both
incoherent and substantively meaningless. With such diffusion of power, it becomes
analytically problematic to classify and gauge how 10 system-wide hegemons, for
example, counter-balance and position within a system. Furthermore, the increased
number of actors conflates system-wide and sub-system variables, since the systemic
structure ends up having a constellation of various mid-level world powers. The
multitude of such powers, numerically, are so high that it will be unintelligible to assume
a multipolar system, and the dynamics of this numerically high world/global political
system of various mid-level, sub-system hegemonic powers will make the concept of
balance of power untenable.
Since one of the most important attributes that defines nonpolarity is the diffusion
of power, this analytical framework is consistent with considerations of concentrations of
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power: the extent to which power is concentrated or diffused. This exercise will further
demonstrate the difference between multipolarity and nonpolarity. Using Ray and
Singer’s (1973) index (the same concentration of power formula utilized by the
Correlates of War), Mansfield (1993) calculates power concentration in relation to the
number of poles/great powers in the system:

S represents the proportion of power possessed by an actor (system-wide hegemon); Sit is
the proportion of the aggregate capabilities/power controlled by actor i in year/time t; Nt
is the number of actors in year/time t; and Concentrationt is a continuous index that takes
on values ranging from 1 to 0 (111). Interpreting Mansfield’s analysis, the closer the
value of concentration is to 1, the more concentrated power is within the system. This
presupposes concentration, or absolute concentration, within a single system-wide
hegemon. The closer the value of concentration is to 0 the more evenly divided, diffused
power is among all of the actors in the world/global political system. Values between
.275 and .4 indicates a bipolar system, between .4 to .5 a unipolar system, and between .2
to .275 a multipolar system (113). The logical continuation of the formula is to
presuppose that as actors increase in the system, the more diffused, or less concentrated
power becomes. This is quite obvious, because if an actor presents such disparity in
power, then it will not be in the system as a system-wide hegemon. Simply put, those in
the system have some concentration of power, and as the number of actors increase in a
system, so does the diffusion of power. With multipolarity ranging from .2 to .275, it may
be inferred that nonpolarity would range from .05 to .175. In the same way a value of 1 is
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unrealistic with respect to unipolarity (no state can possess all the resources in the
world/system), a 0, similarly, is deemed unrealistic when gauging the value of
nonpolarity (there cannot be an absolute diffusion of equal power to such a high number
of actors in the system). As Mansfield’s hypothetical example demonstrates,
concentration or diffusion of power in the system does not surpass 5 actors. To suppose a
system of 9 actors, for example, the concentration value will be exceedingly low and
consistent with our considerations of nonpolarity.
In this sense, it is one thing to observe the balancing behavior of 5 actors, measure
each actor’s capabilities, gauge relative distribution of resources and power
concentration, consider hierarchy and structural positioning, and thus provide a coherent
analysis of a numerically-high multipolar system. These same analytical considerations,
however, fail to provide accountability and explanatory strength when the number of
actors may range in the dozens.
Continuing with the example, one may consider possible sub-system hegemons
within the Global Political System: Israel, Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle
East; Japan, China and South Korea in the Far East; India and Pakistan in South Asia;
Australia (possibly Indonesia) in Oceana; Russia and Turkey in Eurasia; Germany,
France and United Kingdom in Europe; Brazil (possibly Argentina or Chile) in Latin
America; Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa in Africa; U.S. and Canada in North America.
It becomes completely untenable to conceptualize and assess such a system with the
traditional tools utilized when observing multipolar structures. With power diffusion
among some 19 states (power distribution is obviously not equal, yet at the same time, its
level of concentration is much lower than in other modes of polarity), a new conceptual
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model is necessary to account for such a system. It is analytically futile to attempt to
classify such a system as multipolar: the concentration value will be extremely low,
perhaps less than .1, while any considerations of balancing and counter-balancing will
provide neither explanatory powers nor knowledge-accumulation. The nonpolar system,
then, is defined as a structure that lacks system-wide hegemons, where more than seven
actors possess and exercise various kinds of power, as the diffusion of power creates
different centers of power with a constellation of mid-level, sub-system hegemons.

53

CHAPTER 4
THE FAR EASTERN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM
The Far Eastern Sysem primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra
civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between
political units/entities/actors within the wider region of the Far East. Territorially, the Far
Eastern World Political System includes the global region historically occupied by China,
Tibet, Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, and Japan, thus
combining, for the sake of analytical coherence and historical continuity, the sub-regions
of East Asia and Southeast Asia into a single Far Eastern System. However, similar to
other world political systems, to specifically set regional and territorial boundaries in
absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political system obscures the reality of
the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at
the periphery at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from
the system.7 System’s classification of the Far Eastern World Political System, then, does
not specifically rely on establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering
7

For example, actors in the periphery that are part of the Far Eastern System at times exited the system by
way of seeking conquests to the north or west, whether by infringing on the Indic System or the Near EastMiddle Eastern System. The examples of the Huns in Europe, the Hunas and other Chinese infringements
in the Indic System, and the conquest of the Mongols into Eurasia are cases in point. The steppes of Central
Asia, which include the current countries of Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Turkmenistan remain at the extreme periphery of the system, and have primarily served as pathways
toward western expansion by given actors from the Far Eastern System. Concomitantly, in cases where
actors from either the periphery or other world political systems encroach unto the Far Eastern World
Political System, this infringement will be noted when the given actor becomes a system-wide hegemonic
actor, and is thus considered to be part of the power configurations of the system. As such, similar to other
world political system covered in this work, it is anticipated, from time to time, the encroachment of
external actors into the system. Yet this remains ephemeral and does not indicate the absorption of one
system into another. As such, for the sake of historical accuracy, the infringement of powers outside of the
system into the system will be taken into consideration. But this will be treated in two ways: either the
system is conquered and absorbed into another system, thus ending the given system (such as Britain’s
colonization of China, along with the colonizing presence of other European powers in the Far East
System, thus leading to this system’s absorption into the Global Political System), or outside power(s)
become absorbed into the system and remain part of it as one of the given poles (such as the Turkish
Kaghanate).
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the political interactions and power configurations of system-wide hegemons that
function within the region of the Far East.
The chronological treatment of the system’s political history will begin analysis
of polar periods from approximately 1000 BC. Archeological evidence and scholarly
consensus holds the various regional centers in the Yellow River basin and its expansion
and fusion with the proto-civilizations in the Yangtze River valley, from 3000 BC to
2000 BC (Gernet 1968, 46-48; Pearson 1983, 119-124), as the foundational period of
what would become the Far Eastern System. From 2000 BC to 1000 BC, three dynasties,
the Hsia, Shang, and Chou (Zhou in pinyin), dominated the Far Eastern System, with
Chou beginning its system-wide hegemonic preponderance from approximately 1000 BC
(Loewe and Shaughnessy 1999, 11-130).8 The problem with including the periods before
1000 BC as data points for polar epochs is three-fold. First, the line between legend and
historical facts are rather blurry when gauging system’s configuration during the Hsia
dynasty, as the Hsia period has not been fully dated by historians (Chang 1983, 511-515;
Murphy 1996, 33; Penkala 1966, 8-10). Second, the historical evidence for the Shang
period is equally problematic, as it is unclear whether it followed the Hsia era, succeeded
the Hsia, or existed as a separate political unit during Hsia presence (Chang 1980, 350354; Keightley 1983, 537-541; Hsu and Linduff 1988, 19-22). Third, while the historical

8

Pinyin is the official phonetic system in transcribing Chinese characters in China, Taiwan and Singapore.
In 1982 it became the international standard for foreign publications. Prior to 1982, the primary
Romanization system was the Wade-Giles transliteration system, being the most common system of
transcription among English speakers. As such, much of the historical scholarly work done on the Far East
in the 20th century, especially on China, used the Wade-Giles transliteration system. The Wade-Giles
system and pinyin are used interchangeably in many English language publications. To avoid any
confusions, this author has selected to use the Wade-Giles system for two main reasons. First, since many
historical and scholarly works that are utilized in this project use the Wade-Giles system, it remains outside
of this scholarly endeavor to undertake the task of adapting the pinyin system. Second, since the two modes
of transliteration are used interchangeably in the English-speaking world, relying on the traditional system
is both preferable and easier for the task at hand.
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evidence substantiates Chou unipolarity after 1000 BC, Chou’s rise prior to this period,
and its attainment of system-wide hegemonic status prior to 1000 BC remains
controversial (Ebrey 1996, 22-31; Blunden and Elvin 1983, 54-57; Huang 1988, 12-19;
Hsu and Linduff 1988, 41-47). For these reasons, the historical data necessitates the
beginning point of coding power configurations in the Far Eastern System to begin from
1000 BC.
1000 BC – 780 BC Unipolar Structure
Chou attained system-wide hegemonic status throughout much of the Yellow
River basin (Shaughnessy 1999, 307-313), initially subjugating the vast number of tribal
statelets (Eberhard 1967, 21-24), establishing strongholds in the south in the Han and
Huai valleys, and forming defensive barriers to the north against nomadic incursions
(Hsue and Linduff 1988, 129-137). For over 160 years Chou unipolarity remained rather
stable, only to be internally disturbed by a coup in 841 BC, followed by nomadic
incursions by the Jung in the north. Its preoccupation with the Jung weakened Chou’s
control over its southern vassals, with the Jung finally managing to conquer the Chou
capital in 771 BC and end the unipolar period (Shaughnessy 1999, 342-351; Hsue and
Linduff 1988, 258-268). The unipolar structure during this period was primarily sustained
by two factors: absence of any challenges in the system by rising sub-system hegemons,
and Chou’s ability to sustain vassalage of peripheral states. Internal decay, coupled with
external incursions (Hirth 1969, 155-170), however, brought about a transformation of
the power configurations of the Far Eastern System by the end of the 8th century BC.
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Map 4.1

780 BC – 680 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
The post-Chou period gave way to intense disintegration (Huang 1988, 17), with
vast number of small political units, ranging in the hundreds (Hsu 1999, 547-562;
Blunden and Elvin1983, 61-62; Maspero 1978, 170-173), restructuring the system into a
nonpolar power constellation. During this nonpolar period, however, approximately
eleven sub-system hegemons, many of them former Chou vassals, began the process of
consolidating regional power: Chi ( Ji or Zhi in pinyin), Ch’en, Cheng (Zheng in pinyin),
Ch’i (Qi in pinyin), Chou, Chu, Lu, Sung (Song in pinyin), Ts’ai (Cai in pinyin), Ts’ao
(Cao in pinyin), and Wey (Wei in pinyin) (Chang 1980, 348-355; Hsu 1999, 547-548).
The consolidation process and the attempt at attaining system-wide hegemonic status
further contributed to the diffusion of power in the system during this period, as Ch’u in
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the southern Yangtze basin counter-balanced the ambitions of the northern sub-system
actors, primarily Chang and Chou, while Ch’i and Sung undertook irredentist policies of
expansion, only to witness Lu, Ts’ao and Ts’ai consistently engaging in coalitions and
counter-coalitions (Hsu and Linduff 1988, 220-226; Legge 1972, 12-37; Maspero 1978,
172-180; Walker 1953, 38-55), similar to all the other actors in the system, as the highlycomplex process of balancing, counter-balancing, and alliance-shifting reified the
nonpolar structure of this period.
Map 4.2

680 BC – 580 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure
The consolidation of power at the regional level allowed several sub-system
hegemons to attain system-wide status, thus transitioning the nonpolar structure into a
multipolar power configuration. Ch’u sought to transition the multipolar system into a
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unipolar one by challenging other system-wide hegemons, including Cheng, Sung, and
Ch’i. Ch’i sought to counter-balance Ch’u aspirations by forming an alliance and coming
to the assistance of Cheng as it was being invaded by Ch’u (Legge 1972, 62-117;
Maspero 1978, 180-192; Walker 1953, 29-34). The containment of Ch’u’s attempt at
restructuring the Far Eastern System into a unipolar structure was achieved by Ch’i,
along with the other, albeit relatively weaker, poles in the system, Cheng and Sung, thus
counter-balancing and sustaining the multipolar power constellation. Concomitantly,
Chin (Jin in pinyin, not to be confused with Ch’in, which is Qin in pinyin), a small
regional actor in the north of the Yellow River, attained sub-system hegemony, while the
western state of Ch’in attained sub-system hegemonic status through its dominance of the
Wei valley (Hsu and Linduff 1988, 190-194; Maspero 1978, 170-179). By 640 BC Ch’i
weakened as a system-wide hegemon, allowing Ch’u to reassert its aggressive policies,
only to be temporarily counter-balanced by Sung. Sung challenge to Ch’u remained
unsuccessful, as Ch’u forced dominance over Cheng, Ch’en, Ts’ai, Lu, and Sung itself.
The rising system-wide hegemon, Chin, preserved the multipolar system by coming to
the aide of both Ch’i and Sung, thus assuming leadership of the Yellow River alliance
and managing to defeat Ch’u and coerce peace. Chin was soon challenged by Ch’in,
another sub-system hegemon that had elevated itself to system-wide status, opening the
way for Ch’u to reassert its lost prestige against Chin (Hirth 1969, 208-216; Legge 1972,
172-218; Maspero 1978, 188-203). This process of inter-polar conflict continued, as Ch’u
and Chin remained the more powerful system-wide hegemons, while Ch’i and Cheng the
relatively weaker poles. Chin and Ch’u temporarily stopped fighting, having reached an
impasse, while Chin, suffering from internal crisis, was attacked by Ch’in, thus to the
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advantage of Ch’i and Ch’u (Hsu 1999, 551-562; Legge 1972, 245-340). This cycle
remained, as each pole temporarily weakened, then revived to either counter-balance
another pole, or to reassert itself.
580 BC – 540 BC Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure
Ch’u continued with its ambitious expansionism, conquering Cheng, subjugating
Sung, and neutralizing Ch’i. Chin was beaten in a great battle by Ch’u, thus temporarily
weakening Chin. Attempting to capitalize on a weakened Chin and a Ch’u undergoing a
succession crisis, Ch’i undertook expansionist endeavors, only to be thoroughly defeated
by a revived Chin. With Cheng and Ch’i having been reduced to sub-system actors, the
system transitioned into a bipolar structure, dominated by Chin and Ch’u (Hsu 1999, 562563). Chin-Ch’u bipolarity continued through proxy wars, polarization (Ch’u pole
included Ts’ai, Hsu, and Ch’en, while the Chin pole included Chu, Cheng, Chou, Chi,
Ts’ao, Lu, Hsueh, and Wey), and direct conflict between the system-wide hegemons (Hsu
1965, 55-59; Walker 1953, 55-58). The bipolar power constellation of this epoch, then,
included two system-wide hegemons, and several sub-system hegemons, ranging from
Ch’in and Ch’i in the north, to Yeuh and Wu in the southeast and south of the Yangtze
basin.
540 BC – 275 BC Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure
Ch’u proceeded to conquer Ch’en and Ts’ai, only to be counter-balanced by Wu,
thus raising Wu to system-wide status. Chin maintained its status as a pole,
demonstrating preponderance in the north, while Ch’in allied with Ch’u and Yeuh to
counter-balance Wu ambitions (Legge 1972, 547-630, 724-769). System-wide hegemons,
during this epoch, proceeded to both eliminate sub-system actors and limit the number of
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poles in the multipolar structure. Capitalizing on the internal strife within Chin, Wu
sought to dominate the northern league, thus challenging both Chin and Ch’i, while also
threatening its southern neighbor, Yeuh. Yeuh would proceed to defeat and annex Wu
(Hirth 1969, 261-262), thus removing one pole from the system. Similarly, Ch’u
proceeded to destroy Ch’en, thus removing another potential system-wide actor (Ssu-ma
1994, 77-109). By 450 BC Chin disintegrated into three, albeit powerful, units: Hann
(Han in pinyin), Chao (Zhao in pinyin), and Wei (Hirth 1969, 264-266; Maspero 1978,
235-250). While relatively weaker than Ch’in, Ch’i, Ch’u, and Yeuh, Hann, Chao, and
Wei were not merely regional players, but had system-wide status (Hsu 1999, 594-606).
Wei sought to re-establish the Chin dynasty by subjugating Hann and Chao, while at the
same time repulsing an attempt by Ch’i at interference. Wei continued its ascendency by
dominating Sung, Lu, and Wey, and even defeating Ch’u in battle (617). Wei ascendency
was counter-balanced by the collective interference of Ch’in, Ch’i, and Ch’u, hence
preserving the balance of power in the multipolar system. By 300 BC, Ch’in had become
the most powerful system-wide hegemon, overtaking Wei, and facing a combined
coalition of Ch’i and Ch’u, along with Chao and Hann. Unable to defeat Ch’in, a second
coalition was formed in 296 BC, with Ch’i, Hann, Chao, Sung, and Wei (Ch’ien 1994,
108-117). The balance of power was maintained, but Ch’in still remained the more
powerful pole, as the other system-wide hegemons turned against each other: Ch’i
annexed Sung, overwhelmed Lu, and sought to conquer Chao, Hann, and Wei, only to
face a counter-alliance from the other system-wide actors, thus thoroughly being defeated
(Hsu 1999, 632-638) and reduced to sub-system status. With Ch’i removed, Hann, Wei,
and Chao being reduced to sub-system status by Ch’u, the only other system-wide
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hegemon able to counter-balance Ch’in remained Ch’u. In 278 BC Ch’in thoroughly
defeated Ch’u (Maspero 1978, 258-264), removing the only remaining challenger to its
power in the system, and thus transitioning the 260 year multipolar period into a unipolar
structure.
275 BC – 210 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure
Ch’in unipolarity was primarily defined by its irredentist policies, consistently
attacking sub-system actors Wei, Chao, and Hann (Lewis 2007, 30-47; Ch’ien 1994, 118120), seeking not only territorial expansion, but also control of economic resources and
trade (Blunden and Elvin 1983, 67-74). An attempt at a bipolar system was made by
states opposed to Ch’in’s overly-aggressive endeavors, as five states sought polarization
under the leadership of Wei, seeking to establish an opposing pole. In 247 BC the fivestate coalition managed to defeat Ch’in and hold off the unipole’s expansionism (Hirth
1969, 327-328), but immediately dissolved after victory, thus negating any considerations
of bipolarity. The unipolar structure was reified by Ch’in resurgence in a matter of few
years, supplemented by the system-wide hegemon’s continuous policy of expansion. A
similar attempt at polarization was once again undertaken to counter-balance Ch’in, a
proto-pole including Ch’u, Chao, Hann, and Wei. This attempt at counter-balancing via
polarization was an ephemeral one and proved to be unsuccessful as Ch’in remained
victories and continued to exercise unchallenged preponderance (Reischauer and
Fairbank 1960, 86-88; Ch’ien 1994, 121-134). Around 210 BC, due to both
overextension and internal chaos (Qian 1993, 218-226), Ch’in disintegrated, only to
restructure itself as Han. During this restructuration process, however, the unipolar epoch
ended, transitioning from unipolarity to nonpolarity.
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Map 4.3

210 BC – 195 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
The fall of Ch’in and the establishing of Han as a successor state (Reischauer and
Fairbank 1960, 90-92) was supplemented by the expansion of the Far Eastern System
itself, which came to include multitude of sub-system actors in the periphery (Penkala
1966, 7-9). In the southeast coast of the system, Nan-yeuh (Nam-Viet), in current
northern Vietnam, began consolidating regional power (Ch’ien 1994, 140-146), while in
the southwest mountains, the rise of Tibeto-Burman was noted, along with the sub-
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system hegemonic aspirations of Tai. In the northeast of the system, the proto-Koreans,
as Ko-Choson (Lee 1984, 11-18; Han 1970, 11-17) under the dominion of the sub-system
hegemon Yen from Manchuria (Hsu and Linduff 1988, 196-200), sought positioning as
sub-system hegemons when the state of Wiman Joseon was formed through its seizing of
Ko-Choson and expanding both east and south (Nelson 1993, 167-189). In the northwest,
Kashgaria had risen to sub-system status, further compounding the diffusion of power
during this period. The northern periphery of the system, however, displayed the largest
number of rising sub-system actors, as the nomadic people of the Steppe started forming
more coherent political units. These included the Alans, Mongols, Avars, Sienabi, the
Yueh-chih, Turks, and the powerful Huns (McGovern 1939, 118-135; Barfield 1989, 3035; Grousset 1970, 26-32). Without the presence of any system-wide hegemons,
primarily due to the fact that Ch’in had attenuated any potential actors, while Han was
still in the process of regional consolidation (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 93-94), the
power constellations of the system remained inchoate and quite diffused. Two major
developments during this nonpolar period allowed for the transition of the system from a
nonpolar structure to a unipolar one. As noted, the reestablishment of Han slowly brought
about the restructuring of the system; but this was further augmented by the elevation of
the Huns from regional, peripheral actors to system-wide hegemons.
195 BC – 165 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure
By 209 BC the Huns had attained sub-system hegemonic status out of their base
in Inner Mongolia (Kwanten 1979, 12), only to proceed in subjugating eastern Mongolia
and western Manchuria after the fall of Ch’in (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 95).
Around 200 BC the Huns reduced to vassalage most of the city-states of Kashgaria
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(Ishjamts 1994, 152-158), only to face a massive invasion by the new Han state. The
defeat of Han elevated the Huns to the status of unchallenged system-wide hegemons
(Grousset 1970, 34), thus restructuring the Far Eastern System from nonpolar to a
unipolar structure. Hun preponderance of the system was reinforced by its defeat of the
Alans and the complete subjugation of Kashgaria, while having reduced Han to tributary
status (McGovern 1939, 119-128; Barfield 1989, 36-55). While militarily dominant, the
Huns remained economically reliant on the tributes extracted from Han, and as such, Han
slowly reestablished its military might, while sustaining its economic capabilities, while
the Huns remained stagnant, and even began falling under the Sino cultural influence.
165 BC – 120 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
By 165 BC the Hans had repositioned as system-wide hegemons, challenging and
counter-balancing Hun dominance (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 97-98) and creating a
bipolar power configuration. Han expansion, fused with Hun dependency on Han
tributes, not only created a co-dependent bipolar system, but methodically shifted the
relative power of both actors. Han continued to amass both political strength and
undertake territorial expansion. Concomitantly, this bipolar epoch had two system-wide
hegemons, with growing differentiation in power capabilities, along with three
independent states acting as sub-system hegemons: Wiman Joseaon in the Korean
peninsula and northeast China, Nan-yeuh in northern regions of Vietnam, and the Dian
Kingdom, covering much of the Yunnan region (Yao and Zhilong, 2012, 353-357).
120 BC – 160 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
Han directly challenged the Huns for system-wide hegemonic status, severely
defeating them in Outer Mongolia, and succeeding in reducing the Huns to vassal status
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by 100 BC (McGovern 1939, 140-154; Grousset 1970, 36-37). By subjugating the Huns,
Han became the single pole in the Far Eastern System, facilitating the transition to
unipolarity. To display its preponderance, Han undertook the following conquests:
Wiman Joseaon (Choson) (Lee 1984, 14-18; Nelson 1993, 165-171), removing a subsystem actor from the system and assuming dominance of Korea (Reischauer and
Fairbank 1960, 101); Kashgaria, setting up vassal states and tributaries (Yong and Yutang
1994, 228; McGovern 1939, 170-178); northern Vietnam, subjugating Southern and
Eastern Yeuh; Yunnan region, making Dian a vassal state, and thus removing another
sub-system hegemon from the picture (Ebrey 1996, 8-11). Han dominance of the Far
Eastern System seemed absolute by 25 AD, as most of the sub-system hegemons, from
the Huns, to Korea, to Kashgaria, to Nan-yeuh, had accepted either vassal status or had
become tributary protectorates (Bielenstein 1967). During this period, three new subsystem hegemons rose to power, and while unable to challenge Han unipolarity, these
actors nonetheless maintained political independence: Koguryo in southeastern
Manchuria (Henthorn 1971, 25-30), Yarkard, a former Han vassal who was able to
establish independent regional dominance in Kashgaria, and the Northern Huns, who
soon replaced Yarkard (McGovern 1939, 222-240). By 150 AD, overextension, internal
rebellion, and succession problems brought about the disintegration of the Han Empire,
which soon came to be challenged by a rising regional power that attained system-wide
status: the resurgent Sienbi (Hsien-pi) of the Steppe (Grousset 1970, 54).
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Map 4.4

160 AD – 180 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
By 150 AD Sienbi had attained sub-system hegemony through much of the
northwestern region of the Far Eastern System, seeking system-wide status by
subjugating the Puyo of Manchuria, reducing to vassalage tribes of Siberia, and managing
to thoroughly defeat both the Northern and Southern Huns (Grousset 1970, 55). By 160
AD Sienbi had begun challenging and counter-balancing Han, thus transitioning the
system into a bipolar power constellation (Kyzlasov 1996, 317-321). During this bipolar
epoch, Han’s relative power as a system-wide hegemon continued to decline, as Han
vassals revolted and established independence, thus increasing the number of political
units in the system. This process of deconsolidation was supplemented by the decay and
collapse of Sienbi around 180 AD.
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180 AD – 225 AD Transition from Bipolar to Nonpolar
With the disintegration of Sienbi and the fall of the Han Empire into various
political units and sub-units controlled by warlords and generals as ephemeral statelets,
the system transitioned from a bipolar structure into a nonpolar one. Similar to most
nonpolar epochs, a methodical process of regional power consolidation began to take
place, as ambitious sub-system actors sought regional hegemony to fill the power vacuum
left by the absence of any system-wide hegemons. The Far Eastern System underwent an
extensive diffusion of power, as the increased number of independent political units in
the system negated any attempts at cogently formulating a power hierarchy, hence
making the power configurations of the system inchoate. Koguryo moved from
Manchuria to the Korean peninsula (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 404-406), only to
witness the presence of post-Han statelets, while Manchuria itself had Koguryo presence
and Puyo (Nelson 1993, 189-222). The Steppes of the periphery saw the decay of Sienbi,
the disintegration of the Huns into various tribal units, and the presence of several
independent city-states in Kashgaria (McGovern 1939, 310-319). The southwest region
of the system also experienced the same process of power diffusion, as Tonkin and
Champa (Majumdar 1985), in northern and southern Vietnam, established independence,
while Funnan, in the regions of Cambodia (Hall 1981, 27-30), became another presence
in the system. The diffused nature of the nonpolar structure necessitated the concentration
of power at the regional level, as sub-system actors sought consolidation and the
transition of the system into some form of a configuration with a clear power hierarchy.
Thus, by 225 AD, the Three Kingdoms period had been established, restructuring the
nonpolar epoch into a tripolar power configuration.
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225 AD – 265 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Tripolar Structure
The consolidation process during the nonpolar period gave birth to three systemwide hegemons: Shu Han based out of Szechwan in the Yangtze River basin, Wu based
out of Nanking in the eastern Yangtze territory, and Wei based out of Luoyang in the
Yellow River Basin (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 126-128). Of the three poles, Wei
was perhaps the more powerful, subjugating much of Manchuria and the Korean
peninsula (Henthorn 1971, 27-31), and thus reducing Koguryo to sub-system status and
accepting satellite status from Puyo, while at the same time assuming dominance over
Kashgaria in the periphery (Yong and Yutang 1994, 229-335). Shu Han preserved the
balance of power in the tripolar structure, reducing former sub-system hegemon Dian in
the Yunnan to vassalage, and directly challenging Wei. Wu sought system-wide
supremacy by controlling most of southeastern China, reducing Funan to tributary status,
and counter-balancing Wei ambitions. This tripolar epoch was primarily defined by
cyclical warfare, with Wu and Shu Han resisting Wei irredentism, while at the same time
neutralizing and dominating sub-system actors within each pole’s respective sphere of
influence (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 130).
265 AD – 300 AD Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure
By the mid-260’s Wei managed to annex Shu Han, eliminating one pole from the
equation. With Shu Han removed, Wu remained incapable of counter-balancing Wei by
itself. At the same time, Wei underwent a leadership change via military coup, assuming
the new name of Chin (Jin in pinyin), specifically designated as Western Chin, with its
capital in Luoyang. In 280 Western Chin subjugated Wu, completely solidifying its
unipolar status within the system. This was followed by a repulsion of Sienbi invaders
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against Puyo (Lee 1984, 21-24), who had accepted Western Chin suzerainty, followed by
the submission of Funan and Champa (Majumdar 1985, 25-29). Western Chin unipolarity
was supplemented by: the presence of sub-system hegemon Koguryo in Korea, who was
balanced by Western Chin supported Paekche (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 408),
another sub-system hegemon; suzerainty over Tonkin, Yunnan, and much of Cambodia;
and the presence of rising sub-system actors in the periphery of the Steppe and the north
that remained outside of the unipole’s sphere of dominance.
300 AD – 425 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
For the first decade of the 4th century, Western Chin underwent severe internal
crisis, losing control over its territorial holdings and vassal states. The first to react were
the Southern Huns, who not only revolted, but managed to conquer Louyang, the capital.
The Chins fled south, reorganizing itself as Eastern Chin with its capital in Nanking
(Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 132). The north of the Far Eastern System fell into
disarray, as the collapse of Western Chin left a power vacuum that was temporarily filled
by the Southern Huns, who also separated into two political units: Western Chao and
Eastern Chao. Competing at the same time for Chin leftovers in the Yellow River basin
were the Sixteen Kingdoms, a collection of numerous independent political units seeking
regional hegemonic status (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 149-150). Several of these
kingdoms claimed loyalty to Chin, while a large number of them sought sub-system
hegemonic status, with potential aspirations of re-establishing the system-wide power
structure of Western Chin (McGovern 1939, 321-366). In Korea and Manchuria the
system was also shocked by the diffusion of power, as the Sienbi reclaimed parts of
Manchuria, thus marginalizing Puyo, while three Korean states, Koguryo, Paekche, and
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rising Silla, competed for regional dominance (Han 1970, 23-45; Reischauer and
Fairbank 1960, 405-416). In the far south of the system, Champa, Tonkin, and Nam Viet
temporarily attained independence, thus contributing to the number of actors in the
system (Majumdar 1985, 23-29). From 350 the nonpolar structure included
approximately fifteen sub-system hegemonic actors: Eastern Chin, Eastern and Western
Chao, Koguryo, Puyo, Paekche, Liang, Nam Viet, Sienbi, Champa, Tibet, Yamato from
Japan (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 468-469; Henthorn 1971, 33-37) (during this
period Japan’s interaction with Korea, and its subjugation of Korean city-states,
especially the Kayla league, incorporated Japan into the Far Eastern System), and several
statelets from the Sixteen Kingdoms. By 400 relative consolidation of power had been
taking place, as given sub-system hegemons had established regional preponderance,
setting the stage for a transition of the system’s polar structuration. Eastern Chin had
become established in the Yangtze basin; Northern Wei having somewhat tempered the
chaos of the Sixteen Kingdoms in the Yellow River territories (Kwanten 1979, 15-16);
Yamato practiced dominance in southern Japan and parts of Korea; Western Ch’in
attained stability and status in the northwest of the system, based out of Kansu (Gansu in
pinyin); the Tabgach of the Steppe began positioning in the north (Grousset 1970, 60-61);
while the Avar (Juan-juan, Hephtalites) confederacy began building its central Asian
empire in the periphery (Kwanten 1979, 20-23).
425 AD – 555AD Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure
By 425 the Far Eastern System had transitioned into a multipolar structure, as
given regional powers had not only solidified sub-system hegemony, but had also
expanded beyond its regional spheres. Eastern Chin had been replaced by the Sung
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dynasty, with the Sung solidifying its system-wide hegemonic status in the Yangtze basin
(Holocomb 1994, 29-36). Northern Wei (the Tabgach after becoming Sinified)
consolidated power over the north, subjugating and absorbing the remnants from the
post-Chin nonpolar period, thus assuming its system-wide status out of the Yellow River
basin (Grousset 1970, 60-64). The Avar confederacy in the periphery of the system
presented the third pole, having attained dominance over Mongolia and much of the
steppe peoples of the surrounding regions. Yamato sustained itself as a system-wide
actor, albeit relatively weaker than the other poles, yet nonetheless a pole in its own right,
demonstrating dominance not only in its own region, but expanding into the Korean
peninsula. Koguryo shifted between system-wide and sub-system status, at times
challenging and counter-balancing other poles, and at other times accepting tributary
status and thus limiting itself as a sub-system hegemon. Northern Wei proved to be the
more aggressive pole during this early period, both subjugating Kashgaria (Mole 1970,
17-19) and Togon, a former Western Ch’in vassal and a rising sub-system actor, while
carrying out raids against the Avars to challenge and counter-balance their relative
strength in the periphery (Grousset 1970, 58-66). Sung established dominance over much
of the eastern and southern portions of the system, accepting vassalage from Tonkin,
Champa, and Funan. By the end of the century the Sung dynasty was replaced by the
Southern Ch’i dynasty, with no alterations to the balance of power structure. During this
period Koguryo expanded into a system-wide hegemon, overrunning much of the Korean
peninsula and further succeeding in its absorption of Puyo by conquering Manchuria
(Han 1970, 21-51). Internecine war between the poles continued throughout this period,
with the balance of power continuing to preserve the status quo. Internal problems,
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however, by the early 500’s, slowly brought about a restructuration of the system.
Southern Chi was supplanted by Southern Liang, weakening and bringing about the slow
disintegration of this once-powerful Yangtze political unit. Northern Wei split into
Western and Eastern Wei, and proceeded to weaken each other (Wright 1978, 31-44),
with Western Wei soon becoming dominated by Northern Chou, and Eastern Wei by
Northern Ch’i (Ebrey 1996). Koguryo underwent a civil war, losing much of its power to
the other sub-system hegemons in the region, Silla and Paekche (Lee 1984, 42-47). The
other remaining sub-system hegemon, the Avars, faced a growing threat from its subjects,
especially the Turks (Kwanten 1979, 24-26).
555 AD – 675 AD Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure
The Gokturks, a Turkish tribe of the Steppe, rebelled against the Avar empire,
bringing about the latter’s destruction and supplanting it with the First Turkish Khaganate
(empire), through which they proceeded to subjugated the Huns and the Kyrgyz at the
extreme periphery of the system, thus dominating the entire northeast of the Far Eastern
System (30-37). The loose multipolar structure became replaced with Turkish unipolarity,
as the Khaganate incorporated northern China into its sphere of influence, both protecting
and collecting tribute from the previous system-wide hegemons Northern Chou and
Northern Ch’i (Grousset 1970, 66-84; Kyzlasov 1996, 320-323). Around 582, after a civil
war, the First Turk Khaganate split into two: Eastern and Western Turkish Khaganate.
Capitalizing on this development, Sui overthrew Northern Chou and assumed systemwide hegemonic status, solidifying power in the Yellow River basin and then expanding
into south to the Yangtze territory, conquering Southern Ch’en and taking Nanking
(Wright 1978, 138-161). Sui assumption of unipolarity allowed for the continuation of
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the system’s power configuration, as one system-wide hegemon replaced the previous
system-wide hegemon, thus maintaining the unipolar structure. Sui influence expanded
into the Korean peninsula, antagonizing sub-system hegemon Koguryo and accepting
submission from Silla as Sui satellite in the region (Lee 1984, 42-47). Sui’s influence also
spread to the southeast of the system, incorporating Yunnan, Tonkin and Champa into its
sphere of influence (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 154-155). At this stage, the power
constellations of the system included Sui as the single pole along with the presence of
several sub-system hegemons: Koguryo in Korea, a rising Tibet in the south-west
(Beckwith 1987, 14-23), a reviving Togon, the Eastern and Western Turkish Khaganates
in the north and western periphery, and Tang, perhaps the most powerful of the subsystem hegemons based out of its capital Ch’ang-an in north-central China.
Overextension, failed incursions into Korea, and several revolts disintegrated the
Sui empire into various statelets (Wright 1997, 73-113), positioning the Far Eastern
System for a possible transition into a post-unipolar structure. The emergence of Tang,
however, maintained the system’s unipolar structure, which otherwise would have
transitioned into a possible multipolar power configuration. As the most powerful subsystem hegemon, Tang quickly assumed polar status after the fall of Sui (Wechsler 1997,
153-166): establishing dominance over Yunnan, Tonkin, Champa, Funan, and Cambodia
(Hall 1981, 30-36; Majumdar 1985, 37-39) in the south, accepting tributary status from
Koguryo (albeit temporarily) and Silla in the Korean Peninsula (Henthorn 1971, 46-51),
and repelling an Eastern Turkish invasion and managing to subjugate the Khaganate
(Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 155), while accepting vassalage from the powerful
Uighurs (Grousset 1970, 87-93). While several independent sub-system hegemons
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remained present, with potential system-wide hegemonic aspirations, Tang unipolarity
remained unchallenged during this period, as neither of the sub-system actors was
powerful enough to either challenge or counter-balance Tang. By the 670’s, however,
internal problems, fused with failed expedition into Korea and Kashgaria, relatively
weakened Tang (Adshead 2004, 40-48), thus allowing rising sub-system actors to
challenge Tang and restructure the power configurations of the system.
675 AD – 840 AD Transition from Unipolar to Tripolar Structure
Tibet was the first sub-system hegemon to challenge Tang and thus attain systemwide status. Tibet had already managed to destroy the Togon state, while subsequently
submitting much of the Western Turkish Kaghanate (Beckwith 1987, 35-43) and then
directly challenging Tang over Kansu and Kashgaria (Richardson 1962, 30-33). The
Eastern Turks formed the Second Turkish Kaghanate after revolting against Tang,
subjugating the Tang vassal Uighurs, and carrying out raids against Tang (Sinor and
Klyashtorny 1996, 327-335). Tibet twice defeated Tang incursions into Kashgaria, while
Yunnan rebelled against Tang, only to be followed by a resurgent Tang reconquering
Kashgaria and pacifying Yunnan within a 20 year period. Tang counter-balanced the
expansion of the Kaghanate by temporarily allying with Tibet to preserve the balance of
power (Grousset 1970, 105-115), while at the same time preserving the power parity
between itself and Tibet through internecine warfare. Due to internal conflict and
succession problem, the Second Turkish Kaghanate collapsed, leaving a power vacuum
in the Steppe that was quickly filled by the Uighurs, who, although allied with Tang,
nonetheless presented a separate pole in the system (Mackerras 1972), thus preserving the
tripolar structure. A rising sub-system hegemon, Nanchao, based out of Yunnan, broke
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away from Tang, expanded into Burma, and allied (submitted) itself with Tibet (Backus
1981, 68-80), thus threatening the balance of power. Uighurs responded by attacking
Tibet, through Tang help, to counter-balance Tibet, while Tang succeeded in winning
over Nanchao, thus weakening Tibet, and managing to establish a three-way peace treaty
among the poles (Beckwith 1987, 156-167).
840 AD – 880 AD Transition from Tripolar to Bipolar Structure
Two major developments around 840 altered the tripolar system: the Uighurs
collapsed due to internal revolts (primarily due to Kyrgyz and Turkish tribes) (Grousset
1970, 124-127), and the Tibetan empire disintegrated due to factionalism and civil war
(Richardson 1962, 28-34; Beckwith 1987, 171-172). A weakened Tang, having survived
several internal revolts, maintained its system-wide hegemonic status, only to be joined
by Nanchao as a new opposing pole, who had managed to conquer Tonkin, establish
dominance over much of the southeast of the system, and proceed to invade Szechwan
(Backus 1981, 144-161). Tang-Nanchao animosity characterized much of this bipolar
period, while the rest of the Far Eastern System underwent intense power diffusion, from
the Korean peninsula, to the Steppes, to the southeast of the system.
880 AD – 970 AD Transition from Bipolar to Nonpolar Structure
By the end of the century Tang was in serious decay, as increased rebellions,
warlords, and sub-units within the empire disintegrated Tang (Somers 1997, 682-689).
The fall of Tang initiated the transition of the Far Eastern System into a nonpolar
structure, as the period of Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms began: Later Liang, Later
Tang, Later Chin (Jin), Later Han, and Later Chou (Zhou) succeeded one after another in
ten year intervals during this inchoate period in the north (Standen 2009, 38-59; Gungwu
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1967, 130-188). In the south, Wu, Wuyue, Northern Han, Southern Han, Southern Tang,
Jingnan (Nanping), Later Shu, Chu, and Min (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960, 195-196;
Clark 2011, 52-66) all struggled for power, intermittently, seeking regional consolidation
and sub-system dominance (Clark 2009, 188-204).
In Korea, nearly seven political units struggled for regional hegemony with Silla,
Later Paekche, and Koryo (successors to Koguryo) being the main actors (Lee 1984, 9099), while in Manchuria Parhae struggled with both Korean political units, actors from
the north, and the incursion of nomadic Mongols. In Japan the Fujiwara period
introduced relative stability, as sub-system hegemon Kyoto remained content with
Map 4.5

regional dominance (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960; 502-505). Nanchao’s power
thoroughly declined in the Yunnan, with Tonkin, Champa, Tali, Cambodia, and a new
Dai Viet all seeking sub-system status. The situation in the Steppes was was just as
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chaotic, as the decline of Tibet and Uighur had created a power vacuum with numerous
competing political units: Turks, Kyrgyz tribes, Tibetans, and Mongols, especially the
Khitans (Grousset 1970, 125-131). The inchoate power structure began changing by
around 960, as the diffusion of power became absorbed through regional consolidation
(Lorge 2011, 225-231), taking approximately 90 years to formulate a power hierarchy in
the system and thus allow for a transition from the nonpolar structure.
970 AD – 1020 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Bipolar Structure
By 970 the Khitan Mongols had attained sub-system hegemony and expanded
south into China, conquering Parhae, establishing a sphere of influence over the Yellow
River territory, and forming the state of Liao as a system-wide hegemon (Mote 1999, 3260; Grousset 1970, 125-130). During the previous nonpolar epoch, Sung undertook a
process of power consolidation similar to Liao, overthrowing Later Chao in 960,
absorbing Southern Han, Southern Tang, and various other northern states by 980 (NapYin and K’uan-chung 2009, 206-239), and directly challenging Liao for system-wide
dominance (Mote 1999, 68-71; Twitchett and Tietze 1994, 84-86), thus positioning the
Far Eastern System in a bipolar configuration. Sung’s excessive size was matched against
Liao’s superior military, only to be supplemented by the presence of sub-system actor
Tangut (Dunnel 1994, 155-175), a powerful state established by Tibetan Tanguts, as Liao
ally (vassal?) contributing to the balancing act against Sung (Mote 1999, 171-190). In the
rest of the system, sub-system actors fought for regional hegemony both in the south
(Champa against Dai Viet), and in the periphery (Karakhanid Turks against Uighur),
while Korea became a battle ground for proxy conflict between the satellites of each pole,
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only to fall under Liao’s sphere of influence, in the same fashion as Champa and Dai Viet
in the south fell under Sung’s sphere of influence.
1020 AD – 1115 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure
During this period Tangut and Karakhanid initially succeeded in attaining systemwide status, thus joining Sung and Liao in a new multipolar power constellation. While
the latter two remained, relatively, the more powerful poles, Tangut successfully
challenged and counter-balanced Sung, while Liao continued with its consolidation of
Manchuria and extended Korea into its sphere of influence (Mote 1999, 60-68). The
Karakhanids managed to dominate the western periphery by subjugating Dzungaria and
Kashgaria (at least the west of it) (Grousset 1970, 133-147). Sub-system actors either
struggled with one another for regional hegemony, or became vassals to one of the poles:
Koryo and Manchuria vassalage to Liao; Champa vassalage to Sung; Cambodia-Burma
(Pagan) struggle; Dai Viet-Champa-Cambodia struggle, etc. Tangut and Liao challenges
to Sung reduced the latter to accepting unfavorable terms of peace (vassalage?), but the
inter-polar conflict did not alter the polar structure of the system. The system
transitioned, however, when Liao was overthrown around 1114 (Chan 1984, 52-60).
1115 AD – 1205 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure
In 1115 the Jurchen, a Tungusic people from Manchuria (Chan 1984, 51-54)
overthrew Liao (Mote 1999, 199-205), establishing the state of Chin (Jin), also known as
the Jurchen dynasty,9 submitting Koryo (Han 1970, 152-160), reducing Tangut to
vassalage (Mote 1999, 249-256), and directly challenging Sung for system-wide
hegemony (Grousset 1970, 135-138), thus transitioning the system into a bipolar

9

To alleviate any confusion between this Chin dynasty (Later Chin) and the previous Chin dynasty,
Jurchen dynasty will be utilized to refer to Later Chin.
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structure. Jurchen proceeded to attack Sung, conquering much of the Yellow River
territory, seizing Sung’s capital, and forcing the latter to flee the Yangtze River basin, yet
failing to overtake Sung in the south (Franke 1994, 226-234), thus preserving Sung’s
ability to counter-balance and maintain system-wide hegemonic status. Much of the
north, then, remained under Jurchen suzerainty, while Sung exercised dominance, via
vassal states, throughout the south of the system (Franke and Chan 1997, 58-82).
Jurchen’s drive for unipolar status was hampered by the rise of the Mongol confederation
in the north, which as former Jurchen vassals had broken loose and positioned to
potentially challenge Jurchen’s system-wide status (Grousset 1970, 192-197). After
moving their capital to Beijing, Jurchen once again attacked Sung, only to be repelled by
the latter, hence agreeing to terms of peace and continuing with the status quo.
1205 AD – 1235 AD Transition from Bipolar to Tripolar Structure
By the late 1200’s the Mongol confederation declared a Mongol empire of the
steppe under Genghis Khan, proceeding to thoroughly conquer Tangut (Dunnel 1994,
205-209), subjugate Manchuria and Korea, and threaten Jurchen (Grousset 1970, 229233), while Jurchen and Sung continued the inter-polar struggle into a stalemate (Chan
1984, 100-116). The Mongols continued their solidification of the periphery by
conquering Kashgaria and Dzungaria, overrunning the various tribal political units, and
heading south to accept the submission of Tibet (Richardson 1962, 30-33; Grousset 1970,
165-171). The inter-hegemonic conflict between Jurchen and Sung played to the benefit
of the Mongols, and while Jurchen still exercised preponderance over the north-center of
the system, as Sung did the same through the south, the drive of the Mongols for unipolar
status brought about the restructuring of the system.
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1235 AD – 1355 AD Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure
Shortly before 1235 the Mongols destroyed the Jurchen dynasty (Mote 1999, 243248; Kwanten 1979, 117), with Sung supporting the effort with the hope of alleviating
their archenemy (Grousset 1970, 244-251; Kwanten 1979, 133) and creating a bipolar
power constellation. Sung policy proved to be miscalculated, as the Mongols
immediately turned against Sung, unleashing devastating defeats against the latter. The
Jurchen remnants settled in southern Manchuria, accepting tributary status to the
Mongols, while the latter proceeded south-east from Manchuria and accepted the
submission of Koryo in the Korean peninsula (Henthorn 1971, 115-119). This was
followed by the subjugation of Kashgaria, Tibet, and the complete conquest of Sung in
1276 (Grousset 1970, 282-288). Its consolidation of unipolar dominance was
complemented by the Mongol’s adopting a new dynastic name for their state: Yuan
(Langlois 1981, 3-5). Yuan headed south and conquered the Yunnan province, submitting
or accepting vassalage-tributary status from Champa, Tali, Dai Viet, Burma, and
Cambodia (Hall 1981, 169-171; Grousset 1970, 289-291), while at the same time
encouraging the migration of Thai populations into the south to serve as its satellite
(Wyatt 1984, 44-48). Yuan’s capacity to exercise preponderance over the entire Far
Eastern System—from mainland China, to the very south of the system, to the entire
periphery in the north and west, and to the entire north-east from Manchuria to Korea—
remained neither challenged nor counter-balanced by any actor. Yuan absolute hegemony
was only inhibited by its consistent failed invasions of Japan (Reischauer and Fairbank
1960, 539-540), which remained a sub-system hegemon seeking neither expansion
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nor challenging Yuan’s system-wide hegemonic status. Around 1350 several mass
uprisings by the Chinese against their Mongol overlord crippled Yuan, and by 1355 Yuan
disintegrated into several regional statelets under given warlords (Dardess 1994, 580-586;
Mote 1999, 517-540; Kwanten 1979, 239-244). This was supplemented by an intense
civil war among the Mongols themselves, leading to two major developments: 1) the
Mongols retreating back into Mongolia, thus ending Yuan (Dardess 1973, 115-152); and
2) the birth of the Ming state, as one of the regional statelets that quickly rose to power
(Mote 1988, 11-38), defeated all challenging regional warlords, established itself in
Nanking, and attained suzerainty over southern China, while also sweeping north and
pushing Mongol remnants into the northern periphery (Grousset 1970, 321-329).
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1355 AD – 1620 AD Continuation of Unipolar Structure
The stunning rise of Ming in replacing Yuan unipolarity not only allowed for the
continuation of the unipolar epoch, but also prevented the Far Eastern System from
transitioning into a nonpolar structure, for as the historic precedent demonstrates,
nonpolarity tends to be the system’s power configuration after long periods of
unipolarity, as the process of disintegration and re-consolidation characterizes nonpolar
periods. Ming’s capacity to quickly consolidate power and assume the mantle of singular
system-wide superpower after Yuan (Dreyer 1988, 72-105) allowed for the Far Eastern
System to preserve the unipolar structure, albeit under a different system-wide hegemon.
Ming’s near 350 year singular dominance of the Far Eastern System was initially
characterized by the following developments: establishment of tributary status for
Champa, Dai Viet, Thai state of Laos, Burma, and Cambodia in the south (Mote 1999,
607-612); reducing to vassalage Koryo (and renaming it Choson) (Han 1970, 180-225;
Clark 1998, 272-287), as well as subjugating the Jurchen in Manchuria, thus establishing
sphere of influence in the north-east of the system. In the Steppe and the periphery, Ming
either neutralized Mongol tribes or engaging in the game of divide et impera through
diplomacy (Mote 1999, 608-611), such as playing the Oirat Mongols (a sub-system
hegemon acting as Ming satellite) against the Alans and other Steppe actors, while in the
process managing to impede the rise of Moghulistan as a possible system-wide actor
(Grousset 1970, 493-510). Between 1500 to 1600 the system continued to preserve a
similar power structure (Geiss 1988, 466-478; Gungwu 1998, 301-328), with Ming as the
unchallenged unipole, and the rest of the Far East encompassing either states under the
unipole’s sphere of influence, or sub-system hegemons being independent of, but neither
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challenging nor counter-balancing, the unipole: the newly formed Siam and Vietnam,
along with resurgent Burma, exercising independence, while struggling for sub-system
hegemony; Kashgaria, Dzungaria, Mongolia, and rest of the periphery displaying subsystem actors seeking regional consolidation, either independently or through Ming
assistance, yet neither seeking system-wide status; while mainland China, Manchuria,
and Korea remained under Ming dominance, with Japan (dominated by the Tokugawa
Shogunate) remaining an independent/isolated sub-system hegemon (Reischauer and
Fairbank 1960, 590-601).

Map 4.7

84

By 1620, however, famine, internal unrest, and factional alignments (Mote 1999, 779180) profoundly weakened Ming, as the system verged on the disintegration of the
unipole and a transition to nonpolarity.
1620 AD – 1660 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
The disintegration of Ming was halted by the presence of powerful princes
seeking to preserve the unipolar structure. This endeavor, however, proved unsuccessful,
as the Jurchens of Manchuria, establishing the Manchu state, consolidated regional power
and rose to challenge Ming at the system-wide level (Roth 1979, 7-30), bringing the
Koreans (Lee 1984, pp. 210-217) and tribes of eastern Mongols into its sphere of
influence, while expelling Ming out of Peking (Grousset 1970, 514-525), and ushering in
a short bipolar period. The Manchu state adapted the name of Ch’ing (Qing in pinyin)
(Crossley 1997, 78-79), expelling Ming from the north, then heading south and subduing
Ming resistance in the Yunnan (Hall 1981, 400-407), thus proving to be the more
powerful system-wide hegemon, and seeking to transition the Far Eastern System back to
a unipolar power configuration.
1660 AD – 1850 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
Ch’ing success over the Ming propelled the former to the status of unchallenged
system-wide hegemon, as Ch’ing managed to suppress several large revolts by Ming
loyalists, powerful tribes from Inner Mongolia, the Jungars of Dzungaria (Reischauer and
Fairbank 1960, pp. 356-362) the sub-system actors in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand
(Wyatt 1984, 115-122), and pretty much the rest of Southeast Asia. Ch’ing exercised
preponderance over the entire Far Eastern System with the exception of the western
periphery, as Turco-Mongol political units, from the Oirat to the Kokonors, established
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sub-system hegemonic status, successfully maintaining the periphery as their power base
against Ch’ing incursions (Grousset 1970, 525-536), while refraining from challenging
Ch’ing hegemonic status at the system-wide level. Meanwhile, around the late 1680’s the
first presence of European powers, in the form of France and England, began incursions
into the Far Eastern System by way of Siam and Formosa (Hall 1981, 380-410), initiating
what would eventually become the absorption of the Far Eastern System into the Global
Political System. Ch’ing system-wide hegemony, however, remained indifferent to such
developments, as the unipole finally succeeded in conquering Kashgaria, invading Tibet
(even reaching Nepal), submitting Mongolia into vassalage (Mote 1999, 936-940), and
thus solidifying its preponderance over the north and western periphery. While Ch’ing
system-wide hegemony continued in the Far East, the days of the Far Eastern System,
itself, remained numbered, which, in turn, meant the unipolarity of Ch’ing as well.
Absorption of the Far Eastern World Political System into the Global Political System
While European interactions with the Far Eastern System became intensified in
the late 1600’s, direct presence took place with trade and diplomatic relations around the
1790’s, with France establishing a presence in the south of the system (what would
become Indochina), and Britain seeking ports and trade routes around Formosa (Taiwan),
Hong Kong, and pretty much the south-eastern seaboard of mainland China. This was
complemented by European attempts at establishing trading ports in Japan from the
1600’s, only to be actualized in the mid-1800’s by virtue of American forcefulness. The
absorption of the Far Eastern System, that is, the end of its existence as a solitary (quasiinsulated) systemic structure, into the Global Political System, primarily came about with
the First Opium War between China/Ch’ing Dynasty and Britain, which resulted in the
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defeat of the latter, the end of the Canton System (which had limited European presence
to Macau and had thus allowed Ch’ing to control European trade in China and much of
the Far East), the cessation of Hong Kong, and the opening of five additional trade posts.
Complications with these arrangements would bring about the Second Opium War in
1856 (which also included French involvement along with U.S. and Russian interests),
also resulting in the defeat of China/Ch’ing, and the complete opening of the Far Eastern
System to the rest of the world, that is, its absorption into the Global Political System.

Analysis
The dataset for the Far Eastern World Political System, as coded utilizing the
taxonomical categories for the different modes of polarity, provide for a total of 27
observation points. Consistent with the analytical structure of other world political
systems in the dataset, the compilation of the 27 data observations allow for four methods
of analysis: 1) distribution of polar structures; 2) assessment of transitional patters after
unipolar periods; 3) gauging the duration and longevity of polar periods; and 4)
calculating probabilistic outcomes of polar structures after unipolar transitions. The
analytical considerations provide two general conclusions: unipolar transitions tend to
give way to nonpolar epochs in the Far Eastern System, and multipolar epochs never
characterize the post-unipolar structural transitions.
The most common polar structure in the Far Eastern System is the unipolar power
constellation, with 8 polar periods being coded as unipolar. While unipolarity, in relation
to other modes of polarity, is the most occurring polar structure, it is not the norm in the
system, for the distribution of the polar periods suggests a coherent balance. This is best
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demonstrated by the presence of 7 bipolar periods, making bipolarity the second most
common polar structure in the system. The third most common power configuration in
the system is nonpolarity, with 5 periods, followed by multipolarity with 4 polar epochs,
and tripolarity with 3 polar periods. Observationally, in the near 2800 years of the Far
Eastern System covered in this study, unipolarity is the polar structure approximately
30% of the time, followed by bipolarity (25%), nonpolarity (19%), multipolarity (15%),
and tripolarity (11%).
As the figures below demonstrate, the distribution of the polar structures indicate
the system’s tendency to either transition into a unipolar or bipolar structure for more
than 50% of the time, suggesting the Far Eastern System’s predisposition to gravitate
toward structures where the concentration of power is within limited number of systemwide hegemons. Multipolarity and tripolarity remain the least occurring power
constellations in the dataset. If the coding, however, fused tripolarity with multipolarity,
presupposing that any power configuration with more than two system-wide hegemons is
a multipolar structure, than multipolarity will be tied with bipolarity as the second most
occurring polar period in the system. For taxonomical and analytical reasons, however,
the distinction between the two modes remains a necessity: the diffusion or concentration
of power cannot ignore the difference between three poles and the dynamics involved
with four, five, or six poles.
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FIGURE 4.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCUTERS IN THE FAR EASTERN
SYSTEM
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FIGURE 4.2 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN THIS DATASET
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The longevity of a polar period is indicative of the system’s structural stability,
with stability pertaining to the maintenance of a single power configuration for a given
duration, as opposed to treatments of stability being gauged by conflict and war. In this
sense, the longer a polar structure, on average, demonstrates longevity, the more stable
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that given structure, vis-à-vis system’s maintenance, remains. On average, the most
durable power configuration in the Far Eastern System is unipolarity, with duration of
approximately 170 years. The second most durable polar structure is multipolarity,
averaging 147 years of longevity, followed by tripolarity with 78 years, nonpolarity with
75 years, and bipolarity with 46 years. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, by virtue of its durability,
unipolarity remains the most stable structure at the system’s level, since it takes
approximately 170 years in order for structural transition to take place. The longevity of
the multipolar system is also quite telling: whereas it was initially assumed that the Far
Eastern System demonstrates a tendency to gravitate toward structures that concentrate
power within one or two polar formations, the system’s stability of multipolarity pits the
duration of a structure against the number of occurrences for a given polar modality. This
is made obvious by the short lifespan of bipolar epochs with an average of 46 years,
against the multipolar structure’s average of 147 years. As such, while bipolarity occurs 7
times in the system against the presence of multipolarity of only 4 epochs, multipolarity
occupied the system for nearly 590 years, while bipolarity only occupied the system with
325 years.
Further contributing to this assessment is the durability of tripolarity with 78
years, almost twice the durability of bipolarity, thus potentially negating the claim that
the Far Eastern System strictly shifts towards the centralization of power. The aggregate
occurrence of unipolarity and bipolarity, with 15 data observations, is double that of the
aggregate of multipolarity and tripolarity with 7 data observations. With respect to
durability, however, the aggregate average of the centralized polar structures is 216 years,
while the aggregate average of the relatively diffused polar configurations is 225 years.
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On average then, the period of time in which the Far Eastern System had a multi, or tripolar structure is similar to the system’s stability observed during unipolar and bipolar
periods. The latter, however, still remains the least stable polar structure in the system.

FIGURE 4.3 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR STRUCTURES
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Consistent with this analysis, the durability of nonpolar periods, with an average
of 75 years, is indicative of the system’s tendency to fluctuate between the
centralization/concentration of power and its subsequent decentralization of power. As
the dataset demonstrates, all five of the nonpolar periods came after unipolar or bipolar
epochs. In this sense, the concentration of power within the system, either confined to a
single pole, or two relatively equal poles, transitions to a diffused nonpolar structure
approximately 33% of the time (of the 15 combined polar periods of unipolarity and
bipolarity, the system transitioned into a nonpolar structure 5 times). The longevity of the
nonpolar epoch is consistent with the historical data: nonpolar periods undergo the time
consuming process of regional consolidation, inter-regional sub-system conflict, the
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positioning of rising sub-system hegemons at the system-wide level, and then the
restructuring of the system into a post-nonpolar configuration.
The transition of the system’s structure after unipolarity allows for probabilistic
considerations of post-unipolar periods. With unipolarity presenting 8 polar periods, the
data provides for similar number of post-unipolar transitions (since the final unipolar
period transitioned the Far East System into its absorption by the Global Political System,
only 7 post-unipolar data observations are applicable). Figure 4.4 shows the distribution
of polar structures after the system’s transition from unipolarity: 3 periods of nonpolarity,
3 periods of bipolarity, and 1 period of tripolarity. Gauging the data probabilistically, the
unipolar structure in the Far Eastern System had a 43% chance of transitioning into a
diffused nonpolar structure, 43% chance of a more centralized bipolar structure, and 14%
chance of a tripolar structure.

FIGURE 4.4 POST-UNIPOLAR POWER CONSTELLATIONS IN FAR EASTERN
SYSTEM
Probability of Polar Structures After Unipolar Transition
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The analytical considerations of this distribution are three-fold. First, 43% of the time the
system transitions into an inchoate, diffused structure, thus transitioning from a
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centralized/concentrated structuration of power to a non-hierarchical power
configuration. Second, 43% of the time the post-unipolar system transitions into the least
stable structure, thus presupposing that the continuation of power concentration in the
system will last, on average, an additional 46 years with bipolarity. Third, the postunipolar system never transitions into a multipolar structure, indicating two possible
explanations: the concentration of power in the system during unipolarity is quite rigid,
with the unipole thoroughly suppressing the rise of sub-system hegemons, thus the result
being a diffused system after unipolarity. After which, the preponderance of the unipole
is so severe that only the most powerful sub-system hegemons are able to rise to systemwide status and provide a challenge, hence the tenability of bipolarity as opposed to
multipolarity in the post-unipolar structure. To this end, either the unipole completely
collapses, in which the system transitions to nonpolarity, and with most regional actors
being subdued, multipolarity becomes impossible; or, one or two actors manage to
consolidate enough sub-system power to stop the system from transitioning to
nonpolarity and thus challenge the unipole in a new bipolar system. In either case, the
unipolar structure in the Far Eastern System remains inhospitable to the development of
strong sub-system actors, which, in turn, thoroughly limits the post-unipolar period
transitioning into a multipolar one. The result, then, is a temporary continuation of
bipolar power concentration, or a complete diffusion of power and a transition to a
nonpolar configuration. Concomitantly, with 5 nonpolar periods in the Far Eastern
System’s 2800 year history, three of the five nonpolar epochs came after unipolar
periods.
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CHAPTER 5
THE NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM
The Near East-Middle Eastern World Political System primarily refers to the
political interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for systemwide hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region that this
given world political system encompasses. This fundamentally presupposes a group of
political units/entities/actors having relations that are, to a strong degree, permanent or
continuous with one another. Spatial-territorially, the Near East-Middle Eastern System
covers a specific geographical area, but to specify set regional and territorial boundaries
in absolute terms in the conceptualization of a world political system will obscure the
reality of the political realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political
entities at the periphery at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being
absent from the system. System’s classification, then, does not specifically rely on
establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering the political contacts,
interactions, and power configurations of system-wide hegemons that function within the
region that the given system encompasses.
The terms “Near East” and “Middle East”10 cover geographic areas that at times
overlap and at times remain mutually exclusive. To avoid any controversy, or specify
geographic designations that may not pertain specifically to one or either of the terms
used for geographic designation, both terms will be used as a singular reference to a

10

To avoid accusations of Eurocentrism, the term “Western Asia” is sometimes used to refer to the regions
designated as the “Middle East” or the “Near East.” Since this work relies on historical sources, the usage
of terms “Near East” and “Middle East” are used to be consistent and conterminous with the historical
sources. The usage of these geographic terms, then, presents no political reference to contemporary
geographic and geo-political terminology. The usage is purely historical and consistent with the historic
scholarly sources.
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geographic portion of the world that functioned as a world political system. The Near
East-Middle Eastern System, territorially, includes the global region that covers the
following areas: from its eastern periphery it ranges from western Iran in the south and up
north through the Zagros Mountains and into the Armenian Highlands of south
Transcaucasia; heading westward, it covers all of Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf to
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and extends to the Mediterranean coast of Syro-Palestine;
to the north it covers the entirety of Anatolia/Asia Minor all the way to the Aegean; and
further south and south west, it encompasses Egypt, with the rest of northern Africa, from
Libya to Numidia, serving as its south-western most periphery. In this sense, the term
“Middle East,” for example, covers much of the territory within the designated world
political system, but fails to include parts of Transcaucasia and North Africa west of
Egypt, while including Afghanistan that is not part of the designated world political
system. Similarly, the term “Wider Near East,” historically, covers the regions primarily
associated with the Ottoman Empire, thus including all of the Balkans and various coasts
of the Black Sea, which are not part of the designated world political system, while
failing to include much of the Arabian Peninsula that is, in fact, part of the designated
world political system. Consequently, the limited designation of the term “Near East,” as
opposed to “Wider Near East,” specifically covers Anatolia, northern Syria, and upper
and central Mesopotamia: territories that make up only part of the designated world
political system. For these reason, the geographic designations “Middle East” and “Near
East” are connected together by a hyphen and used as a single designation to
conceptualize the region of the world that makes up the Near East-Middle Eastern World
Political System.
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Data collection for polar periods within the Near East-Middle Eastern System
begins around 2600 BC, where basic city-states have begun forming in parts of
Mesopotamia, Syro-Palestine (Mediterranean Coast) and southern Anatolia. Egypt, by
this time, has a highly-developed civilization, but Egypt’s interaction with the rest of the
system remains almost non-existent until the 1600’s BC, and as such, Egypt remains
classified as a sub-system hegemon at the periphery. Considerations of polar structures
prior to this period present obvious complications: historical evidence is rather limited;
formation of political units that function at the system-wide or sub-system level are quite
unclear; and inter political interactions between newly-forming political units are
structurally so underdeveloped that it makes no analytical sense to classify such
developments through the criteria of polar structuration. For these reasons, the coding of
polar periods in the Near East-Middle Eastern system begins from 2600 BC.
2600 BC – 2330 BC Nonpolar Structure
Southern Mesopotamia, during this period, was comprised of approximately thirty
five city states, “more or less evenly divided over the region” (Van de Mieroop 2004, 43).
The agrarian economic structure of the region, primarily in Babylonia, gave way to intercity competition over agricultural land, reifying the nonpolar power configurations of this
period by virtue of the excessive diffusion of power within the system. The irredentist
aspirations of city-states to expand their sphere, or zone, of influence contributed to the
inchoateness and the absence of any power hierarchies in the Near East-Middle Eastern
System, which, in turn, provided the opportunity for rising sub-system hegemons to seek
to consolidate regional power and thus provide some form of possible hierarchy to the
system. Political units such as Lagash, Umma, Ur, Eridu, Adab, Isin, Kish, Shuruppak,
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Larsa, Nippur, and various other prominent city-states methodically began positioning to
fill the vacuum (Hall 1960, 182-190, 210-211). Uruk, for example, sought expansion
around 2400 BC, conquering Ur, only to be soon challenged by Umma, as the latter not
only conquered Uruk, but also Lagash, Ur, and the entire south of Babylon. Such
conquests, however, were ephemeral, since coalitions and counter-coalitions among citystates either challenged or undid the attempt of centralizing and concentrating power by
given rising actors. The cases of Kish, Lagash, Umma, Sumer, and Uruk are cases in
point (Langdon 1923, 373-401).
Outside of Southern Mesopotamia, rising city-states in the Levant and Northern
Mesopotamia began establishing minor centers of power in the region, while expanding
the Near East-Middle Eastern System into Anatolia, thus creating a link between the
north and south of the system primarily through trade and diplomacy. Some of these
states included Nagar, Shehna, Urkesh, Mari, Ebla, Ugarit, Assur, Carchemis, and
Byblos. To the east, Susa, Ansham, and Elam began economic interactions with the
Babylonian/South Mesopotamian city-states, thus establishing inter-civilizational
relations between the periphery of the system at edges of modern-day Iran and the core of
the system along the Euphrates (Podany 2010, 20-29). Diplomatic and economic relations
also extended into the Persian Gulf region, especially to eastern Arabia and Oman. The
south west of the system, during this period, remained excluded, as interactions between
the sub-system hegemon Egypt and the rest of the political actors in Northern and
Southern Mesopotamia were either nonexistent, or the historical evidence has not yet
substantiated it. In totality, then, extensive diffusion of power throughout the entire
system, with a large number of centers of power remaining unable to consolidate power
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within their regional settings, contributed to the nonpolar structure of the system during
this period by virtue of failing to establish any system-wide hegemonic actors.
2330 BC – 2150 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure
The diffused power structure of the previous epoch witnessed a rapid
consolidation, especially in Babylonia, as the Akkad dynasty, previously ruling the citystates of Sumer and Akkad, undertook a precipitous process of political centralization,
temporarily ending the system of city-states and establishing a large presence throughout
much of Mesopotamia. Initial conquest of Kish and solidification of power in northern
Babylon led to expansion into the south, where much resistance was provided by rising
sub-system actors Uruk and Umma. Akkad’s conquest of these actors was followed by
dominance of Adab and Lagash (Langdon 1923b, 403-421). Consequently, Akkad realtered the formerly independent city-states by integrating them “within a larger structure
in every respect, politically, economically, and ideologically” (Van de Mieroop 2004,
60). Attention was then applied to the political units in western Iran, conquering and
exercising dominance over Simmurum, Prahshum, Susa, and Elam (Langdon 1923b, 418420). This was followed by expeditions into northern Syria and the upper Euphrates,
overwhelming Tuttul, Dagan, Nagar, Urkesh, Shehna, and the most prominent political
centers in the region, Ebla and Mari (Podany 2010, 58-59). Expansion into the Persian
Gulf was undertaken for economic reasons, as selective raids were utilized to monopolize
crucial trade routes, offering Akkad important commerce from such diverse regions as
Bahrain, Oman, and the Indus valley (Podany 2010, 35-51).
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Map 5.1

After approximately 180 years of unipolarity, the Near East-Middle Eastern
System witnessed the collapse of the Akkadian empire, as the system-wide hegemon
remained unable to curb the intense political fragmentation that soon followed. Several
explanations are suggested for the disintegration of Akkad, and the underlying reason, it
appears, is a clustering of all presumed factors. The irredentism of the unipole, coupled
with incessant campaigning and consistent expansionism, slowly emboldened local actors
to seek defensive measures against Akkadian preponderance, thus laying the groundwork
for potential secessionism or independence. Economic decline, famine, demographic
shifts, and environmental degradation also had a devastating effect on Akkad’s capacity
to preserve its system-wide status: increasing aridity, supplemented by low rainfall and
drought, skyrocketed grain prices and led to severe scarcity, thus contributing to famine
and rapid demographic shifts. These explanatory factors played a crucial role in shaping
the subsequent outcome that ended the unipolar epoch: the Gutians, nomadic barbarians
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from the Zagros Mountains of Iran, poured into Mesopotamia, conquering Babylonia and
ending Akkadian unipolarity (Langdon 1923b, 422-426).
2150 BC – 2110 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
The decline of the system-wide hegemon presented the system without any
coherent structures or hierarchies of power, as Akkadian preponderance had not only
alleviated possible challengers for system-wide status, but had also formulated a political
and economic system of dependence upon the unipole. For this reason, the collapse of
Akkad immediately resulted in rapid diffusion of power, as no sub-system hegemons
were initially present to assume some system-wide positioning, while rising regional
actors seeking sub-system status lacked sufficient power and resources to fill in the
vacuum. The singular concentration of power, from the initial nonpolar period to the
subsequent unipolar structure, saw a return to a new nonpolar structure, since the capacity
of actors to consolidate and engage in some concentration of power, even at the local and
regional level, remained absent after the fall of the single system-wide hegemon. While
economic trade and forms of commerce were sustained within the new structure of citystates or groupings of political units, albeit in a much decreased form, political
interactions remained somewhat unclear or inchoate. In this forty year period, then, the
fragmentation of power, and the dispersion of previously centralized political units,
allowed for a power constellation within the Near East-Middle Eastern System that was
one of nonpolarity.
2110 BC – 2010 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure
During the previous nonpolar period, regional actors proceeded to consolidate
power, which brought about inter sub-system hegemonic conflict, as these rising political
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units sought to restructure the system within a new form of power hierarchy. While the
Gutians, after the fall of Akkad, sought to concentrate power in north Babylonia, Uruk, in
southern Babylonia, had already positioned itself as a sub-system hegemon. The outcome
was a bipolar conflict between rising sub-system actors for system-wide positioning,
resulting in the victory of Uruk and the expulsion of the Gutians from much of
Mesopotamia. The dynasty at Uruk proceeded to impose dominance over all of
Babylonia and greater part of southern Mesopotamia, while switching its capital from
Uruk to Ur (Langdon 1923c, 435-436), and seeking to reestablish a unipolar structure
similar to Akkad. Ur expansion proceeded east, into western Iran, reclaiming Susa and
taking Awan, while campaigning the Tigris River and the Zagros Mountains, and
establishing full control over the area from Susa in the south to the Mosul plains in the
north (438-440).
Ur’s preponderance of the system was quite different from Akkad, for Ur was
geographically more restricted vis-à-vis size, yet it had more internal centralization of
power. For this reason, while the previous unipolar structure did not allow the presence of
any rising sub-system actors, Ur’s modality of preponderance was rather different: areas
under direct Ur rule were highly centralized, regions to the east between Tigris and
Zagros were militarily controlled, but the rest of the Near East was dealt with either
diplomatically or through economic interactions. While some of these economic
interactions presupposed military raids, much of the trade, however, involved the
exporting of wool and textiles from Babylonia in exchange for copper and stones, and in
this sense, “Ur’s contacts with the east and south were thus for the purpose of obtaining
mineral resources, through trade, diplomacy, and military raids” (Van de Mieroop 2004,
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75). By virtue of such developments, Ur unipolarity was not as dominant as Akkad’s,
which, in turn, allowed regional actors in much of northern Mesopotamia, the Levant,
and in the east to consolidate power as sub-system actors. Two rising sub-system
hegemons, the Amorites from the west (primarily from northern Syria) and Elamites from
the east, would challenge and end Ur unipolarity (Langdon 1923c, 456-460). Similar to
what the Gutians did to Akkad, the Amorites poured into Babylonia, thus greatly
weakening Ur’s capacity to exercise preponderance as the only system-wide hegemon.
This was supplemented by an invasion from Elam, formerly a subject of Ur and a rising
regional power. Elam’s conquest of Ur, and much of western Iran that was under Ur
military dominance, ended the unipolar structure.
2010 BC – 1980 BC Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure
The transformation of the power configurations from unipolarity did not give way
to extensive diffusion of power, since the existing sub-system hegemons filled the
structural power hierarchy of the system by positioning at the system-wide level. The
formation of Isin, from the remnants of Ur, as a system-wide hegemon, became
substantiated as it immediately challenged and expelled the Elamite invaders from
Babylonia (Thompson 1923, 470-473), thus presuming system-wide status by virtue of
exercising sub-system hegemony. While the Elamites were expelled from Babylonia,
Elam, itself, became a system-wide hegemon by both establishing regional dominance
and counter-balancing other system-wide actors (Podany 2010, 67-68). In northern
Mesopotamia, Assur established itself as one of the powerful actors in the region (Kuhrt
1995, 81-88), only to elevate itself to system-wide hegemonic status by both exercising
preponderance over the region and countering any system-wide challenges to its status. In
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central Mesopotamia, east of the Tigris, Eshnunna also positioned itself as a system-wide
hegemon, exercising extensive regional dominance (Yuhong 1994), while also acting at
the system-wide level. While Egypt remained in the periphery, and its interactions with
the rest of the system, similar to previous epochs, was rather lacking, its preponderance
over the entire Nile Valley and up north into the Mediterranean is noted. During this
thirty year period, then, the multipolar structure of the system was sustained by the
regional actors that had managed to consolidate and exercise some power under the
previous unipolar epoch. Consequently, their rise to system-wide status was a transitional
byproduct of reifying the power configurations of the system.
1980 BC – 1890 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure
The previous multipolar structure transitioned into a unipolar power constellation
by virtue of three general developments. First, since the presence of several system-wide
hegemons was a byproduct of the decline of the previous unipole, each of the hegemonic
actors were presuming system-wide status as an extension of their existing regional
power base. Second, once this reality set in, the transformation of the system allowed for
the more powerful system-wide hegemon to presume unipolar status without being
challenged by the other actors in the system. And third, since the previous system-wide
hegemons became such through default, their demotion to sub-system hegemonic status
was not inherently problematic, unstable, or violent as it would be expected. Simply put,
by the end of the thirty year multipolar period, it had become evident that Isin, in fact,
was the most powerful system-wide actor, and since all of the previous system-wide
actors either lacked the ability or the will to challenge and counter-balance Isin, they
accepted a return to sub-system status and thus recognized the positioning of Isin as the
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single system-wide hegemon. Isin proceeded to establish dominance through the entire
region of Babylonia and southern Mesopotamia, assuming control over Ur, Uruk, and
Lagash in the south, while solidifying power to the north through Babylon, Kish, and
Nippur (Van de Mieroop 2004, 85-88). The absence of any challenges to Isin’s unipolar
status provided the Near Eastern-Middle Eastern System with nearly a century of peace,
as the sub-system hegemons remained content or unwilling to engage in revisionism,
while the system-wide hegemon sought neither irredentist policies nor an overexpansion
of power. The power configurations of the system, then, were defined by a single systemwide hegemon and a set of several sub-system hegemons, which included Elam,
Eshnunna, Assur, and, by around 1930, the rising power of Larsa.
1890 BC – 1800 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
By nineteenth century BC, the polar structuration of the system had not only
transitioned, but had also developed into a complex hierarchy of competing powers, both
at the system-wide and at the sub-system level. Around the 1890’s Larsa, a rising subsystem hegemon in southern Babylonia, challenged Isin unipolarity (Thompson 1923,
480-482), thus transitioning the system into a bipolar structure, which, in turn, gave way
to a more diffused concentration of power throughout this world political system. Elam,
Eshnunna, Mari, along with a rising Babylon, and a very powerful Yamkhad from
northern Syria (southern Anatolia) (Langdon 1923c, 444-449), began engaging in subsystem hegemonic conflict, as each actor sought to solidify regional dominance and
expansion into the spheres of influence of other sub-system actors. Within this context,
the inter sub-system hegemonic conflict allowed Isin and Larsa to play out their bipolar
struggle without any of the regional actors having the capacity to rise up as an additional
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pole in the system. Larsa managed to attain full control of the regions in the south (all the
way to the Persian Gulf) and east (until Nippur) of Babylonia, thus containing Isin to
primarily central Babylonia (Van de Mieroop 2004, 87), which, in turn, allowed
peripheral states under Isin’s sphere of influence to reject the former unipole’s suzerainty.
Larsa’s threat to the balance of power gave way to an alliance between Isin, Babylon and
Uruk. But Larsa’s defeat of the coalition, followed by the destruction of Uruk sustained
the former’s position as one of the reigning poles in the system.
The ephemeral polarization under the given system-wide hegemons allowed for
the preservation of the bipolar system, but at the same time contributed to the internecine
conflict between sub-system actors. Eshnunna’s rising power, for example, and its
expansion into Mari territory, gave way to Elam, Mari, and Babylon forming an alliance,
with Larsa’s approval, and offering Eshnunna a devastating defeat. Elam’s expansion in
its region, which included Susa and the Zagros highlands around Anshan, along with
Elam’s role as an important player in the macropolitics of the system, gave way to an
alliance between Eshnunna and rising Babylon, which would soon extend pressure on
Elam’s role as a regional powerhouse (Potts 1999, 189-207). The pole formed by Larsa
would in turn seek expansion into Elamite territories, which, consequently, led Elam to
join the pole led by Isin, which included Uruk and other local Babylonian actors. By the
end of the century, the growing strength of Larsa had reduced Isin’s capacity as a systemwide actor, hence the latter’s consistent need to rely on its sub-system allies.
Concomitantly, the inter sub-system hegemonic conflict reduced the number of powerful
sub-system hegemons in the system, as the cases of Eshnunna and Elam demonstrate.
Within this developing structure, the bipolar system transitioned into a tripolar system, as
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Larsa maintained its system-wide status, but was soon challenged by Hammurabi’s
Babylon, and a new actor in the north of Babylonia, known as the Kingdom of Upper
Mesopotamia.
1800 BC – 1760 BC Transition from Bipolar to Tripolar Structure
Of the three poles within the system, Larsa remained the weakest and in decline,
with the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia being perhaps the most powerful, while
Babylon sustained a middle ground, assuaging the balance of power. What became the
Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia initially began with the city-state of Assur, only to
expand into northern Syria, the Habur valley, followed by a conquest of the powerful
sub-system hegemon Mari. By the 1800’s, the entire region north of Babylonia, from the
Tigris in the east to Balikh in the west, came to form the Kingdom of Upper
Mesopotamia (Van de Mieroop 2004, 101). Babylon found itself bordered by the
relatively more powerful Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia to the north, and Larsa to the
south, while still having to balance the alliance formations and inter-regional conflict
between many of the sub-system hegemons (especially Eshnunna and Elam). Babylon’s
position as system-wide hegemon was rather unique: it selectively and strategically
“bandwagoned” or “shirked” with the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia, but at the same
time remained a power player in the sub-system hegemonic conflicts, while continuously
positioning itself as a counter-balance and a potential challenge to its neighbor to the
north. In this sense, as Larsa continued to methodically decline, while the Kingdom of
Upper Mesopotamia sought overexpansion, Babylon chose to engage in resource
maximization and bid for time (103-104). Consequently, the slightest weakening in the
structural positions of either of the poles immediately gave way to Babylonian
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revisionism, hence transitioning the system, in merely 5 years, from a tripolar structure to
a unipolar one.
1760 BC – 1710 BC Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure
By the 1770’s, the Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia’s overexpansion brought it
into severe conflict with regional actors, especially the sub-system hegemons Yamkhad
and Enshnunna (Kupper 1973, 14-18). The result was a devastating defeated levelled
upon the former, which gave way to its disintegration as a political unit, and the
reification of local powers and collection of small independent states. The ability of
Yamkhad or Enshunna to fill this vacuum and assume system-wide status was
immediately curtailed by the speed with which Babylon assumed unipolar
preponderance.
Babylon immediately assumed dominance over southern Mesopotamia by
defeating Larsa, along with all given actors that were under Larsa’s sphere of influence
(Ur, Uruk, Lagash, Eridu) and thus absorbing the entire southern region (Kupper 1973,
24-27). Upon removing the remaining system-wide hegemon, Babylon proceeded to
subjugate Elam to the East, Eshnunna in central Mesopatamia, and Mari to the northwest. This was followed by a protracted conflict in the north against a rising Assyria,
which gave Babylonian ascendancy by virtue of Assyria’s acceptance of tributary status
(Thompson 1923, 487-493). Thus, from the Persian Gulf in the south, to the Zagros
Mountains to the east, the Middle Euphrates and Nippur in the center, Mari in upper west
Mesopotamia, and Assur in the north, Babylon exercised unchallenged preponderance.
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Map 5.2

The structure of this unipolar hierarchy, then, included Babylon as the single
system-wide hegemon, with a weakened Elam as a sub-system hegemon subject to the
unipole, Yamkhad as a powerful sub-system hegemon in the north that remained outside
the reach of Babylon (Kupper 1973, 35-34), and Egypt in the periphery that, while not
being incorporated in the Near East-Middle Eastern System yet, had limited interactions
with other actors in the region through selective trade and commerce. Concomitantly, no
actor in the system presented the capacity or the ability to either challenge or counterbalance Babylon, for its preponderance and extraordinary concentration of power over
the system had either thoroughly weakened potential regional actors, or, as in the case of
Yamkhad, had necessitated the latter, by virtue of severe power disparity, to avoid
confrontation and seek preservation through geographic distance. Due to the level of
power concentration within this specific unipolar structure, the system underwent severe
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power diffusion after the disintegration of Babylon. Series of rebellions in the south gave
way to Babylon’s loss of control of southern Mesopotamia, which, in turn, thoroughly
ended its sphere of influence in the east (Elamite territories), the north west (Euphrates
and Syria), and upper Mesopotamia. Reduced to northern Babylonia, it sustained itself
only as a regional actor, thus losing its system-wide status and ending the unipolar period.
1710 BC – 1550 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
The decline of Babylon as the only system-wide hegemon introduced great deal of
inchoateness in the Near East-Middle Eastern System, for the power configurations of the
system had been structured to accommodate a unipolar system with a set of sub-system
actors sustaining regional coherence. Three general developments explain the transition
from the previous unipolar period to a nonpolar structure. First, the diffusion of power
did not give way to regional disintegration, and as such, sub-system actors still exercised
a great deal of power. At the same time, since they had been constrained and limited to
primarily function at the regional level, no subsystem actor had the relative capabilities or
the revisionist aspirations to attain system-wide status. Two, since power diffusion was
intense at the system-wide level, it remained rather concentrated at the regional level,
which allowed for a large number of centers of power to be established throughout the
system, hence reifying the nonpolar structure. Third, the introduction of the IndoEuropean people, primarily in the form of the Hurrians and the Hittites, as political units
that had established regional relevance in western Asia Minor/Anatolia (both terms are
used interchangeably, but due to the use of Anatolia by historic sources, this is the term
that will be used in this work), further contributed to the dispersion of power at the
system-wide level, yet consolidation of power at the regional level (Kupper 1973, 36-41).
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The outcome, then, was intermittent inter-regional conflict, with existing sub-system
hegemons primarily seeking to preserve their regional status, while the new IndoEuropean actors consistently infringed unto their neighbors in the south, primarily in the
Levant and Upper and Lower Mesopotamia, only to retreat back to their original
territories. The absence of any single actor, at the system-wide level, is the primary
explanatory variable that designates the power structure of this period as nonpolar.
The Hittite expansion from central Anatolia into the Levant brought it into
conflict with Yamkhad, with this inter sub-system hegemonic conflict leading to the
weakening of the latter, but not resulting in its destruction, since the former failed to
occupy Aleppo or other centers of Yamkhad power (Gurney 1973, 240-245). The result,
however, was diffusion of power within this specific region, as the weakening of
Yamkhad gave way to the rise of local actors seeking regional recognition. Similarly, the
Hittite conquest of Babylon was not followed by consolidation of power, which, in turn,
resulted in more political confusion and disintegration within the region.
The political disintegration in the Levant and Mesopotamia, and the absence of
any powers filling the void in the structural hierarchy, further contributed to the
nonpolarity of the Near East-Middle Eastern System. Concomitantly, internal
complications within the Hittites (Old Hittite Kingdom) thoroughly limited its
consolidation of power beyond its Anatolian base. During these developments, southern
Levant, or the Syro-Palestinian region, saw the development of robust city-states, which,
while interacting with the rest of the system, also opened up important interactions with
Egypt in the periphery (Kenyon 1973, 77-85). In this sense, Egypt was slowly becoming
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absorbed as an important actor in the system, as opposed to remaining limited to its subsystem functions in the periphery.
In totality, then, during this approximate 160 years of nonpolarity, the Near EastMiddle Eastern System had no system-wide actors, but rather a high number of centers of
power: a rising Assyria and powerful Mitanni (Hurrian kingdom) in upper Mesopotamia;
declining and then resurgent Babylon, under the Kassites, in lower Mesopotamia;
Sealand dynasty in Sumaria; Yamkhad and Qatna in north Syria (upper Levant); Elam in
the east (Hinz 1973b, 267-271); the Old Hittite Kingdom in Anatolia; rising Kizzuwatna
in southern Anatolian; Hatti (a new Hittite kingdom) in central Anatolia; Egypt in the
south-western periphery of the system in the Nile Valley of north Africa; and several
mid-sized regional powers in the form of city-states primarily in Syro-Palestine (Arzawa
in the western periphery of Anatolia, Alashiya in Cyprus, Amurru in northwest Syria,
Byblos in central Levant, Kadesh in northern Levant, and Damascus) (Liverani 2000, 69).
1550 BC – 1450 BC Transformation from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure
By mid-16th century BC, the Near East-Middle Eastern System had reached its
fullest integration, with the previous nonpolar period giving way to the development of
what became known as the Great Power’s Club. A general term used by historians, this is
primarily a reference to the establishment of powerful system-wide hegemons that
managed to consolidate power during the nonpolar epoch and transition the system into a
multipolar structure that was fundamentally defined by a balance of power. Mitanni,
centered in north Syria, between Euphrates and the Tigris, would expand its power to the
south coast of Anatolia and further reach the borders of Babylonia (Grimal 1992, 213;
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Hallo and Simpson, 1998, 107-109; Van de Mieroop 2004, 141-144). The Hittite state of
Hatti dominated all of central Anatolia, parts of southern Anatolia, and extended west to
the bordering states on the coast of the Aegean (Bryce 1998, 110-112). Hatti’s eventual
expansion will methodically encroach east and south upon Kizzuwatna’s and Mitanni’s
territory (Hogarth 1924, 262-264), but initially, Hatti was consumed with deterring subsystem hegemons in northern Anatolia and western Asia Minor, while also dealing with
internal problems (Gurney 1973b, 677-680). Kizzuwatna was perhaps the weakest of the
five system-wide hegemons, based out of southern Anatolia, circling the Taurus
Mountains, and primarily covering the region that would become Cilicia (Van de
Mieroop 2004, 146-148).
Serving as a power player in the balancing act between the relatively more
powerful Mitanni, Hatti, and Egypt, Kizzuwatna maintained its system-wide status by
initially allying with Mitanni, then shifting allegiances to Hatti, while at the same time
preserving its position within the system. Babylon had slowly re-emerged from its initial
decay under the new leadership of the Kassites (Drower 1973, 437-439), managing to
absorb the southern kingdom of Sealand, and re-establish Babylonian regional dominance
over southern Mesopotamia, while also having ambitious claims over Assyria in the north
(Van de Mieroop 2004, 164). The least revisionist of the reigning poles in the system,
Babylon primarily sought to preserve the status quo through diplomacy and trade.
Egypt’s expansion from the Nile Valley into Nubia in the south (Bryan 2000, 223-234),
and into Syro-Palestine to the north (Hornung 1999, 80), introduced Egypt as one of the
more active and irredentist system-wide hegemons during this period.
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Map 5.3

Since southern and central Mesopotamia remained stable under Babylon’s nonrevisionist policies, while Hatti initially dealt with internal problems and then solidified
its dominance over the large geographical region of Anatolia (Bryce 1998, 120-123),
much of the inter-hegemonic conflict took place in Syro-Palestine between Egypt and
Mitanni, with Kizzuwatna initially succeeding as a powerbroker, but eventually being
absorbed by Mitanni (Drower 1973, 457-464). Egypt’s expansion into Palestine
immediately brought it into conflict with Mitanni, as Egypt overwhelmed Mitanni vassals
in the region, reaching the important states of Ugarit and Kadesh (Van de Mieroop 2004,
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154). Mittani, in the meanwhile, taking advantage of Hatti’s temporary indifference to
system-wide developments due to its internal complications, had pushed westward,
exercising preponderance over the strategic city-states of Aleppo and Alalakh, while
subjugating Kizzuwatna and reducing it to a sub-system actor around the 1470’s (Bryce
1998, 125-130). Around 1457 Mitanni orchestrated a coalition of north Syrian states,
prominently including Kadesh, in a direct challenge against Egypt, only to be defeated by
the latter and thus having to retreat from southern Syro-Palestine (Hornung 1999, 87-9;
Sicker 200, 30-32). Ten years later Egypt’s expedition reached the Euphrates, and
crossing the river, Egypt dealt a severe defeat upon Mitanni, proceeding to conquer
Kadesh and establish control over much of Syro-Palestine (Grimal 1992, 215-216; Bryan
2000, 244-251).
The power configurations of the system, then, during this period, was defined by
five system-wide hegemons, with two of the more active actors (Egypt and Mitanni)
confronting each other for dominance over Syro-Palestine, a third actor (Kizzuwatna)
attempting to preserve its system-wide status in relation to the relatively more powerful
actors, and Hatti and Babylon maintaining regional hegemony while also holding systemwide status by virtue of diplomacy and equal recognition from the other system-wide
hegemons in the system. Concomitantly, the initial 5 poles (being reduced to 4 at end of
the period) were supplemented by a set of sub-system hegemons: Arzawa and Ahhiyawa
in western Anatolia; Amurru and Kadesh in north Syria; a rising Assyria in north
Mesopotamia; and a nascent Elam in the east.
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1450 BC – 1345 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure
Egypt’s defeat of Mitanni transitioned the multipolar structure into a unipolar one,
for Egypt’s dominance of the system, during this period, remained neither matched nor
counter-balanced by any other actor. By incorporating the entire coastal strip of SyroPalestine, Egypt’s preponderance of the system spread from the southern peripheries of
Nubia and up north into Sinai, Canaan, Amurru, Upe, Carchemish, and the coastal areas
of all of northern Syria and parts of southern Anatolia. Unable to match or challenge
Egyptian unipolarity, previous system-wide hegemons accepted positioning at the subsystem level, as the Hittites, Babylonians, and the rising Assyrian’s sent tribute in
recognition of Egypt’s unchallenged dominance of the system (Grimal 1992, 215-216;
Bryan 2000, 245-248).
Egypt’s dominance of the entire Levant also made Egypt the economic might of
the Near East-Middle Eastern System, as its control over seaports and trade routes,
coupled with extensive collection of tributes from its vassals in Syro-Palestine, not to
mention access to vast amounts of gold from Nubia, allowed for Egypt’s reification of its
unipolar status. The power hierarchy during Egypt’s unipolarity, in this sense, did not
undergo serious concentration of power, since many of the sub-system hegemons
remained relatively powerful in their own rights within their own regions. The unipolar
structure, then, was fundamentally a byproduct of these powerful sub-system hegemons
not being powerful enough to either challenge or counter-balance Egypt, thus either
bandwagoning (Babylon) or shirking (Hatti).
A temporary resurgence by Mitanni, after an uprising by Kadesh against Egypt,
proved to be fruitless (Hall 1960, 345-353). This was followed by Mitanni turning its
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attention east, undertaking an inter sub-hegemonic conflict with Assyria, defeating the
latter, and inciting rebellion against Egypt through Carchemish and other vassals in SyroPalestine (Grimal 1992, 216-219). Egypt’s excessive economic might, robust diplomacy,
and well-placed garrisons throughout Syro-Palestine proved Mitanni incapable of
seriously challenging Egyptian unipolarity (Cook 1924, 299-301). This was more
thoroughly confirmed by Mitanni’s acceptance of an alliance with Egypt (Van de
Mieroop 2004, 147), thus assuming sub-system positioning, through which Egypt
allowed parts of northern Syria to Mitanni, while maintaining control over strategic cities
and ports (Bryce 1998, 155-159; Grimal 1992, 219). Mitanni’s reversal from being a
revisionist state to one that supported the status quo may also be attributed to the threat it
received from Hatti, since the latter demonstrated possible system-wide aspirations, and a
potential challenge to Egyptian unipolarity, by overwhelming Anatolian sub-system
hegemons Arzawa and Assuwa, while also heading south and dominating Kizzuwatna,
Aleppo, and posing a direct threat to Mitanni (Bryan 2000, 250-255; Bryce 1998, 135148).
The possible transition of the system, in the 1390’s, from unipolarity to HattiEgypt bipolarity was hindered by the former’s inability to thoroughly consolidate power
in Anatolia, as attacks from a revived Arzawa and the nomadic Kaska from the north
forced Hatti to stop its system-wide ambitions and return to regional consolidation. By
the 1350’s, Egyptian unipolarity was supplemented by the presence of several, albeit
bandwagoning, powerful sub-system hegemons: Mitanni (tributary); Babylon (tributary);
Assyria (had broken off from Mitanni suzerainty and become a tributary to Egypt); Elam
(non-aligned in eastern periphery); and a resurgent Hatti (revisionist).
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Map 5.4

1345 BC – 1290 BC Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure
Hatti’s direct challenge to Egyptian unipolarity structurally altered the Near EastMiddle Eastern System, as powerful sub-system hegemons, capitalizing on the relative
weakening of Egypt, sought positioning at the system-wide level, and curtailed tributary
or bandwagoning behavior. Hatti’s invasion of Mitanni, Egypt’s close ally and tributary
in the region, was followed by absorption of Kizzuwatna, conquest of Aleppo and
Kadesh, and the establishment of vassal relations with Ugarit, Byblos, and Amurru
(Bryce 1998, 170-190; Van de Mieroop 2004, 147-148). Hatti’s complete dominance of
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northern Syria was solidified as Carchemish and Amki were removed from the Egyptian
camp and placed under the former’s suzerainty. This was followed by the destruction of
sub-system hegemon Arzawa in western Anatolia, and subsequent Hatti hegemony over
the regions of Anatolia and northern Levant (Hogarth 1924, 263-265). The demotion of
Mitanni to Hatti vassal introduced a new system-wide actor into the system: Assyria. A
once Mitanni vassal, and sub-system hegemon, Assyria positioned itself at the systemwide level, demanding recognition from Hatti (even temporarily encroaching on its
sphere of influence) and Egypt, and challenging Babylon for dominance of upper
Mesopotamia (Campbell 1924, 234-237; Gadd 1975, 28-30). Babylon, in turn, assumed
system-wide status by forming an alliance with Hatti, while balancing its relationship
with Egypt (not as a tributary, but as equals), only to proceed to a protracted war with
Assyria to the north (Gadd 1975, 28-33).
In the meantime, Elam attained system-wide status by establishing equal relations
with all the other system-wide hegemons, relying more on its economic and diplomatic
successes rather than on military expansionism (Potts 1999, 209-230; Hinz 1973, 112119). Within these developments, Egypt’s inability to placate Hatti ambitions gave way
to structural consequences in which powerful sub-system tributaries transitioned from
status quo preservation to revisionist behavior, as Babylon, Elam, and Assyria assumed
system-wide hegemonic status, joining Hatti and Egypt in a five pole multipolar
structure.
1290 BC – 1210 BC Transition from Multipolar to Tripolar Structure
Two major developments during this period transformed the previous multipolar
structure into a tripolar power configuration: Assyria’s defeat of Babylon and Elam’s
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unexplained retreat (Wiseman 1975, 340-346; Labat 1975, 379-384) from the systemwide level (Munn-Rankin 1975, 288-290). Assyria undertook an intense expansionist
policy during this period, thoroughly defeating Babylon, thus reducing it to sub-system
status, and extending its presence into the northern hills of the Zagros Mountains. Much
of former Mitanni territory east of the Euphrates was also annexed by Assyria, along with
expansion into northern Syria at the expense of Hatti (Van de Mieroop 2004, 171), only
to be followed by Assyrian expansion all the way to the Uruarti-Nairi regions in the
Armenian Plateau, thus covering much of middle and upper Mesopotamia, northeastern
and east Anatolia, and northern Syria (Munn-Rankin 1975, 280-292).
Egypt attempted to reclaim its lost sphere of influence in north Syria by
challenging Hatti’s gains during the previous epoch, retrieving Tyre, Byblos, Amurru,
and Ugarit back to its sphere of influence (Bryce 1998, 255-263). The result was a
massive reaction by Hatti in the famous Battle of Kadesh, as close victory against Egypt
symbolically left much of Syria under Hatti sphere of influence, while much of Palestine
managed to establish independence from Egypt (Grimal 1992, 251-256). The recognition
of Hatti’s pyrrhic victory, coupled with the exhaustion of both sides, gave way to what
would become a long-lasting peace treaty between the two system-wide hegemons in
1259, as both sides recognized each other’s spheres of influence, sought to preserve the
status quo, and agreed to mutual assistance in cases of war or internal rebellion (Hornung
1999, 110-112; Bryce 1998, 308-312). By the end of the century, the tripolar structure of
a much weakened Egypt, a disintegrating Hatti, and an internally decaying Assyria, was
supplemented by much weaker sub-system hegemons in the forms of Babylon and Elam,
along with rising number of independent small actors in much of Syro-Palestine.
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1210 BC – 1120 BC Transition from Tripolar to Nonplar Structure
During this period, the “entire system collapsed” (Van de Mieroop 2004, 158),
with two general factors explaining these developments: the inflow of the Sea Peoples
and the internal decay of previous system-wide actors. The initial collapse begins with
Hatti, as it disintegrating into an inchoate constellation of various actors dispersed across
much of Anatolia. The causes of the upheavals throughout most of Anatolia remain
unclear, but three general explanations prevail: famine, political disintegration, and the
migration of the non-sedentary Sea Peoples from the west (primarily from the areas of the
Balkans and north east Asia Minor) giving way to much fragmentation and destructive
violence (Barnett 1975, 363-366). Concomitantly, the collapse of the Hittite empire
reduced a very large portion of the Near East-Middle Eastern System into an
indeterminate sub-structure of highly diffused power configurations.
The consequence of such developments upon the rest of the system was profound:
the power structure over Syria collapsed, leading to the formation of several independent
city-states, many of which, in turn, would also be destroyed by the inflow of the Sea
Peoples (Barnett 1975, 366-370). In Assyria, internal revolt greatly weakened and
reduced the former system-wide hegemon to a mere regional actor, leading to its defeat,
and further contraction, at the hands of a similarly weak Babylon (Wiseman 1975, 444451). Similarly, Babylon remained a minor regional actor, with its own internal problems,
along with much conflict with neighbors Assyria and Elam, the latter which, itself, had
been reduced to sub-system status (although the historical evidence remains unclear as to
why) (Hornung 1999, 120-126). Egypt also faced extensive internal turmoil, ranging
from issues of succession to rebellion, the case of the latter being prevalent in Palestine.
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Rising independent actors Israel, Ashkelon, and Gezer, for example, challenged Egyptian
hegemony over the region, as did the new Philistines (Hornung 1999, 118-119), while
raiding parties out of Libya greatly weakened Egypt’s initial capacity for system-wide
positioning, only to be supplemented by the incursion of the Sea Peoples on the borders
of Egypt (Grimal 1992, 268-271).
Gauged from the macropolitical level, the power constellations of the system
during this period may be summed up as followed. First, internal turmoil and regional
disintegration forced the previous system-wide hegemons to divert inwardly, thus
shirking away from system-wide positioning. Second, the inflow of the Sea Peoples from
the west exasperated these complications by reifying the already unstable and weak
predisposition of the power actors on the Mediterranean coast, while at the same time
leading to the destruction of such important centers of power as Alasiya, Arzawa, Hatti,
Cyprus, Ugarit, Tyre, and Amurru (Bryce 1992, 377-381). Third, the consequence of
these events transitioned the system into a highly diffused power constellation: Anatolia
and northern Syria remained thoroughly disintegrated, as new centers of power were
formed by neo-Hittite, Syro-Hittite (Albright 1975, 526-529), and Kaska peoples:
Melitene, Gurgum, Hamath, Commagene, Tabal, and Carchemish (Bryce 1998, 382388); Palestine possessed multitude of disintegrated regional actors and settling Sea
Peoples, who, led by the Philistines, established five centers of power: Ashkelon,
Ashdod, Edron, Gath, and Gaza (Cook 1924b, 376-380; Barnett 1975, 371-377); southern
Syria displayed similarity with Palestine, as the new-settling Phoenicians established
such centers of power as Tyre-Sidon, Arvad, and Byblos-Berytus (Albright 1975, 511526); much of Mesopotamia, cut off from the Mediterranean coast, displayed weakened
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regional actors barely sustaining territorial integrity, as Assyria, Babylon, and Elam
engaged in internecine warfare (Van de Mieroop 2004, 183-185; Wiseman 1975, 454457); and a struggling Egypt seeking to both sustain its internal structure due to problems
of succession, as well has dealing with the incursion of the Libyans and the Sea Peoples.
With no coherent structure of hierarchy in the system, and lacking any system-wide
actors to gauge relative power or system-wide positioning, the Near East-Middle Eastern
System, during this period of the invasion of the Sea Peoples, underwent extensive
diffusion of power, both at the sub-system and system-wide level, thus designating the
polar structure of this period as one of nonpolarity.
1120 BC – 1050 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure
The ascendancy of Assyria to system-wide hegemonic status transitioned the
nonpolar structure of the previous epoch to a unipolar power constellation. Two major
events offer explanatory strength to this development. First, the inter-regional conflict
between Babylon and Elam led to the disintegration of both actors, which was, in turn,
coupled by the presence of the Arameans (from north Syria, possibly of the Sea Peoples)
moving into Babylonia (Albright 1975, 31-33). Thus, the collapse of Kassite Babylon,
due to Assyrian, but especially Elam pressure, resulted in temporary revival of local
Babylonian leaders, who, in turn, sacked and destroyed Elam itself as a regional power
(Wiseman 1975, 443-446). In this context, mutual destruction between the two regional
actors opened up much of lower Mesopotamia and western Iran to Assyria (Van de
Mieroop 2004, 176-177). Second, the remaining power structuration of the system,
specifically at the sub-system levels, remained largely unchanged from the previous
nonpolar period. Syro-Palestine, with its multitude of independent city-states, functioned
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specifically at the sub-system level, primarily engaging in trade and commerce. The
situation remained similar in Anatolia as well, with its multitude of independent centers
of power politically operating primarily at the regional level, with no single actor, or set
of actors, seeking regional consolidation or positioning at the system-wide level. The
developments in Egypt indicated its continued decline, as internal instability, raids by
external tribes, and loss of its sphere of influence in Palestine (even in the Sinai) reduced
Egypt to the level of a weak sub-system actor (Grimal 1992, 288-312), soon to be
followed by the splitting of Egypt into Lower and Upper. In totality, then, during the
previous nonpolar period, the extensive diffusion of power continued to sustain itself,
regionally, unto the subsequent unipolar period, as evident within Syro-Palestine and
Anatolia, and complemented by a chronically weak Egypt, thus leaving the system ripe
for a unipolar dominance by Assyria.
Soon after 1120 BC, Assyria revived its irredentist aspirations, undertaking
unprecedented conquest of the entire central and eastern portion of the Near East-Middle
Eastern System, beginning up north from the Nairi-Urartu Tigris regions around Lake
Van to Babylon and Elam in the south east, and all the way to the Mediterranean coast in
the west, battling such newcomers as the Arameans and the Mushku/I (Barnett 1975b,
420-426). Concurrently, expansion into Lebanon led the acceptance of Arvad, Byblos,
and Sidon as vassals (Hornung 1999, 122-127). The extensive trade and commercial
wealth of the Phoenician states remained important sources of income for Assyria’s
tributary relations with the coastal city-states. This was juxtaposed by Assyria’s policy of
plunder and massacre up north, primarily against the Nairi-Urartu cities. Expansion into
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southern Mesopotamia was also one of pillage and destruction, forcing Babylon to accept
Assyrian suzerainty, especially in the face of continued Aramean incursions.
Structurally, then, the power configuration of the system during this period is
defined by a single system-wide hegemon, with the bottom of the power hierarchy made
up of important regional actors and rising sub-system hegemons functioning within a
relatively diffused power structure: Upper Egypt, Lower Egypt, Babylon (under local
dynasties), Philistine Confederation in Palestine, Carchemish Confederation in north
Syria, Tyre-Sidon in central Levant, the Nairi Confederation around Lake Van, and
powerful political units in the Cappadocia region of Anatolia (Mushku/i, Hurrians,
Kaska, Luwians, etc.).
1050 BC – 940 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
Around 1055 BC Assyria experienced a civil war that reduced its system-wide
behavior to the sub-system level, fragmenting the extensive gains it had made during the
previous epoch, and thus re-altering the Near East-Middle Eastern System into a nonpolar
structure (Wiseman 1975, pp. 466-469). The Assyrian empire was reduced to its
heartland, having lost control of most of northern Syria and large parts of Mesopotamia
(Van de Mieroop 2004, 172). Consequently, the power configurations of the system
assumed the diffused power structure as having been present prior to Assyrian unipolar
ascendency. Namely, most of the sub-system actors and aspiring regional hegemons had
not fully consolidated power, and as such, there remained no system-wide actor(s) after
Assyria’s decay, but rather a continuation of multitude of centers of power for almost
every region in the system. Much of Anatolia maintained a diffused power structure with
the Neo-Hittite city-states in eastern and southern Anatolia, along with the quasi-nomadic
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Mushku/i, Kaska, and Arameans operating in western and central Anatolia, with the
Arameans pouring into upper Mesopotamia, and central Anatolia witnessing the presence
of the Phrygians (Katzenstein 1973, 74-77).
Northern Syria continued with its set of commerce-rich city states, primarily in
the form of Tyre-Sidon, Damascus, and the Carchemish confederation, soon to be
dominated by the Arameans (Aubet 2001, 29-35). Palestine witnessed the regional
struggle between Philistine and Israel for sub-system hegemony (Ehrlich 1996, 23-25),
while further south and west of the Sinai, Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt competed for
regional dominance. Assyria sustained itself as the sub-system hegemon in upper
Mesopotamia, while having to deal with the Nairi-Urartu confederation up north; and this
was complemented by Babylon’s positioning as sub-system hegemon in lower
Mesopotamia, only having to deal with the presence of the invading Arameans and
internal instability (Wiseman 1975, 470-473).
The system during this nonpolar period had approximately nine centers of power
(Assyria, Babylonia, Upper Egypt, Lower Egypt, Israel, Philistine, Tyre-Sidon, NeoHittite city-states, inchoate Anatolia, and the presence of powerful peoples such as the
Kaska, Mushku/i, Phrygians, and the Arameans, who would soon dominate much of
northern Syria) with no single actor(s) possessing enough relative power to assume
system-wide status. The diffusion of power, then, while not extensive, was nonetheless
dispersed through the various regions, with sets of regional actors continuing the process
of consolidation. On first consideration, some might suggest that the system during this
period be classified as multipolar, since several observable centers of power are present.
This assumption is refuted for three reasons. First, categorically, the system continuously
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and consistently exceeds the 7-actor threshold in the set criteria of polar designation, thus
qualifying the structure of the system as nonpolar. Second, the observable centers of
power remained functional primarily at the regional level, and as such, none of the
regional power actor(s) functioned at the system-wide level. And third, balancing and
counter-balancing, and any possible treatment of relative power capabilities, was
fundamentally limited to the sub-system level, making considerations of multipolarity
incoherent at the structural, system-wide level. By 950 BC, however, a united Egypt, a
powerful Tyre-Sidon, and a resurgent Assyria would restructure the Near East-Middle
Eastern System.
940 BC – 880 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Tripolar Structure
The unification of Upper and Lower Egypt by 940 BC allowed Egypt to
reposition itself as a system-wide hegemon, extending its sphere of influence to Palestine,
thus exercising suzerainty over the south-western section of the system (Myśliwiec 2000,
23-45). Tyre-Sidon became the most powerful political actor in the Levant, primarily due
to its powerful navy and excessive wealth by virtue of its ever-present dominance of the
sea routes in the Red Sea and the Phoenician coast of the Mediterranean (Katzenstein
1973, 116-128). Assyria also reasserted itself as a system-wide hegemon, re-establishing
dominance of Mesopotamia, reducing Babylon to the level of sub-system actor, while
also turning up north to check the growing power of Urartu (Grayson 1982, 246-251;
Brinkman 1982, 301-303). This was further supplemented by a westward expansion,
primarily fighting the Arameans (Aram-Damascus) for control of northern Syria. Much
of Anatolia remained similar to the previous epoch, as rising regional actors, especially
Phrygia, slowly attempted to consolidate power, while Neo-Hittite centers of power such
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as Carchemish and Malatiya worked hard to resist Aramean, Assyrian, and Urartu
pressure (Van de Mieroop 2004, 206-207). This tripolar power configuration, then, was
defined by the presence of Assyria, Tyre-Sidon, and Egypt as system-wide hegemons,
with Israel, Babylon, Aram-Damascus, Charchemish, Malatiya, and Urartu as sub-system
hegemons.
880 BC – 830 BC Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure
By 880 BC Assyria once again unleashed its expansionist policies, undertaking an
impressive dominance of the Near East-Middle Eastern System, and transforming its
structure from tripolarity to unipolarity. An initial incursion south reified Assyria’s
dominance of lower Mesopotamia, followed by tribute collection and economic-military
control of Babylon. An excursion north targeted sub-system hegemon Urartu, subjugating
the later into its sphere of influence, and demanding tribute (Smith 1925, 32-34). This
was soon followed by an expedition west, conquering much of Lebanon and north Syria,
including Carchemish, Tyre-Sidon, Byblos, Arvad, and Bit Adini (Grayson 1982, 254267). In 853, at the battle of Qarqar, Egypt, Ammom, Byblos, Cilicia, Israel, and AramDamascus fought as a coalition against Assyria, temporarily halting the latter’s expansion
into southern Syro-Palestine (Smith 1925b, 21-23). The coalition, however, soon
dissolved, and Assyria devastated Aram-Damascus, Israel, Tyre-Sidon, Cilicia, and
Byblos, only to follow up by demanding tributes and reducing much of the Mediterranean
coast (with the exception of Damascus and Phoenicia) to vassalage (Grimal 1992, 324328). In sum, Assyria expanded its preponderance of the system from its northern border
with the Urartu Kingdom around the south of Lake Van to all of upper Mesopotamia;
down south to Babylonia; north-west all the way to Cilicia, southern Anatolia, and
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northern Syria; and westward to large chunks of the Mediterranean coast (Van de
Mieroop 2004, 226).
Assyria’s unmatched dominance of the system transformed the previous tripolar
power constellations into a unipolar structure, with a single system-wide hegemon, set of
relatively powerful sub-system hegemons in the form of Urartu, Egypt, and Damascus,
and multitude of weaker sub-system actors such as Babylon, Sealand, Israel, Cilicia,
Carchemish, and Tyre-Sidon. Various other political units were reduced to vassalages.
Assyria’s economic reliance on tributary states necessitated excessive military
concentration to extract and punish actors who at times obstructed the flow of goods into
Assyria (such as cloth and dye from Phoenicia, or horses from the Zagros Mountains,
etc.), while its awareness of possible revisionist sub-system hegemons led Assyria to
constantly attack and limit such actors within its regional scope, hence making certain
that its unipolar status would remain unchallenged.
830 BC – 745 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
Precipitous expansion does not merely give way to overextension, but also to an
inability to organize and institutionalize such gains in a timely fashion. As such, in the
face of internal discord, ephemeral and precipitous overextension immediately results in
precipitous disintegration. Assyria’s nearly 50 years of unipolarity came to end in such a
fashion, as a dynastic civil war produced three general outcomes: vassal states stopped
paying tributes, local autonomy became reified after the decay of centralized power, and,
Assyria went from being the system-wide hegemon to one of many sub-system actors.
The diffusion of power during this nonpolar period remains somewhat unique: between
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the previous unipole and the set of weaker sub-system vassals, the system also possessed
a set up powerful regional sub-system hegemons.
Assyria’s decline, however, did not lead to one of the revisionist sub-system
hegemons assuming system-wide status. Rather, the result was the opposite: Egypt
underwent internal conflict, once again splitting into various political units; Damascus
remained one of many active players in northern Syria, but lacking the ability to be a
regional powerhouse; and Urartu, while perhaps the most powerful of the sub-system
hegemons after the fall of Assyria, failed to expand past its regional boundaries. For these
reasons, the possibility of system-wide power concentration sustaining itself within a
specific hierarchy was negated through the extensive diffusion of power throughout the
entire system. The result was a highly complex development of a very high number of
political actors and centers of power, only to be accompanied by the presence of new
actors in the east.
In the north of the system, Urartu maintained sub-system hegemonic status, only
to have Assyria to its south maintaining, albeit weakly, regional control of upper
Mesopotamia (Sayce 1925,173-177). Southern Mesopotamia was further diffused by
retaining three centers of power: Babylon, the Chaldeans, and Sealand. At the eastern
periphery of the system, a resurgent Elam rose at the southern tip of the Zagros
Mountains, while to the west of the mountains the presence of the Persians was observed,
only to be accompanied by the growing power of the Medes in north-central Zagros.
North Syria remained as complicated as before, with the fusion of the previous NeoHittite city-states being absorbed by the new Aramean city-states, ranging from AramDamascus to Bit-Adini to Arpad (Hogarth 1925, 158-164). Anatolia continued its
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inchoate power structure, with Cilicia initially falling to Assyria and then to Urartu
(Smith 1925, 53-55), while central and western Anatolia remained in the process of
power consolidation by Phrygia and soon Lydia.
The power structure of the Levant and Palestine were distributed between Israel,
the city-states of Philistine, and Tyre-Sidon (Van de Mieroop 2004, 226, 234). The
centers of power in Egypt were perhaps the most numerous in its history, as
approximately five political units, during this period, defined the power hierarchy of this
region: Leontopolis of Lower Egypt, Sais of Lower Egypt, Tanis-Bubastis centered on
Thebes, Kingdom of Kush (south of Thebes, modern day Sudan), and Upper Egypt
(Grimal 1992, 328-335). Collectively, for nearly 80 years, the diffused nonpolar structure
of the system sustained itself, as neither of the sub-system actors managed to position and
function at the system-wide level. To the contrary, possible revisionist sub-system actors
remained at the regional level, while potential sub-system hegemons further remained at
the sub-regional level. The cases of Urartu, Babylon, and Assyria attest to the former,
while much of Syro-Palestine and Egypt attest to the latter.
745 BC – 620 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure
By the end of the previous nonpolar period, Assyria had laid the groundwork to
restructure the system by re-establishing its irredentist aspirations and transitioning the
Near East-Middle Eastern System to a unipolar structure. The continued inability of subsystem actors to attain system-wide status played in Assyria’s favor, since its ascendancy
to unipolar preponderance was absent of any direct challenges or counter-balancing by
any other actor in the system. Assyria’s first act was to reconquer much of Babylonia,
thus incorporating lower Mesopotamia back into its sphere of influence (Hallo and
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Simpson 1998, 128-131). Seeking to further solidify suzerainty over the south, Assyria
targeted the nascent states in the Zagros Mountains, reducing them to tributary vassals
and establishing provinces at the eastern periphery of the system. This would eventually
be followed by an invasion of Elam (Smith 1925c, 67-68) and contact with Media,
demonstrating a clear desire to dominate the entire eastern periphery of the system.
Having placated the south and the east, Assyria immediately turned its attention
north toward aggressive Urartu, which had expanded all the way to northern Syria and
might have challenged Assyrian unipolarity if the latter had not so quickly sought to
weaken its northern enemy. Assyria defeated Urartu and its ally Arpad, further
weakening the former as sub-system hegemon, and thoroughly conquering the latter
(Sayce 1925, 179), thus removing it as a sub-system actor and reducing it to an Assyrian
province (Barnett 1982, 348-351). This was followed by expansion to the west, reducing
most of the powerful Syro-Palestinian actors to tributary status: Cilicia, Carchemish,
Hamath, Byblos, Israel, Tyre-Sidon, and Damascus. Philistine city-states, especially
Gaza, Gezer, Ashdod, and Ashkelon did not comply, only to be crushed and annexed.
This was followed by the annexation of Israel and Damascus as Assyrian provinces
(Katzenstein 1973, 210-219). A newly unified Egypt made an attempt at polarization to
possibly counter-balance Assyrian expansion, bringing into its camp Hamath, Ekron,
Gaza, Israel, Tyre-Sidon, and Judah, only to be thoroughly defeated by the unipole
(Thompson 1925, 210-212). Similarly, a few years later, Urartu, Phrygia, and
Carchemish formed an alliance to limit Assyria’s western expansion, only to be
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Map 5.5

crushed, with Carchemish being annexed as an Assyrian province (Barnett 1982, 351353). This process of temporary and ill-fated revolts, followed by massive Assyrian
military response and annexation, along with mass deportations and resettling of
conquered people, continued throughout much of this unipolar period (Van de Mieroop
2004, 235-236). Having attacked and thoroughly defeated all possible revisionist subsystem actors, Assyria accounted for the preservation of the unipolar structure by
maintaining an aggressive militaristic policy, only to be supplemented through the
extraction of material resources via tributaries and vassals. The approximate 130 years of
Assyrian preponderance of the system, however, would soon be challenged by the rising
power of a new actor from the east, the Medes, and a rejuvenated Babylon.
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620 BC – 540 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
Around the 620’s BC the political confusion in Assyria had allowed Babylon (at
times referred to as “Neo-Babylon) to reassert itself as a powerful sub-system hegemon,
with designs to challenge Assyrian unipolarity. By 615 BC, Babylon challenged Assyria
by attacking vassals of the latter in Mesopotamia, and even directly attacking a much
perplexed Assyria (Thompson 1925, 212-214). At the same time, the Medes, covering
central Zagros and heading east all the way to Elam (Assyria’s destruction of Elam had
allowed Media to assume sub-system dominance of the region), had created a rather
powerful military state. A joint Babylonian-Median alliance, with assistance from the
semi-nomadic Scythians (having recently defeated Phrygia) from the north Caucasus
(Minns 1925, 192-195), gave way to a direct invasion of Assyria, the sacking of its
capital Nineveh, an extensive destruction of the Assyrian heartland, and the end of
Assyria as both system-wide hegemon and political unit (Smith 1925d, 126-131). The
entirety of Assyrian lands became split between the two allies, as Media assumed control
of the north, dominating Urartu, and heading westward toward Anatolia. The Median
state reached all the way to central Anatolia, creating a treaty with the sub-system
hegemon Lidya in western Anatolia (Mellink 1991, 649), and exercising preponderance
from there to western Iran and the entire eastern periphery to all of northern Mesopotamia
and much of the Armenian Highlands of southern Transcaucasia (Young 1988,16-23).
Media’s expansive growth made its southern neighbor quite uneasy, leading Babylon to
build the Median wall from the Tigris to the Euphrates as a barrier to the geo-political
boundaries of each pole. Babylon assumed dominion over the remaining territories of
Assyria to the south and the west, primarily Syro-Palestine. Initially challenged by Egypt,
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since much of Palestine remained the latter’s historic sphere of influence, Babylon
defeated the Egyptians near Carchemish in 605 BC, annexed Cilicia, followed by TyreSidon, and then headed south to assume control of the entire region, destroying Jerusalem
and Judah, and entertaining an invasion of Egypt itself (Thompson 1925, 212-216). The
latter objective did not materialize, but Babylonian dominance of the entire
Mediterranean coast remained unchallenged, with Babylonian system-wide hegemonic
presence ranging from all of Mesopotamia (with exception of northern portions under
Median rule) to the entire western coast of Syro-Palestine. At the macro level, during this
period, the Near East-Middle Eastern System observed a power configuration of two
system-wide hegemons, and several introspective or rising sub-system hegemons (Egypt,
Lydia, Scythians, Cimmerians, Persians, etc), with the rest of the political units in the
system reduced to vassalage or tributary actors.
540 BC – 330 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure,
Absorption of the Near East-Middle Eastern System by the Mediterranean System
The bipolar structure of the previous period was immediately transformed into a
unipolar configuration upon the overthrow of the Median state by the Persians, with the
latter assuming power in the Median territories, and swiftly challenging Babylon for
singular dominance of the system. By 550 BC the Persians had taken over all areas under
Median rule (Van de Mieroop 2004, 257), and proceeded further west to conquer Lydia
by 547 BC (Gray 1926, 9), assuming dominance of all of Anatolia, even the Ionian Greek
city-states on the Aegean coast of. In 539 BC Persia directly invaded Babylon from the
Zagros, defeating the latter, overtaking the capital (Thompson 1925, 223-225), and
assuming dominance of not only the entirety of the Babylonian empire, but of the Near
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East-Middle Eastern System. This was further reified by the conquest of Egypt in 525
BC, extending all the way to Libya and extracting tribute from Nubia in the periphery
(Gray 1926, 19-20). From these developments, Persian system-wide hegemony managed
to cover the entire system, from the very edges of the eastern periphery (even infringing
into the Indic System) to all of Mesopotamia, Transcaucasia, Egypt, Syro-Palestine, and
Anatolia. Persia’s dominance of the Near East-Middle Eastern System was absolute and
unchallenged, with highly weakened sub-system actors functioning at the regional level,
and no possible revisionist actors either posing a counter-balance or a threat to Persian
unipolarity.
Persian unipolarity, however, would come to an end not from any developments
within the Near East-Middle Eastern System, but rather as a result of Persia’s endeavor to
infringe into the Mediterranean World Political System in its desire to conquer Greece.
Around 499 BC the Ionian Greek city-states on the Aegean coast of Anatolia rebelled
against Persian suzerainty (Murray 1988, 480-490), not challenging the latter’s unipolar
status, but merely seeking local independence. Within five years the unipole managed to
subdue and repress the rebellion, but the political developments of these events were
three-fold. First, inter-system interactions between the Near East-Middle Eastern System
and the Mediterranean System became more prevalent, as the Ionian Greeks had clear
allegiance to their mother city-states as opposed to Persia. Second, Persia did not only
hold the Ionian Greeks responsible for the uprising, but the Greek mainland itself, thus
developing plans to infringe into the Mediterranean System. Third, Persian incursion into
the Mediterranean System, while ephemeral, allowed for the development of a precedent,
which would lead to Persia’s destruction at the hands of Macedonia. Within this context,
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Persia’s incursion into the Mediterranean System did not lead to the absorption of one
system by the other, since the Persians were repelled in a set of military confrontations,
from Marathon, to Salamis, to Plateau (Munro 1926, 239-251; Hammond 1988, 502517). As such, this incursion resulted neither in Persia’s absorption into the
Mediterranean System, nor Persia’s dominance of Greece and hence the absorption of the
Mediterranean System into the Near East-Middle Eastern System. Due to the temporary
nature of the inter-system incursions, inter-system absorption did not take place, and for
this reason, a Greece-Persian bipolar system would seem analytically incoherent.
Concomitantly, Persia continued its unipolar dominance within the Near East-Middle
Eastern System until the invasion of the Macedonian Greeks, which not only ended
Persian unipolarity, but also ended the Near East-Middle Eastern System, absorbing it
into the wider Mediterranean System.

Analysis
The cumulative dataset from the polar periods in the Near East-Middle Eastern
System produce 23 observational data points, with the set modalities of polar structures
being coded within the criteria set forth. Categorical demarcations between polar
structuration and subsequent transitions allow for four general schemes of evaluations:
the general distributive nature of polar structure during given periods; transitional
patterns for polar structures after unipolar epochs; system’s analysis concerning the
duration and longevity of polar periods; and a probabilistic treatment of possible
structural outcomes after unipolar transitions. Three general remarks may be suggested at
the outset: the system demonstrates a consistent tendency in its fluctuation between
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unipolar and nonpolar configurations; tripolarity appears to be unfit as a transitional
structural outcome after unipolarity; and multipolar periods demonstrate the least stable
structures with respect to durability.
The distribution of polar periods in the Near East-Middle Eastern System shows
unipolarity to be the most occurring power configuration, as 9 out of the 23 polar
structures in the dataset are coded as unipolar. In relation to other world political system,
the Near East-Middle Eastern System lacks a coherent balance between the various
modes of polar periods. This is consistently demonstrated by the presence of 6 nonpolar
periods as the second most common polar structure in the system, followed by tripolarity
and multipolarity, with each structure, respectively, having three polar periods. The least
common polar structure remains bipolarity, with only two bipolar periods. Collectively,
in the approximate 2300 years of the Near East-Middle Eastern System investigated in
this chapter, 39% of the time the system’s structure assumed a unipolar configuration,
followed by nonpolarity with approximately 26% of the time, tripolarity and
multipolarity with 13% each, and bipolarity with only 9% of time.
The analytical considerations are rather unique and quite telling of the Near EastMiddle Eastern System: for nearly 65% of the time, the system was either defined by
unipolar concentration of power, or, at the very end of the continuum, defined by
nonpolar diffusion of power. In this sense, during the vast majority of the system’s
history, the structure of the system shifted from one extreme to the next, with the
remaining power configurations, collectively, only assuming 35% of the system. The
system, then, displayed a tendency to either be fit for dominance by a single pole, or the
absence of any system-wide poles. In this sense, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar
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structures remained somewhat unfit to the structural power hierarchies of the Near EastMiddle Eastern System. As Figure 5.1 shows, 15 out of the 23 polar periods were

FIGURE 5.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN THE NEAR EASTMIDDLE EASTERN SYSTEM
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either defined by singular concentration of power, or nonpolar diffusion of power. As
such, even if tripolarity and multipolarity are collapsed together into a single category,
both collectively merely match the number of nonpolar epochs in the system, thus
suggesting that the Near East-Middle Eastern System did not seem fit for power
distribution between a set of equal powers: the system experienced either singular or no
power hierarchy at all for the majority of its existence
The durability of polar periods allows for important knowledge-accumulation
with respect to system’s maintenance. Specifically, the longer a polar structure
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demonstrates longevity, the better a system demonstrates fittidness vis-à-vis structural
power hierarchies with respect to concentration or diffusion. This assessment is also
related to considerations of systemic stability: the duration of polar structures suggests
the extent to which the conditions of the system are favorable to specific power
configurations. The distribution of polar periods, for example, shows the number of polar
periods with respect to structural coding. This, however, does not measure the longevity
of the given polar structures, but merely the number of occurrences. By gauging duration,
numbers of occurrences are better understood in relation to the historic space that the
given polar structures occupy.
Within the Near East-Middle Eastern System, the most durable polar structure, on
average, is nonpolarity, with duration of approximately 126 years. The second most
durable polar period is unipolarity, averaging 109 years, followed by bipolarity with 85
years, multipolarity with 62 years, and tripolarity with 60 years. At the system-wide
level, then, the most durable, and systemically stable, power configuration remains
nonpolarity, for it takes approximately 126 years for a nonpolar structure to transition.
This tentatively suggests that diffused power constellations in the Near East-Middle
Eastern System was not an exception or an outlier, but rather part of the norm, since the
system, on average, was consumed for longer periods by diffused power structures than
by relatively equally concentrated power structures. The almost dialectical relationship
between nonpolarity and unipolarity becomes even more interesting when observing the
longevity of unipolar periods lasting on average of 109 years.
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FIGURE 5.2 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR PERIODS
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As Figure 5.2 suggests, this observation is quite interesting: the system either had
long periods of nonpolar structures, on average, or long periods of unipolar structures, on
average. In this sense, the system demonstrated longevity either in a highly diffused or
highly concentrated structure, and less stability and longevity under relatively equal
distribution of powers, such as in bipolar, tripolar, or multipolar structures. In totality, as
Figure 5.3 demonstrates, of the 2300 years of the Near East-Middle Eastern System, the
system had a unipolar structure for 980 years and nonpolar structure for 755 years. As
such, for nearly 75% of the time (1,735 years), the system fluctuated from singular
concentration of power to a diffused power configuration.
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FIGURE 5.3 HISTORICAL SPACE OF THE NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EASTERN
SYSTEM
Total Years Occupied by Polar Periods
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Post-unipolar patterns of structural formations provide important calculations in
gauging probabilistic outcomes with respect to systemic transitions. Of the 23 data points
collected in this chapter, 9 of the observations are unipolar periods, of which 8 allow for
examinations of post-unipolar transitions (the final unipolar period transitioned the Near
East-Middle Eastern System into its absorption by the Mediterranean System, thus
excluding it as an applicable data observation with respect to post-unipolar transitions).
Figure 5.4 displays the distribution of polar structures after unipolar transitions: 4 periods
of nonpolarity, two periods of bipolarity, no period of tripolarity, and two periods of
multipolarity. Analyzing the data probabilistically, the unipolar structure in the Near
East-Middle Eastern System had a 50% chance of transitioning into a nonpolar structure,
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25% probability of a bipolar structure, 25% possibility of a multipolar structure, and no
probability of a tripolar structure.
FIGURE 5.4 POST-UNIPOLAR POWER CONFIGURATIONS
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The probabilistic patterns of post-unipolar power configurations appear consistent
with much of the results observed in the dataset. Since the system displays a consistent
tendency to fluctuate from highly centralized to highly diffused power structures,
nonpolarity remains the most probable structural transition after unipolarity in this
system. Of the six polar periods that are defined as nonpolar, four of these resulted after
unipolar transitions, indicating a systemic connection between concentrated power
structures that last for approximately 109 years and subsequent diffused power structures
that sustain system’s stability for approximately 126 years. The remaining probabilistic
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outcomes suggest a relatively more concentrated power structure in the form of a bipolar
configuration, or an equally probable outcome of a relatively more diffused power
structure in the form of a multipolar configuration.
Possible explanations of these developments are four-fold. First, since the Near
East-Middle Eastern System displayed, consistently, high numbers of centers of power,
even at regional and sub-regional/local levels, these centers of power were able to reestablish their capabilities after long periods of unipolar dominance. Second, unipolar
system-wide hegemons displayed a very conscious effort to immediately confront and
weaken possible revisionist states, hence allowing for long periods of unipolarity, while
at the same time leaving no actors strong enough to fill in the power vacuum after
unipolar epochs. Third, shirking remained an observable reality in the Near East-Middle
Eastern System, as many sub-system hegemons, even with the potential capacity to
expand and exercise relative power, chose to remain at the regional level, thus refraining
from functioning at the system-wide level. And four, since bipolar, tripolar, and
multipolar structures have much shorter lifespans, this suggests that many of these
arrangements were relatively unstable and difficult to maintain, and as such, the
probability of these power configurations forming after unipolarity remained relatively
low. That is, the presence of two or more revisionist sub-system hegemons ready to
assume system-wide positioning after the decline of a unipole remained a low probability
in the Near East-Middle Eastern System. For these general reasons, unipolarity primarily
gave way to a diffused power constellation with high numbers of regional and subregional centers of power.
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CHAPTER 6
THE INDIC WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM
The Indic System primarily refers to the political interactions, inter and intra
civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between
political units/entities/actors within the region of the Indian subcontinent, or the region of
South Asia. Territorially, the Indic World Political System covers much of South Asia,
but to specify set regional and territorial boundaries in absolute terms in the
conceptualization of a world political system obscures the reality of the political realm.
The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at the periphery at
times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from the system.11
System’s classification of the Indic System, then, does not specifically rely on
establishing absolute regional boundaries, but rather considering the political interactions
and power configurations of system-wide hegemons that function within the structural
perimeters of this world political system.
The historiographical method of political history will begin analysis of polar
periods within the Indic System from 500 BC. Prior to this period, the Indic System is
defined by the Verdic Age, with approximately 16 large rising proto-states (Gokhale
1959; Bongard-Levin 1985b) that are in transitional and developmental stages, at times
11

For example, Afghanistan tends to be on the periphery, yet is part of the system, yet Persia, while
bordered on the periphery, is considered to be part of the Near East-Middle Eastern System. In cases where
the Persian Empire encroaches into the Indic System and becomes a system-wide hegemonic actor, it is
then considered to be part of the power configurations of the system. As such, we anticipate, from time to
time, external actors encroaching into the system. Yet this remains ephemeral and does not indicate the
absorption of one system into another. The case of Alexander the Great’s conquest of Bactria (modern
Afghanistan and Pakistan) is a case in point. This was a temporary infringement by the Macedonians, and
did not lead to the incorporation of the Indic System into any other world political system. As such, for the
sake of historical accuracy, the infringement of powers outside of the system into the system will be taken
into consideration. But this will be treated in two ways: either the system is conquered and absorbed into
another system, thus ending the given system (such as Britain’s colonization of India and its absorption into
the Global Political System), or outside power(s) become absorbed into the system and remain part of it as
one of the given poles (Mughal system-wide hegemonic status is a case in point).

144

merging, at times being conquered (Schwatzberg 1992), and as such, not displaying
coherent units of political analysis (Bognard-Levin 1985a) with respect to gauging the
power configurations of the system. Thus, it is from the period after 500 BC that the
political history of the region is substantiated and allows for the coding of polar
structures, as historical records of power politics are established (Basu 1969) and
coherent political units formed (103), hence allowing for the structuration of polar
systems based on the “struggle…for hegemony” (Bognard-Levin 1985b, 56). Each polar
epoch will be specified chronologically, indicating the timespan of the polar period and
the specific power configurations that define the system. Specific analytical attention will
be provided for system’s configurations coded as unipolar periods, and the subsequent
system at the end of unipolarity. In the chronological narrative, in order not to have
consistent gaps, the polar structures of non-unipolar periods are also coded.
550 BC – 450 BC Unipolar Structure
In the mid-6th century BC much of the northwest of South Asia fell under the
dominance of the Achaemenids, beginning with the periphery in the distant western
frontiers and expanding to the east with their conquest of Gandhara and Kaisa (north of
Kabul), followed by Sogdiana and an extension all the way to the south of the Hindu
Kush mountains (Bongard-Leving 1985b, p. 62; Keay 2000, 58). The Achaemenids
reinforced their system-wide hegemonic status by annexing Zaranka, Seistan, and
Haraubatish, allowing them to further expand west by joining Artakona and Phrada, south
by taking Arachotus, east by consuming Gazaca and Kapisi, and north by conquering
Bactria (Schwatzberg 1992, 166). In sum, Persian dominion in the system stretched from
Herat and Gandhara through the north-western Punjab, along with the whole of Sind and
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a large portion of Punjab east of the Indus (Gokhale 1959 30). From 550 BC – 500 BC
the Achaemenids remained the single system-wide hegemon in the Indic System, levying
taxes on Indian provinces, receiving tributes from neighboring states, and recruiting
soldiers for their ever-expanding military (Chattopadhyaya 1950). During this period,
Achaemenid unipolarity was neither challenged nor counter-balanced by any other
political unit within the Indic System.
During Achaemenid unipolarity, various sub-system hegemonic states were
formed in the system, as several of the initial 16 mahajanapadas (large developing states)
from the Verdic period were beginning to merge or envelop each other within their
specific regions, allowing given dominant regional actors to position themselves as subsystem hegemons. Along the Ganga Plain, Kashi had established regional dominance in
the center, Kosala in the north, Magadha and Anga in the east, the Vajji confederacy
north of Magadha, and the Avanti in the west (Mishara 1962; Singh 1967).
Concomitantly, the Indic System in the entire northwest, and much of the greater
northern region was dominated by the Achaemenids, while to the south, in the greater
Ganga region of central South Asia, various regional actors were competing for subsystem dominance. Within this context, three general observations are prevalent. First,
Achaemenid dominance of the system is unmatched, for its preponderance is reified
through both its unmatched strength and the absence of any system-wide challengers.
Second, due to the emerging stages that the regional power players are going through,
none of the sub-system actors have either attained sub-system hegemony, or the ability to
challenge and counter-balance Achaemenid supremacy. Third, for these reasons, the
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power configuration of the system is one of unipolarity, with a single system-wide
hegemon and numerous rising sub-system hegemons.
By 500/late-400 BC two major developments took place that reshaped the internal
power dynamics of the system, but provided no changes to the mode of polarity. First, as
the Achaemenids solidified their complete dominance of Iran, their attention shifted West
(Olmstead 1948), and away from the Indic System, as the beginning stages of the GrecoPersian conflict removed the Achaemenids as actors in the Indic System, marginalizing
them to the periphery of the subcontinent. This was confirmed by the Ionian Revolts in
Asia Minor in 499 BC, as the Achaemenids become preoccupied primarily with the Near
East-Middle Eastern System and its intrusion into the Mediterranean System, and thus
exiting as hegemonic actors from the Indic System. Second, the sub-system hegemons
were positioning themselves as potential system-wide actors through warfare and interhegemonic competition (Rapson 1922; Ghoshal 1966), and with the exit of the Persians,
the vacuum was filled by the ascendency of sub-system actor(s) to system-wide
hegemonic status.
Kosala, Magadha, Kashi, Vasta, Vajji Confederacy, and Avanti were the “major
regional powers…in the late 6th century BC” (Schwartzberg 1992, 166-167), and under
the unipolar system, each not only sought to establish sub-system dominance, but also
position itself as a potential system-wide challenger. Within the specific sub-system of
the central Ganga Plain, inter-regional hegemonic competition between Kosala and Kashi
for sub-system preponderance first led to Kashi’s initial triumph over Kosala, giving way
to Kashi expansion all the way to Anga in the south and Magadha in the east. Kashi
dominance, however, was short-lived, as Kosala reasserted its power base, re-establishing
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lost territories and eventually conquering Kashi itself (Majumdar et al 1967). Kosala’s
absorption of Kashi not only gave way to Kosala sub-system hegemony, but also
elevation to the status of system-wide hegemon by 500 BC, for the only system-wide
hegemon, the Achaemenids, exited the Indic System, thus making Kosala, by default, the
only system-wide hegemon. Due to these developments, while the system-wide hegemon
changed from one political actor to another, the structure of the system did not, for the
power configuration of the system still remained unipolar. Kosala unipolarity was
supplemented by the presence of several sub-system hegemons, and until these subsystem hegemons rose to the position of system-wide hegemons by way of challenging
and counter-balancing Kosala, the Indic System remained unipolar until 450 BC.
During these 50 years of Kosala unipolarity, Magadha established itself as a subsystem hegemon in the east and laid the foundations to challenge Kosala dominance at
the system-wide level, while the Avanti undertook similar steps through its establishment
of sub-system hegemony in the south. Thus, while Kosala attained unipolar status, the
regional hegemonic actors were in the process of consolidating their own drive for
system-wide status. Magadha undertook the conquest of Anga, a regional power,
allowing for control of its rich forest and mineral resources, as well as trade routes to the
sea (Gokhale 1959, 30). Magadha’s expansion to the north and west, however, during this
period, was barred by the other sub-system hegemon, the Vajji Confederacy (Trautmann
2010, 55). As such, Magadha’s drive for system-wide status was at this point hampered
through the counter-balancing capabilities of the Vajji Confederacy at the sub-system
level. The Avanti, on the other hand, had demonstrated dominance over the southern
region by proceeding to absorb Vasta, one of the other major regional powers
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(Raychaudhuri 1972, 180), and thus practice hegemony over the entire Malwa Plateau.
Concomitantly, Avanti had positioned itself with the Vajji Confederacy to counterbalance Magadha’s expansionist endeavors (Raychaudhuri 1972, 213.), and as such, a
three-way sub-system inter-hegemonic balance of power was playing out within the
wider context of attaining system-wide hegemonic status. As a result of this sub-system
hegemonic competition, Kosala’s unipolar status remained unchallenged, since none of
the sub-system actors, at this stage, had established the necessary ability to become
system-wide actors.
Map 6.1
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450 BC – 400 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
By 450 BC Kosala’s status as unipole was challenged by Magadha, having risen
to the status of system-wide hegemon. Magadha’s system-wide hegemonic status was
confirmed after its eventual conquest of Vajji, the main sub-system hegemon that had
managed to previously counter-balance Magadha’s aspirations for expansion and
complete domination of the entire eastern region. This was augmented by Magadha’s
defeat of Malla, another regional actor and ally of Vajji. After attaining dominance of the
eastern region, Magadha challenged Kosala for system-wide dominance (Bognard-Levin
1985b, 58-59), seeking to expand north and establish hegemony over the entire northeast. In the pursuing system-wide hegemonic struggle, Magadha defeated Kosala (Keay
2000, 65-67), thus establishing itself as a pole in the structure of the Indic System.
Magadha’s hegemony over the north-east was countered by the rise of Avanti as a
system-wide hegemon with its preponderance of the southwest, and expansion into the
northwest (Bognard-Levin 1985a, 104-105).
After having consolidated power over the Malwa Plateau, along with its conquest
of Vasta, Avanti had expanded north by challenging Gandhara and gaining control over
the material resources of the western seaboard and the Southern Route. The polar
structure of the system, then, had transitioned from Kosala unipolarity to the bipolarity of
Magadha and Avanti. As system-wide hegemon, Magadha controlled the entire eastern
and north-eastern region of the system, while Avanti, as the other system hegemon,
controlled the entire southern and western region, and large portions of the north-western
region. The subsequent power configurations within this epoch demonstrate structural
transition from unipolirty to bipolarity, with two new system-wide hegemons formulating
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the mode of polarity, while the previous system-wide hegemon being conquered and
absorbed.
400 BC – 180 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
The bipolar system proved to be unstable by the end of the 5th century BC, as
Avanti’s system-wide hegemonic status, through its dominance of the southwest and the
northwest, brought about hegemonic war with the other system-wide hegemon, Magadha.
The confrontation between the two poles was predicated on two factors. First,
economically, both sought control over the Ganges river system, which was a crucial
trade route (Bognard-Levin 1985a, 104-105). Second, politically, while each sought to
restructure the system into a unipolar one, there was also the underlying issue of Avanti’s
consistent threat to Magadha by allying itself with Magahda’s enemies as a method of
counter-balancing (Schwartzberg 1992). In the ensuing conflict, after a set of prolonged
wars, Magadha managed to defeat and conquer Avanti (Iyer and Chawla 1983), thus
altering the previous bipolar system into a unipolar one. It established itself “into a
leading force in the whole of North India and had become the centre of a unified Indian
state” (Bognard-Levin 1985b, 60). From around 400 BC, upon its victory over Avanti,
Magadha maintained its system-wide hegemonic status over the Indic System, only to be
disturbed from 327-325 BC by the conquest/intrusion of Macedonia, under Alexander the
Great (Snyder 1966), into the Indic System.
Magadha’s positioning as the single pole is best expressed through three
developments. First, due to the fact that it had initially established sub-system hegemony
prior to becoming a system-wide hegemon, it had absolutely no challengers within its
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Map 6.2

sphere of influence. Second, since Avanti had done the same, the southwest and the
northwest also did not present any regional challengers to the given poles. And thirdly,
since polarization does not seem to have been present during this bipolar system,
Magadha’s dominance became complete, since neither alliance obligations nor the allies
of its defeated foe served to constrain Magadha’s behavior as the single system-wide
hegemon. In this sense, unlike the unipolar structure under the Achaemenids, or the
Kosalans, the power constellation under Magadha’s initial 70 years of unipolarity was
one of a single system-wide hegemon with no sub-system hegemons or rising
(revisionist) actors.
Alexander the Great’s incursion into the Indic System produced two general
results. First, by destroying the Persian Empire, the Achaemenids were completely
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removed from the periphery (Bury 1963, 798-313), and replaced with what would
become in the future Indo-Greek political units (Prakash 1964). Second, it temporarily
shook the unipolar structure, as it posed a severe threat to the existing system-wide
hegemon. The exit of the Greeks, however, allowed for the strengthening and
continuation of the unipolar system, as Magadha, under the Muaryan Dynasty, became
the Muaryan Empire (Bognard-Levin 1985b; Dikshitar 1953), and reified the power
constellation of the system. The Greek invasion contributed to Mauryan system-wide
hegemonic preponderance by destroying all potential sub-system actors in the entire
north and northwest, hence alleviating any challenges to the unipolar structure
(Schwartzberg 1992, 169). At the same time, Mauryan system-wide dominance allowed it
to deal with Alexander’s successor in the north-western periphery, the Seleucids, on
equal terms. Portions of the north-west, including Gedrosia, Arachosia, Paropamisadae,
and Aria (most of modern-day Afghanistan), were conceded by the Seleucids to the
Mauryans (Rostovtsev 1959; Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 1987), along with accepting noninvolvement (Grainger 1990) in the Indic System (hence remaining in the periphery and
operating primarily in the Near East-Middle Eastern System). This was reciprocated by
Mauryan allocation of military assistance (primarily war elephants) to the Seleucids and
solidification of amicable terms (Trautmann 2010, 56-58). The result was the continuous
absence of the Seleucids in the political affairs of the Indic System, with Mauryan
friendly recognition of Seleucid presence in the periphery.
Having solidified its dominance in north India, with its western boundaries all the
way to the Indus River in the west, and parts of Punjab to the north (as part of its peace
treaty with the Seleucids), the Muaryans turned to the south of the subcontinent,
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conquering Andhra and after a vicious war, taking Kalinga around 260 BC (Eggermont
1956; Raychaudhuri 1972). As such, with the exception of the lands at the very south of
the subcontinent, and the lands north-west of the Punjab region (the periphery ruled by
the Seleucids), the Mauryans of Magadha dominated the unipolar structure as the
unchallenged system-wide hegemon of the Indic System.
Map 6.3

180 BC – 140 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
Around 255 BC the Indo-Greek state of Bactria revolted against the Seleucids,
breaking off and formulating its own military-imperialist state (Sidky 2000, 135-147).
This signaled the decline of the Seleucids and the birth of separate Indo-Greek political
units with aspirations of becoming major actors (Schwartzberg 1992, 172-173) in the
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Indic System. By 200 BC the Indo-Greek Bactrians had become sub-system hegemons,
with aspirations of challenging the Muaryans for system-wide hegemonic status. The
power constellations of the system were beginning to change. This was complimented by
the incremental decay of Muaryan unipolarity, primarily contributed to the rise of
regionalism and secessionist behavior within Maurya’s sphere of influence
(Raychaudhuri 1972, 346-351). Bactrian aggression gave way to Indo-Greek conquest of
Mauryan territory west of the Indus River around 180 BC (Bongard-Levin 1985a, 137139), along with dominance in most of the northwest, including the Punjab region (Keay
2000, 104-108). This paved the way for Bactrian ascendance as system-wide hegemons,
for not only had they established sub-system hegemony, but had also began to counterbalance and directly challenge Mauryan system-wide dominance.
A bipolar system was formulated as Bactrian system-wide hegemonic status was
supplemented by the overthrow of the Mauryan dynasty by the Sunga dynasty of
Magadha. As Magadha continuously lost territories to new independent political units
formed out of the old Mauryan Empire, the Indo-Greeks managed to conquer
Paropamisadae and Gandhara by 190 BC (Tarn 1951). Magadha, thus, faced a two-front
war: one against rebelling provinces, and one against the Indo-Greeks (Pusalker et al
2001). The potential for Indo-Greek unipolarity, however, was hampered by the split
within Bactria itself, for in 170 BC the Indo-Greek kingdom was split into two: the
eastern Indo-Greek kingdom based out of Gandhara, and the western Indo-Greek
kingdom based out of Bactria (Trautmann 2010, 63-34; Sidky 2000, 189-227). While
both Indo-Greek kingdoms kept gaining at the expense of the declining unipole,
especially Gandhara’s expansion south of the Hindu Kush by 155 BC, Gandhara, as a
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rising sub-system hegemon, began to counter-balance Bactria, which not only ended
Indo-Greek unity, but allowed Magadha some breathing room. The power configurations
of this period, then, are defined by two system-wide hegemons, and a rising sub-system
hegemon.
Map 6.4

156

140 BC – 120BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
The inter-hegemonic conflict between the two system-wide hegemons in the
bipolar structure, Bactria and Gandhara (Tarn 1951), thoroughly weakened both actors to
such an extent that by 130 BC, exhaustion, coupled with Gandhara’s inability to defeat a
weakened Bactria, ended the Indo-Greek dominion in the Indic System (Narain 1957).
The decline of both actors from system-wide status to sub-system actors allowed
Magadha, under the Sunga dynasty, to reassert its system-wide hegemonic status.
Structurally, then, the system transitioned from a bipolar constellation to a unipolar one,
with a single system-wide hegemon and two sub-system hegemons in the northwest.
120 BC – 60 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
As Magadha’s system-wide hegemonic status declined, multitude of regional,
sub-system actors overwhelmed the system. This was supplemented by the invasion and
settling of new political units from the north. The Tukharians, Northern Sakas, and
Scythians/Sakai (Shrava 1981), as a byproduct of the tribal upheavals in central Asia,
migrate into the Indic System, with the Scythians overwhelming Sogdiana and its
surrounding areas, the Northern Sakas conquering Gandhara and driving south, while the
Tukharians engulfed and settled in Bactria (Chaudhuri 1955). The northwest was also
presented with the presence of the Parthians (Isidorus 1914). The Indo-Greek sub-system
hegemons were replaced with a multitude of rising sub-system actors, ending the loose
sub-system bipolarity of the north with a nonpolar structure of various Indo-Parthian
political units. In the north-central region, west of the Ganga Plain, several independent
republics, such as Yaudheyas and Arjunayas, were expansionist powers with irredentist
objectives (Schwartzberg 1992, 174). In the Ganga Plain, with the decay of Magadhan
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power, Mathura, Pancala, Kosala, and Kausambi (Sharma 1969) established themselves
as independent powers, while in the southeast Kalinga established itself as a sub-system
hegemon with system-wide aspirations, only to be challenged by a rising system-wide
actor, the Satavahanas of Mulaka (Yazdani 1960). As such, the system, during this
period, was quite chaotic and in a state of flux, without any system-wide hegemons, and a
very high number of sub-system actors and minor actors trying to become sub-system
actors. Each region witnessed a process of consolidation, where each rising sub-system
hegemon sought to solidify power in relation to other rising regional actors.
Concomitantly, this period saw a process of regional consolidation of power, with no
actors being able to attain system-wide dominance, rather only driving to achieve subsystem hegemonic status.
60 BC – 30 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure
The continuous consolidation process during the nonpolar epoch continued in
much of the region, except for the northwest, as the various political units of the
Scythians, Sakas, and Parthians intermingled to form the Indo-Parthian dynasty,
proceeding to conquer Arachosia, Kandahar, and Paropamisadae (Colledge 1968). While
many of the other sub-system actors in the system had ambitions of system-wide status,
most were still in the process of either consolidation or simply solidifying regional
hegemony. As such, only the Indo-Parthians were able to elevate themselves to the status
of system-wide hegemons, qualifying this given period as unipolar. By virtue of all the
other actors being weak or in the process of developing, the Indo-Parthians displayed
system-wide preponderance, not only dominating the Indus and the west, but also having
ambitions of expanding to the Ganges region.
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30 BC – 40 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure
Indo-Parthian unipolarity was quickly challenged and thoroughly counterbalanced by the rising sub-system actors who had attained system-wide hegemonic status.
This development gave way to the formulation of a multipolar system, with four subsystem hegemons solidifying regional power and positioning themselves at the systemwide level. Seeking to display their system-wide hegemonic position, the Indo-Parthians
sought expansion to the east, seeking to dominate the Ganges region. This advance,
however, was blocked and counterbalanced by the Sakas of Mathura (Chattopadhyaya
1967), who had consolidated regional power and elevated themselves to system-wide
status.
The ability of Mathura to challenge the Indo-Parthians, as indicative of the end of
the unipolar epoch, was further reinforced by the rise of Kalinga and Mulaka. To the
southeast, Kalinga had also consolidated regional power and had become a system-wide
hegemon, even penetrating all the way to the northwest (Majumdar 1996). In the centerwest of the subcontinent, the Satavahana of Mulaka had attained system-wide hegemonic
status, not only displaying regional hegemony, but expanding all the way south and
controlling vast regions of the southern portion of the subcontinent (Sircar 1939). While
the Indo-Parthians were perhaps the strongest of the four system-wide hegemons, they
nonetheless failed to construct a unipolar system by virtue of their inability to
demonstrate preponderance. Namely, the ability of the other powers, especially of
Mathura, to counterbalance and challenge the Indo-Parthians, clearly indicates a
multipolar structure.
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40 AD – 90 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure
The Indo-Parthian dominance of the northwest was challenged by rising subsystem actor Kushanas, which not only sought to overthrow the Indo-Parthian dominance
of the northern sub-system, but also conquer Indo-Parthia and attain system-wide
hegemonic status. The Kushanas, who were the Tukharians of Bactria, reduced the IndoParthians to vassalage in the northwest (Banerji 1908), conquered Mathura in the north
center, and thus rose to the status of system-wide hegemon, “ranking among the major
contemporary Eurasian empires” (Szhwartzberg 1992, 174). Kushanas would soon
proceed to envelop Gandhara, making Gandhara the center of their realm. Kushanas’
system-wide status was balanced by the other system-wide hegemon in the system
operating in the south, the Satavahanas of Mulaka. To this end, the Indic System during
this epoch was structurally bipolar, with the more powerful Gandhara being
counterbalanced by the relatively less powerful, yet nonetheless a system-wide hegemon,
Mulaka. Western Sakas, in the Deccan, was in the process of conquering Avanti (Sen
1999, 185-189), hence solidifying power as a sub-system hegemon with aspirations of
challenging Mulaka.
90 AD – 150 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
The Kushanas of Gandhara extended their empire from Central Asia all the way
to northeast India (Trautmann 2010, 65), demonstrating preponderance of the system that
was neither matched nor challenged by any other actor. Mulaka was reduced to subsystem status as it became challenged by Western Sakas (Basham 1953), engaging in
continuous conflict that weakened both actors and alleviated their ability to position
themselves as system-wide hegemons in relation to Gandhara. In this sense, the decline
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of Mulaka from system-wide to sub-system actor, and the inability of Western Sakas to
overwhelm Mulaka and position at the system-wide level, left Gandhara as the only
system-wide hegemon in the Indic System, hence qualifying this period as unipolar.
150 AD – 200 AD Transition from Unipolar to Tripolar Structure
After reasserting themselves in Surashtra (Narain and Prasad, 1998), Western
Sakas not only established sub-system hegemony, but also rose to the status of systemwide hegemon by reconquering lost territories to Mulaka and proceeding even to
challenge and overtake parts of the southern territories held by Gandhara. Similarly,
Mulaka had also attained system-wide hegemonic status by serving as a bulwark against
Kushana penetration to the south (Puri 1965), thus counter-balancing Gandhara at the
system-wide level. These developments clearly indicate the relative decline of Gandhara
and the rise of Mulaka and Surashtra, thus transitioning the power configurations from a
unipolar structure dominated by Gandhara to a tripolar structure that includes Mulaka and
Surashtra.
200 AD – 310 AD Transition from Tripolar to Nonpolar Structure
By the end of the 2nd century Kushana power was in serious decline, as the IndoScythian Murundas in the northeast, the Kuninda republic in the northwest, the Maghas
in the lower Ganga, and the Yaudheyas republic all broke away from Kushanas and
proclaimed independence (Sen 1999, 201-202). Mathura was lost to the Nagas by midcentury, while the rising power of the Guptas destroyed all Kushana power in the Ganga
Plain (Fleet 1888). The Mulaka empire of the Satavahanas also underwent a similar
disintegration (175), with various newly-formed republics dominating the Rajasthan
region, while multitude of kingdoms sprang up on the Ganga Plain, only to be

161

complimented by Satavahana feudatories proclaiming independence in the south. With
this continuous disintegration, the mode of polarity in the Indic System underwent a
massive transition, as centers of political power were dispersed to a wide-ranging number
of units and actors. Sub-system actors during this period were numerous within every
region of the system, thus eliminating any considerations of rising sub-system hegemons
at this point. The entire system underwent a methodical process of re-consolidation, as
rising regional actors slowly developed sub-system status, only to attain sub-system
hegemony toward the end of the century, and thus seek system-wide hegemonic status at
the start of the 3rd century. In this sense, with approximately 10-15 centers of power
throughout the system during this period, the structure had transitioned to one of
nonpolarity.
310 AD – 350 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Bipolar Structure
More than hundred years of nonpolarity in the Indic World Political System
allowed for the formulation of new regional actors that by the start of the 4th century had
consolidated sub-system hegemony, with two political units managing to establish
system-wide hegemonic status: the Vakataka and the Guptas (Altekar 1946). This bipolar
structure was augmented by the presence of several sub-system actors: the Hunas in the
northwest, the Naga in the north, the Sakas in the Deccan, and the Pallavas, after the
disintegration of the Satavahanas, in the south. The Vakatakas attained system-wide
hegemonic status by conquering Kalinga in the central-eastern coast of the subcontinent
and stretching all the way to the Decann region (Banarjea 1957, 280-286), overwhelming
the sub-system hegemons the Sakas of Avanti and the Western Sakas of Surastra (Keay
2000, 130-131). Vakatakas’ system-wide status was counter-balanced by the rise of the
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Guptas. As system-wide hegemons that dominated the Ganga Plain, Gupta suzerainty
stretched all the way from Kosala in the west to Kajangala in the east, and virtually
assumed the territorial size of the first Magadha empire (Banjeri 1933). The interhegemonic conflict between Vakatakas and Gupta brought about the polarization of allies
into the two distinct bipolar structures: Vakatakas incorporated the sub-system Nagas and
several other allies into its pole, while Gupta brought Vaisali and Pataliputra into its
camp. The post-nonpolar structure, thus, observed the formation of a bipolar system that
was characterized by a process of polarization.
350 AD – 460 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
The Guptas restructured the Indic System into a unipolar power configuration,
establishing system-wide hegemony that was neither challenged nor counter-balanced for
over a century. Guptas initially conquered northern India, including Vakatakas ally the
Nagas, proceeding to overtake Malwa, Mathura, and reach all the way to Kalinga.
Heading south, the Guptas established suzerainty over Kosala and Kanci, the Pallava
capital. In the Ganga Plain, the long-standing republics, beginning with Madrakas and
ending with the powerful Yaudheyas, were brought under Gupta control. In the north, the
Kushanas where overwhelmed, while in the Deccan, the Saka kingdoms of Avanti and
Surastra were conquered (Agrawal 1989, 103-132). Gupta’s conquest of much of the
Indian sub-continent, complete with the strategic subjugation of Vakatakas allies, along
with reducing Vakataka as “virtual appendage of the Guptas” (Schwartzerg 1992, 179),
solidified the unipolar structuration of this specific epoch. Gupta system-wide hegemony
was defined by satellite rulers and tributaries that obeyed imperial edicts, and the
concession of all political units within Gupta sphere of influence of its hegemonic status.
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Sub-system hegemons that remained outside of Gupta dominance, but were unable to
counterbalance the only superpower, were the Hunas in the northwest, elements of the
Sassanians of Persia on the periphery (around Gandhara), and the Pallava in the very
south of the subcontinent.
460 AD – 510 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
By mid-5th century, Gupta power declined, primarily due to internal revolts, the
rise of sub-systems hegemons seeking system-wide status, and the reassertion of
Vakatakas as a challenger counter-balancing Gupta at the system-wide level. While
dealing with internal instability, the Guptas faced a direct challenge from the Hunas, the
sub-system hegemon in the north. Gupta’s ability to repel Hunas’ ascendance reaffirmed
Gupta system-wide hegemonic status and temporarily blocked the Hunas from attaining
system-wide positioning (Sharma 1989, 195-196). But these developments allowed for
Vakatakas to restablish itself as a system-wide counterbalance to the Guptas (Majumdar
and Altekar 1986), hence restructuring the power constellations of the system to one of
bipolarity by establishing control in the west and coastal northeast of the subcontinent
(from Avanti all the way to Kosala and Kalinga).
510 AD – 540 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
While the previous period was bipolar, both system-wide hegemons were in
severe decline, allowing Hunas to elevate itself from sub-system hegemon to the most
dominant power in the system. The Hunas were a Central Asian people that migrated
from the north and became absorbed by the Indic System. The Hunas had split into two
distinct political units after being initially repelled by the Guptas: the Hephthalites in the
northern most part of the system, and the Southern Hunas, who drove south to absorb

164

Kushana and finally defeat Gupta (Biswar 1971). The defeat of Gupta, and the
disintegration of Vakatakas by 510 AD, made Southern Hunas the only system-wide
hegemon in the system. Southern Hunas suzerainty stretched from the vast areas of
Aghanistan to Gandhara, Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, and central India, while keeping
the defeated Gupta as tributaries (Banjeri 1962, 57-62). The disintegration of both the
Gutpas and Vakatakas, however, would produce a very high number of independent,
ambitious political units that the temporary superpower, the Southern Hunas, will have
difficulty exercising preponderance over.
540 AD – 580 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
The disintegration of both Gupta and Vakataka allowed for the temporary rise of
Southern Hunas unipolarity in the previous epoch, yet the consequences of the previous
political fragmentations had begun to restructure the power hierarchy of the system.
Within this framework, intense, multipartite struggles both at the regional and systemwide level, as consequence of the numerously new independent political actors that had
broken away from Gupta and Vakataka dominance, sprung up, forming scores of centers
of inchoate power through the Indic System. These developments were accompanied by
the disintegration of Hunas system-wide positioning as a result of defeats handed down
by Iranian Sassanid and Central Asian Turkish incursions into the northwest of the
system. The outcome was a plethora of regional actors seeking consolidation, sub-system
dominance, and potential system-wide aspirations. Both the Hephthalite Hunas and the
Southern Hunas were reduced to regional actors, while Sind, along with the Gonandas in
Kashmir, offered regional challenge to both Huna states. Maukharis began its slow rise in
the north-central region (Pires 1934), only to be challenged by Magadha (Sinha 1977,
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110-115), another rising sub-system actor. Pushyabhunti, a rising sub-system actor in the
north-center began positioning itself for regional dominance (Singh 2008, 562-563),
while Karnata in the west, Kadambas in the south (Mishra 1979), and Kamarupa in the
northeast began consolidating regional hegemony. The very south of the system saw
continuous conflicts for regional preponderance, as Pallavas and Pandyas
counterbalanced the ambitions of Kongu, while a little west, Kadambas was consistently
pressured by the rise of Karnata (Schwartzberg 1992, 179-181). In this sense, with the
absence of any system-wide hegemons, the previous regions under hegemonic control
first began the consolidation process of formulating sub-system hegemons, thus primarily
acting at the regional level. Consequently, the mode of polarity transitioned to a nonpolar
configuration, as several actors, within every sub-system itself, sought regional
dominance, while at the larger system-wide level, no hegemons were present.
580 AD – 650 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure
The consolidation of sub-systems by regional powers brought about the transition
from a nonpolar structure to a multipolar one, as given sub-system hegemons sought
expansion and system-wide status. Maukharis, based out of Kanyakubja, attained mastery
of the entire Gangetic Plain, overwhelming Magdha, Kosala, and reaching far east into
Gauda (Sinha 1977, 112-118). Pusyabhuti, having defeated the Hunas of Punjab, along
with the rulers of Gandhara, Sindhu, the Gurjaras of Rajasthan, and the kings of Malava
and Lata, allied itself with Maukharis, but once Maukharis fell (Maukharis system-wide
presence was relatively short, as Sasanka, one of its feudatories, rebelled and thoroughly
weakened Maukharis, hence its need for alliance with the rising Pusyabhuti), Pusyabhuti,
moving into Kanyakubja, became the most powerful system-wide hegemon in the
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multipolar structure (Devahuti 1998; Goyal 2006). In the Deccan region, Kalacuris, based
out of Anupa, attained system-wide hegemonic status by conquering Maharastra, Lata,
the Malwa Plateau, and the Maitrakas, while counter-balancing and serving as a buffer
against Pusyabhuti incursion into central India. To the south the Calukyas, based out of
Karnata, established sub-system hegemony over the entire south of the sub-continent and
proceeded northwest, overtaking much of the lower Deccan and “rivaling the dominant
Pusyabhutis of the North” (Schwartzberg 1992, 181). Calukyan dominance in the south,
however, was challenged by Pallavas, a sub-system actor that had positioned itself at the
system-wide level, counter-balancing Calukya in the south while Calukya sought
expansion in the north (Gopalan 1928, xxxii). This multipolar structure, then, saw a
balance of power between Pusyabhuti in the north; Kalacuris in the upper Deccan and
central India; Calukyan ascendancy from the south and its challenge to Kalacuris over
central India; Pallavas challenge to Calukyan power in the south; and Calukyan and
Kalacuris counter-balance to Pusyabhunti aspirations south of the Gangetic Plain.
650 AD – 700 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure
By 650 AD the Pusyabhuti empire had disintegrated, Kalacuris was reduced to a
sub-system actor by Calukyas, while the Calukyas itself had been reduced to sub-system
status by its defeat at the hands of Pallavas. Inter-hegemonic rivalry had either destroyed
previous system-wide hegemons, or reduced surviving ones to regional actors. The
outcome was a structural transition from multipolarity to bipolarity: Pallavas attained
system-wide hegemonic status by virtue of its defeat of Calukyas and its dominance over
the south and southwest of the system (Sen 1988, 446-449), while Cacas, based out of
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Sind, attained dominance of the northwest, defeating the rising sub-system hegemon
Karkotas out of Kashmir and overtaking remnants of the Pusyabhutis.
700 AD – 740 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
Arab incursion into the periphery of the Indic System had a detrimental effect on
powerful actors in the northwest, especially Cacas, as the Caliphate’s continuous attacks
on Sind greatly weakened Cacas, forcing Cacas to reposition as a sub-system hegemon
(346-352). The other system-wide hegemon in the previous epoch, Pallavas, was
consistently challenged by rising sub-system actors in the south, only to be defeated by a
new system-wide hegemon: the revived Calukyans of Karnata (359-363). Calukyas
ascendance to unipolar preponderance was a direct byproduct of the geopolitical
consequences of the Arab incursions, including Calukyas’ ability to repel the Arabs,
along with the inter-regional conflicts in the south that reduced the only existing systemwide hegemon from the previous period to sub-system status. As such, with the northwest
in disarray (including the Ganga Plain) and the south destabilized, the Calukyas
consolidated power throughout much of south-central India, stretching from the western
coast of the subcontinent all the way to the eastern coast. This unipolar structure was
supplemented by the presence of several sub-system hegemons: Cacas, Karkotas,
Kalacuris, Magadha, and Pallavas.
740 AD – 780 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
The inability of the Arabs to consolidate power in the Indic System was followed
by the rise of several new sub-system actors seeking to fill the power vacuum in the given
sub-systems. The decay of Calukyas further contributed to this development, bringing
about a nonpolar structure, as the system remained absent of any political units that
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exercised power system-wide, only having a high number of regional actors seeking to
solidify local hegemony, hence suggesting a very high number of power centers
throughout the system. The Varmans of Kanyakubja were challenged by the rising subsystem hegemon Karkotas for dominance of the northwest; the Calukyas, who had been
slowly weakened by the rise of sub-system hegemons, especially Rastrakutas, were
reduced to sub-system status; from the Bengal region, Pala established itself as a subsystem hegemon, only to be challenged by Gurjara-Pratiharas, another regional power;
and in the south, the conflict between Andhra, Pallavas, and Pandya continued and
intensified. These constellations of mid-ranged powers were supplemented by the
presence of Kalacuris, Magadha, Kamarupa, and Maitrakas. In sum, following the
unipolar system, the power structure during this epoch became inchoate and highly
diffused, thus indicating a nonpolar structure.
780 AD – 880 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure
Rastrakutas establishes itself as the singular system-wide hegemon during this
period, conquering the entire Deccan region, proceeding south and submitting Pallavas,
and then turning north and defeating Gurjara-Pratiharas. While Rastrakutas’ military
victories up north did not translate into sustained political gain, all of southern and central
India, from its western to eastern coast remains under Rastrakutas dominance (Altekar
1967). Only the north of the Indic System did not fall under Rastrakutas dominance,
where two sub-system wide hegemons, the Gurjara-Pratiharas and Pala, remained in
constant struggle over regional hegemony. Thus, Rastrakutas dominated approximately
60% of the Indic System, while the remaining 40%, which comprised the Ganga Plain of
the north and the territories to the northwest, where the battle ground of the two powerful
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sub-system actors. If it was not for the inter-sub-system hegemonic conflict between
Gurjara-Pratiharas and Pala, where which each political unit may have attained its own
sphere of influence and cease weakening each other, in relation to Rastrakutas, this
period may have been designated as tripolar. However, the consistent utilization of
resources at the regional level, as opposed to counter-balancing Rastrakutas at the
system-wide level, along with Rastrakutas initial defeat of Gurjara-Pratiharas and Palas’
continued reliance on Rastrakutas (412-417), suggests the unipolar structure of this
period. Namely, while both sub-system hegemons had the potential to counterbalance the
much more powerful Rastrakutas, and thus suggest a tripolar structure, this potential was
marginalized by Rastrakutas’ ability to intervene intermittently in the conflict, further
destabilizing the northern region, and thus further reifying its system-wide hegemonic
status.
880 AD – 920 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
Rasrakutas unipolarity came to end when Gurjara-Pratiharas finally conquered
Palas in 883 AD, thus transitioning the Indic System into a bipolar structure. Rasrakutas
maintained its status as the most powerful political actor in the system, but the elevation
of Gurjara-Pratiharas from regional actor to system-wide hegemon brought about a
counter-balance to Rasrakutas preponderance. Gurjara-Pratiharas’ domain extended from
coast to coast, from the Eastern to the Western Sea, and from the Himalayas to the
Vindyas, thus establishing domination from the upper-Deccan and throughout the Ganga
Plain (Puri 1986). Gurjara-Pratiharas consistently succeeded in deterring Rasrakuta
ambitions of conquest to the north (Allan et al 1943, 132-136), but Rasrakuta power
allowed for its continued dominance of Southern Gujarat and Kalacuris, much to the
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dismay of Gurjara-Pratiharas. The bipolar system was best illustrated by the number of
times Avanti changed hands, as each actor used this strategic city to counter-balance and
demarcate the limits of each polar power. A state of perhaps equal power was Hindu
Sahis, based out of Gandhara in the northwest after the Arab conquests (Mishra 1972).
However, since Hindu Sahis, regardless of its power, remained a regional actor, thus
refraining from involvement at the system-wide level, it primarily positioned itself as a
sub-system hegemon.
920 AD – 970 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
The Rastrakutas re-transitioned the Indic System into its previous unipolar
structure by embarking on several major expansions: Gurjara-Pratiharas was invaded,
thus being thoroughly weakened, while expansion to the south reaffirmed Rastrakuta
hegemony in its defeat of Cola, Pandya, and Simhala. Rastrakutas hegemonic status was
neither balanced nor seriously challenged by any actors at the system-wide level, thus
creating a unipolar structure. The decline of Gurjara-Pratiharas, however, created
important developments that soon brought about the end of Rastrakuta preponderance.
The Candellas of Bundelkhand, the Paramaras, the Calyukas, and the Palas all reestablished themselves as independent, regional actors and rising sub-system hegemons
(Sen 1988, 307-321). In the northwest the Hindu Sahis came into regional conflict with
Ghazni, another Arabic kingdom absorbed into the periphery of the Indic System.
970 AD – 1120 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure
By 970 AD, Rastrakuta faced severe challenges by the given sub-system
hegemons seeking system-wide status, and this was reified in the defeat of Rastrakuta by
the Paramaras of Malwa (Bhatia 1970). Paramaras thus established itself as a system-
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wide hegemon, seeking suzerainty over Kalacuris, Cahamanas, Caulukyas, and Guhilas
(Seth 1978, 47-66). Hindu Sahis became a system-wide hegemon upon entering in
conflict with Ghazni, as both system-wide actors sought control of the northwest and
expansion in the Indic System. Ghazni remained the most powerful hegemon in the
system, conquering lands from the Kabul region, to Punjab, to all the way across central
India (Bosworth 1963). Paramaras and Hindu Sahis stubbornly sought to counter-balance
Ghazni growth, thus limiting Ghazni from altering the system into a unipolar structure.
By 1021 Ghazni achieved its destruction of Hindu Sahi, thus removing a hegemonic actor
from the system, only to be confronted by the elevation of Candellas to system-wide
status, which not only staved off Ghazni encroachment into the Ganga Plain, but
expanded the former’s dominance of the region as well (Dikshit 1977, 55-65). In the
south the rise of Cola added a fourth actor to the multipolar system, as the new systemwide hegemon subjugated Ganga, conquered Simhala, and pressed gains in Bengal at the
expense of Palas. In a matter of a decade, Kalacuris overwhelmed Candellas and replaced
it as one of the poles in the system (101), while the Calukyas of Karnata established
system-wide hegemonic status by proceeding to challenge and thoroughly weaken Cola,
Palas, Candellas, and Paramaras (Schwartzberg 1992, 188-90). In this sense, at any given
time during this period, between four and five system-wide hegemons challenged and
counter-balanced each other, while rising sub-system hegemons overwhelmed the
declining ones, and thus reinforcing the continuous multipolar system.
1120 AD – 1175 AD Transition from Multipolar to Tripolar Structure
Around 1120, due to Seljuk ascendancy in Central Asia and Middle East, Ghazni
was overwhelmed and thus removed as hegemonic actor from the Indic System. The
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structure thus transitioned into a tripolar configuration through the rise of Caulukyas from
Gujarat (not to be confused with Calukyas of Karnata), the Cahamanas based out of
Rajputana (Singh 1964), and the Gahadavalas of Kashi (Niyogi 1959). Caulukyas
proceeded to annex Paramaras and counter-balance and even weaken Cahamanas, while
establishing supremacy in western India, including much of Rajasthan. Cahamanas had
established dominance in parts of the Ganga Plain and in the Punjab, while constantly at
conflict with Caulukyas, initially Candellas, and then Gahadavalas (Dikshit 1977, 129138). Gahadavalas became system-wide hegemons by weakening Palas, annexing
Magadha, and counter-balancing the ambitions of Cahamanas.
1175 AD – 1220 AD Transition from Tripolar to Unipolar Structure
The decline of Ghazni, along with the inflow of Muslims into the Indic System’s
periphery, gave way to the incursion of Turkish dynasties into the system. The most
powerful political unit to replace the Ghazni in the north were the Ghurids, who
conquered southern Punjab, Sind, Ghazanavid, the Cahamanas, Kashi, parts of Bengal,
and Malwa, thus extending their power from the periphery in the northwest all the way
across the Gangetic Plain (Nizami 1998, 180-186). In a period of 15 years, the Ghurid
established itself as the most powerful system-wide hegemon in the Indic System by
defeating the previous system-wide hegemons, or reducing them to sub-system status,
thus alleviating any challenges or counter-balance to its preponderance. The power
constellation during this period is thus coded as unipolarity, with a single unchallenged
hegemon, and various sub-system actors, including the rising sub-system hegemon
Yadavas (Schwartzberg 1992, 196-197).
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1220 AD – 1295 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
The Ghurids, seeking consolidation of power into the Middle East, exited the
Indic System, yet conferred on the Mamluks politically autonomy to control the
conquered domains (Jackson 1999, 3-21), thus creating the Sultanate of Delhi (the Ghurid
dynasty, however, soon collapsed, with the northwestern states gaining independence, but
this had no effect on Delhi’s system-wide status) (Chaurasia 2002; Aziz 1987; Habib and
Nizami 1970).Delhi’s position, however, was soon challenged by the rise of Yadavas, a
new system-wide hegemon based out of Maharastra, who managed to expand both east
and south, dominating the Deccan and central India (Altekar1960). The system had thus
transitioned into a bipolar structure, with the usual motley crew of sub-system actors:
Candellas, Caulakyas, Orissa, Gujarat, Paramaras, and Pandya.
Map 6.5
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1295 AD – 1400 AD Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
In 1290 the Mamluks were replaced by the Khalji dynasty (Day 1963), yet the
Sultanate of Delhi remained a single political unit, only this time it managed to defeat the
only other system-wide hegemon, Yadavas (Jackson 1999, 171-176), thus transitioning
the Indic System into a unipolar structure. While Mongol groups had moved into the
northern periphery of the system, and proceeded to undertake raids on Delhi territories
from time to time, a coherent Mongol political unit was not formed, thus removing any
systemic challenge to Delhi unipolarity. In 1320 the Tughluq dynasty replaced the
Khaljis, undertaking a massive expansion that engulfed almost the entire Indic System.
Ghazni, Qandahar, and Kabul were raided in the northwest to deter any future Mongol
incursions, while Peshwar, Gujarat, Telingana, Malwa, Rajputana, Pandya, Mahrastra,
Bengal, and even the Himalayas, were all conquered (Chaurasia 2002, 47-66). With the
exception of tribal areas in the northwest periphery, Kashmir, small parts of the eastern
sea coast, and parts of Rajputana, the Delhi Sultanate controlled the entire Indic System.
Delhi’s system-wide hegemonic status remained unchallenged until the end of the
century, and while its expansive size gradually limited the Sultanate’s capacity to control
all of its realms, as vassal states slowly broke off during Delhi’s decline, no system-wide
hegemon, however, rose to challenge or alter the unipolar structure.
1400 AD – 1550 AD Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
The incursion of Tamerlane (Amir Timur) into the Indic System, albeit
temporarily, threw the power constellation of the system into inchoateness for nearly 150
years, as endless conflict between sub-system actors, rising regional hegemons, and
aspiring system-wide actors transitioned the power configurations from the Delhi
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Sultanate’s unipolar structure to a nonpolar one. In 1398 Tamerlane launched his
invasion of India, conquering most of the northwest and the Ganga Plain, thus ending the
Delhi Sultanate (Ashrafyan 1998). Tamerlane’s incursion, however, did not translate into
any consolidations or annexations, as Tamerlane proceeded west to conquer Persia,
Eurasia, and much of the Middle East, while solidifying his empire in Central Asia
(Mukminova 1998). His incursion, however, left the Indic System in a state of chaos, as
the decay of the unipole brought about multitude of new political actors in the northwest
and north-center, while in the periphery new political units started forming that would
continue incursions into the sub-content, thus contributing to its continuous nonpolarity.
Kashmir, Sind, Rajputana and Punjab established themselves as competing sub-system
hegemons in the northwest, soon to welcome the rising Mughals (Tamerlane’s TurkicMongol descendents) in the periphery; Jaunpur and soon Malwa (under the new
Ghurids), then a resurgent Delhi, positioned as regional powers in the north-center;
Bengal, Assam, and Orissa establish sub-system hegemonic status in the northeast; while
Bidar, soon to be challenged by Gujarat, then Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, competed in the
West; and in the South, Vijayanagar, Andhra, and Ceylon intensely struggling for
regional dominance (Schwartzberg 1992, 199-204).
Inter-regional conflict, along with cross-regional conflict between aspiring subsystem hegemons continued until 1550 AD, with no single political unit being able to
attain system-wide hegemonic status. From time to time given actors temporarily
succeeded in attaining sub-system hegemonic status, but this was soon challenged by new
rising sub-system actors, thus limiting the capacity of such regional powers to attain
system-wide positioning. Concomitantly, a continuous cycle presented itself, as new
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independent actors popped up in the system, while older ones declined; conquests
became ephemeral, with limited longevity of five or ten years at the most, thus
reinforcing the nonpolarity of the system by virtue of intense dispersion of power, with
centers of power in the system ranging from a minimum of 10 actors to a maximum of 16
actors.
1550 AD – 1725 AD Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure
By 1525 the Mughals had established itself as sub-system hegemons in the
northwest, seeking system-wide positioning by attempting to make headway into the
Ganga Plain, and finally attaining after 30 years by conquering and solidifying their base
of power in Delhi (Akbar 1948; Richards 2001, 9-15). The Mughals proceeded to absorb
Awadh, Rajputana, Bihar, Sind, and Malwa in the north-center (Chaurasia 2002, 181205), then turning north and subjugating Kabul, Kandahar and Kashmir (Mattoo 1988),
followed by heading northeast to absorb Bengal and northern Orissa (Ray and Raya
1981), to then conquer Ahmadnagar to the west (Shyam 1966, 297-312), and finally
overwhelm Bidar and Golkonda in the south (Chaurasia 2002, 275-277), reaching all the
way to Arkat at the southeastern tip of the subcontinent. Mughal suzerainty, thus,
extended all the way from Kabul and Kandahar in the periphery of the Northwest, all the
way across the Ganga Plain in the North-center to the eastern seacoast, the entire Deccan
and all of central India, and much of the southern tip of the sub-continent. Mughal
system-wide hegemony remained neither challenged nor counter-balanced by any
political units in the system until the 18th century, classifying this epoch as fundamentally
unipolar. While incursions by Persia into the northwest periphery especially into
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Map 6.6

Kandahar, created military problems for Mughal, Persia was neither an actor in the Indic
System (since these incursions were inherently ephemeral), nor did they pose any threat
or challenge to Mughal unipolarity. Similarly, Maratha resistance to Mughal expansion
(Dighe 1944), for example, does not suggest a capacity for counter-balancing or Maratha
status as system-wide challengers to Mughal hegemony (Mughal would proceed to
conquer Maratha as a final outcome). To this end, the polar structure of the Indic System
remained unipolar for nearly two centuries.
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1725 AD – 1820 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure
By 1725 the Mughal Empire had disintegrated, as various political units, either by
breaking away from Mughal dominance, Mughal governors declaring independence, or
outside powers infringing into the system, resurrected their respective states as systemwide actors. Hyderabad, Marathas, the Durranis of Afghanistan, and the British Empire
became the system-wide hegemonic actors in the new multipolar structure of the Indic
System. British selective incursion, through the British East India Company, had begun
from 1740’s, only to be supplemented by methodical British expansion and complete
dominance, colonization, of the sub-continent by 1819.
During this period, however, Marathas became a system-wide hegemon by
controlling Bundelkhand, Gujarat, and Malwa, raiding Rajput territories, (Gordon 1993,
132-149; Chhabra 2005, 15-27) and directly challenging and counter-balancing one of the
other system-wide hegemons, Hyderabad. Hyderabad established its dominance
throughout the Deccan, thus directly confronting Marathas to its north, both militarily and
diplomatically (Bawa 1986). In the northwest, Afghanistan established system-wide
hegemonic status by seizing Punjab and Kashmir, only to meet a challenge from
Marathas over Punjab and offer Marathas a severe defeat (Schwartzberg 1992, 211-212).
Afghanistan’s ability to deter and weaken Marathas further balanced power through the
system, as Hyderabad did not face an overly-powerful Marathas by itself. The interhegemonic conflict between the indigenous powers, while relatively balancing their
strengths, also, relatively, weakened their capabilities in relation to the British. As such,
Marathas, Hyderabad, and Afghanistan, by early 19th century, slowly began to cede
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territory to the British, either through treaties or conquest, only to be enveloped by British
power (Chaurasia 2004, 94-127; Chhabra 2005, 131-144).
1820 AD – 1858 AD Transition from Indic System to Global System
During this period, British dominance of the Indic System not only included
territorial conquest and consolidation, but also administrative and political solidification
of British power. In 1757 British victory at the Battle of Plassey over Bengal and its
French allies had paved the way for what would become British domination of the Indian
subcontinent. This dominance, however, was not immediate as took Britain some time to
consolidate its economic and terriotiral interests. This process, at the same time, was
primarily led by the British East India Company, as it both administered and controlled
the given territories and trading posts under the auspices of London. Disenchantment
with British East Indian Company’s rule, however, gave way to the Indian Rebellion of
1857, with regions from Delhi, Maratha, Utter Pradesh, and Bihar joining the uprising,
while Bengal, Madras, Punjab, and Bombay did not.
In 1858 the rebellion was suppressed, but the outcome was two-fold: the British
East Indian Company was dissolved, hence ending its administrative rule; at the same
time, however, the entire country and much of the sub-continent became directly
administered by Britain, hence replacing the political units of the Indic System with
British Raj. As such, the territories, political units, and the socio-cultural and economic
structures that comprised the Indic System officially became part of the British Empire.
Forthwith, this period witnessed the colonization by Britain of the Indic System, and the
absorption of the Indic World Political System into the Global Political System.
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Analysis
A total of 32 data observations are collected as polar periods where the power
constellations of the system are categorized according to the coding for modalities of
polarity. The collected data allow for four types of analytical considerations: distribution
of polar structures, transitional patterns after unipolar periods, duration of polar periods,
and probabilistic considerations of polar structures after unipolar transitions. In the Indic
World Political System, the most common power configuration is unipolarity, with 13
unipolar periods being observed. In relation to other modes of polarity, unipolarity tends
to be the norm, as the system consistently transitions to a unipolar structure after, on
average, two different polar systems. This is indicative of the Indic System’s tendency to
transition into configurations that display high concentrations of power.
Bipolarity remains the second most common polar structure in the system, with 8
periods, followed by nonpolarity with 5 periods, multipolarity with 4 periods, and
tripolarity with 2 periods. Concomitantly, in the 2200 years of the Indic System covered
in this study, unipolarity was the polar system 40 percent of the time, followed by
bipolarity (25 percent), nonpolarity (15 percent), multipolarity (12 percent), and
tripolarity (6 percent). Figure 6.1 charts the distribution of the polar structures,
demonstrating the system’s tendency to consistently transition to a unipolar structure.
Multipolarity and tripolarity remain the least occurring modes of power configurations,
and even if the two were combined, presupposing, for the sake of argument, that any
system over two system-wide hegemons is a multipolar system, its occuramce remains at
six, lower than bipolar periods and not even half of unipolar structures.
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FIGURE 6.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN INDIC SYSTEM

On average, the most durable power constellation is nonpolarity, its average
duration lasting approximately 80 years. As Figure 6.2 demonstrates, unipolarity remains
the second most durable polar structure, averaging 75 year of longevity, followed by
multipolarity with 71 years, tripolarity with 52 years, and bipolarity with 49 years. By
virtue of its durability, nonpolarity remains the most stable structure at the system’s level,
since it takes nearly 80 years in order for structural transition to take place. This appears
to be consistent with the historical data: nonpolar periods witness the time consuming
process of regional consolidation, inter-regional sub-system conflict, and then the
positioning of rising sub-system hegemons at the system-wide level. In this sense,
nonpolarity is structurally stable vis-à-vis system’s maintenance, not in relation to
conflict and war. Similarly, unipolar longevity suggests the predisposition of the Indic
System as favorable to system-wide hegemonic actors, since the removal of a pole either
revolves around new challenging actors, or the disintegration of the hegemon by virtue of
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internal weakening or overextension. In either case, the unipolar structures average 75
years of preponderance. An interesting observation is the system’s stability of a
multipolar modality in comparison to bipolar structures. While bipolar configurations
appear to be far more common, they at the same time are the least durable, while
multipolar systems, while relatively less common, are almost as durable as unipolar
periods. Systemically, then, bipolarity remains the most unstable power configuration in
the Indic System.

FIGURE 6.2 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR STRUCTURES
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The distribution of polar structures after unipolar periods offers insight into the
probabilistic nature of post-unipolar system’s formation. 13 data observations allow for
analytical consideration of trends after unipolarity, which suggests an almost equal
distribution of polar structurations. As Figure 6.3 shows, of the 13 unipolar periods, the
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system transitioned into a bipolar structure 5 times, a nonpolar structure 4 times,
multipolar structure 3 times, and tripolar structure only once.

FIGURE 6.3 POST-UNIPOLAR POWER CONSTELLATIONS IN INDIC SYSTEM
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Probabilistically, then, the unipolar structure in the Indic System had a 38%
chance of transitioning into a bipolar configuration, 30% chance of diffused nonpolar
structure, 23% chance of multipolar constellation, and 7% chance at tripolarity. The
analytical conclusion of these observations is two-fold: 38% of the time the post-unipolar
system transitions into the least stable structure, while 30% of the time the system
transitions into the most stable structure. The explanations for these developments are
consistent with the historical data. In instances where system-wide hegemons disintegrate
internally or due to overextension, the system generally transitions into a nonpolar
structure, where which its longevity is sustained through the long climb that regional
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actors must take in seeking to fill the vacuum left by the disintegrated, post-unipolar
structure. In instances where the unipolar structure transitions into a bipolar one, this is
generally the byproduct of rising or new system-wide hegemons counter-balancing and
challenging the existing hegemon, in which case a sustained bipolar structure remains
untenable, as either one of the poles succeed in dominating the other, or they manage to
weaken each other to such an extent that new actors rise to the system-wide level, thus
restructuring the power configurations.
The data allows for the rejection of any general hypotheses that contend
multipolar or bipolar systems as the norm, rather suggesting the opposite: unipolarity is
the most occurring polar structure in this given world political system. Likewise, the
traditional disregard of scholars for considerations of nonpolar systems is also questioned
by the data produced in this chapter. In the Indic System, nonpolarity was present 15%
within its historic sequence, more prevalent than multipolarity or tripolarity.
Interestingly, the durability of nonpolar configurations, especially after unipolar
transitions, is very telling: in 5 polar periods, nonpolarity accounted for 400 years of
system’s maintenance, while multipolarity, with 4 polar periods, accounted for a total of
285 years of system’s maintenance. The long-term presence of diffused, inchoate power
constellations in a system are very important findings that have implications for our
assessment of the overarching structurations of polar periods. To this end, should a postunipolar system transition into a nonpolar structure, this period will not be a temporary
epoch, but would last for a fairly long period of time without any system-wide hegemons
or superpowers.
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CHAPTER 7
THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Mediterranean World Political System primarily refers to the political
interactions, inter and intra civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide
hegemonic status between political units/entities/actors within the region that the given
world political system encompasses. This fundamentally presupposes a group of political
units/entities/actors having relations that are, to a strong degree, permanent or continuous
with one another. Spatial-territorially, the Mediterranean System covers a specific
geographical area, but to specify set regional and territorial boundaries in absolute terms
in the conceptualization of a world political system will obscure the reality of the political
realm. The regional boundaries tend to be flexible, with political entities at the periphery
at times being incorporated in the system, and at times being absent from the system.
System’s classification, then, does not specifically rely on establishing absolute regional
boundaries, but rather considering the ebb and flow of powerful political actors, primarily
the political contacts, interactions, and power configurations of system-wide hegemons
that function within the region that the given system encompasses.
The Mediterranean System, territorially, includes the global region that covers the
following areas. The western periphery begins with the Atlantic Coast of the Iberian
Peninsula, along the Sea of Gibraltar, heading south to the northern coast of modern-day
Morocco, and proceeding eastward along the North African coast all the way to Cyrene
(modern day Libya), with the Egyptian periphery of Numidia serving as the eastern-most
periphery of the Mediterranean System. Heading north, the system covers much of the
Mediterranean all the way to Cyprus, with Cyprus serving as its easternmost periphery,
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heading northwest to the island of Rhodes and the entire eastern coast of Asia
Minor/Anatolia (Ionian Asia Minor) serving as the central-eastern periphery of the
system. Heading westward from Ionian Asia Minor, the system covers all of the Balkans,
the Aegean Sea, the mainland of Greece along with all of the accompanying islands in the
Mediterranean, the Adriatic Sea, the Italian Peninsula (with the accompanying islands of
Sicily and Sardinia), and the entire south of the European continent all the way to the
Iberian Peninsula.
The collection of data for polar periods within the Mediterranean System begins
around approximately 2000 BC, with Aegean Greece providing the first case of unitary
political actors, chronologically speaking, within the system. Evidence of political actors
during the Neolithic Period within the Mediterranean System remains fundamentally
limited, and for this reason, historical evidence is primarily extrapolated from the Late
Bronze Period, with the Minoan Civilization serving as the initial subject of observation.
In this sense, the scope of data collection undertaken in this work sharply differs from
much of the scholarship undertaken by political scientists that have covered the political
interactions and power configurations of ancient Mediterranean, especially of Greece:
scope of research has primarily concentrated on the Archaic and Classical Periods, with
extensive attention to interstate relations between city-states and the Peloponnesian War
(Bederman 2001; Adcock and Mosley 1975; Kozak 2001; Kauppi 1991; Eckstein 2003;
Gilpin 1981, 1988; Evera 1999; Doyle 1991; Lebow and Strauss 1991; Finley 1991;
Waltz 1979; Wight 1978; and Rostovtzeff 1922). As such, the research at hand greatly
expands the scope of data collection by observing the historical and archeological
evidence prior to these periods, presenting findings of macropolitical developments for

187

approximately 1200 years of history that has been generally ignored by political
scientists.
While the Mediterranean System covers the entire world region specified above,
at its inception, however, it primarily covered four sub-regional civilizations of Aegean
Greece: Crete, the Cycladic Islands, Helladic Civilization (Peloponnese and southern,
mainland Greece), and Thessalonian Civilization (north-eastern Greece) (Wace 1923a,
174) . Until the expansion of the system into Macedonia, Thrace, eastern (Ionian) Asia
Minor, Italy, southern France, and the Mediterranean coast of Spain, for approximately
900 years (2000BC–1100BC), the Mediterranean System remained limited to these four
sub-regions. However, interactions with other world political systems, primarily the
Middle East-Near East System, did take place primarily through trade with Egypt and the
Syro-Palestinian Levant. Political interactions, however, remained almost non-existent, as
system-wide actors within the Mediterranean System applied all of their attention to the
Aegean, while system-wide actors in the Middle East-Near East System limited their
reach to Cyprus, or, in the case of Anatolian system-wide actors, to the periphery of
Ionian Asia Minor. Interstate relations between system-wide hegemonic actors of each of
the respective systems did not come into political, high-level diplomatic, or military
contact until the incursions of the Persian Empire into the Mediterranean System. Within
this context, the two systems existed separately until the temporary incursion of the
Persians during the Greco-Persian Wars, and the final absorption of the Middle East-Near
East System into the Mediterranean System after Macedonia’s conquest of the Persian
Empire and the formation of a single world political system.
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2000 BC – 1700 BC Bipolar Structure
The classification of power configurations within the Mediterranean System
begins around 2000 BC with the island of Crete, as the Minoan Civilization of the island
represented the most politically and economically developed culture of the Aegean.
Evidence of developed political entities in the system remain absent until the spread of
Minoan Civilization to the Cycladic, Helladic, and Thessalonian sub-regions during the
next 300 years. Within this period, then, the power configuration of the Mediterranean
System is defined by the two power centers within Crete: Cnossus in the north and
Phaestus in the south. While the historical evidence remains obscure as to whether these
system-wide hegemons were rivals or separate seats of power, there is conclusive
evidence that the two were the “great centers of power in Crete.” No archeological
evidence exists to demonstrate any challenges to the dominance of Cnossus in the north
and Phaestus in the south, leading to the possible assessment that the two “may have been
the Athens and Sparta of the time; and the other towns of Crete may, like most states of
fifth-century Hellas, have been divided between two political alliances” (Wace 1923b,
593). The naval powers of these Cretan states also gave way to two developments:
extensive trade relations with political units on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean
(primarily Egypt), and the complete dominance of trade in the Aegean. Much of Aegean
Greece, then, became enveloped with the culture, trade, and civilizational developments
of the Minoans (Freeman 2004, 123-124).
1700 BC – 1550 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
The complete decline of Phaestus is noted during this period, with the overthrow
and destruction of much of the city, yet with no clear historical evidence as to why.
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Concomitantly, the decline of Phaestus “ended with the transference of the seat of power
elsewhere, probably to Cnossus in the north,” thus transitioning the polar structure of the
system from a bipolar constellations to a unipolar one. Within this context, a unipolar
Crete came to dominate much of the system, with a “far stronger and wider Cretan
suzerainty over south-eastern Greece and the adjacent islands,” that is, the Cyclades,
where the “influence of Crete seems to have been practically supreme in the islands;”
while in the Peloponnese and central Greece, it “is possible that Cretan colonies were
established at some sites, Mycenae, Tiryns, Corinth, Orchomenus, Thebes; or we might
believe that the influence was exercised, not by colonization or conquest, but by peaceful
penetration, trade, settlement” (Wace 1923b, 597-608). While the colonization theory
remains controversial and unsubstantiated, Cretan dominance, however, remains
unquestioned. For no political actor had an “interest in disputing the position of Crete,
and the Aegean world from which she had emerged was as yet no match for her” (Matz
1973, 557). Within this context, toward the end of the Cretan unipolar period, the system
had three possible sub-system hegemons in the form of Orchomenus, Thebes, and
Mycenae, with a single unipole whose “domination of her neighbors was a foregone
conclusion” (Wace 1923b, 614-615). The rise of Mycenae, however, will lead to a realteration of the Mediterranean System, as a dominant actor from mainland Greece will
proceed to counter-balance Crete’s system-wide hegemonic status.
1550 BC – 1400 BC Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
Around 1600 BC, Mycenae of mainland Greece, in the Achaean-Argolis region,
began its rise as a sub-system hegemon by challenging regional hegemon Thebes for
local power, proceeding to sack the latter and begin solidifying Mycenaean power in
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north-east Peloponnese (Stubbings 1975a, 169-171). While Mycenae remained the
cultural center from which the Mycenaean civilization spread, as a political unit,
however, Mycenae, at this point, observed the presence of two other sub-system
hegemons: Elis in the north-west and Pylos in the south-west of the Peloponnese
(Stubbings 1973, 651). Rising Tiryns and a nascent Athens, while active politically, did
not present positioning at the sub-system level, while Mycenae, Elis, and Pylus displayed
a rather peaceful balance of power, with Mycenae as not only the relatively stronger actor
(Freeman 2004, 127), but also the revisionist actor with aspirations of system-wide
hegemonic status. Mycenae’s interactions with Crete were both frequent and extensive,
since Crete had exercised suzerainty over much of the southern Peloponnese for the
previous few hundred years. At the same time, while archeological evidence
demonstrates Cretan dominance over Athens, southern Peloponnese, and the Cycladic
islands, Cretan preponderance over Mycenae has never been established. Within this
context, a rising Mycenae not only viewed Crete as its equal, but also a challenge to
system-wide preponderance. Mycenaean expansion into the Cycladic island, as evidenced
in Melos, into Asia Minor as evident in Melitus, establishment of settlements on Rhodes
(a traditional Cretan sphere of influence), and extensive trade with not only Egypt,
southern Palestine, and Syria in the east (Stubbings 1973, 644-645), but Sardinia, the
Italian Peninsula, and Malta to the west, clearly represent the rise of Mycenae as systemwide hegemon challenging and counter-balancing Crete’s system-wide hegemonic status
(Matz 1973, 577). By around 1550, the Mediterranean System had transitioned into a
bipolar structure, with Mycenae dominating mainland Greece, while also expanding into

191

the Aegean, and Crete dominating the southern Aegean and attempting to preserve its
system-wide status.
1400 BC – 1100 BC Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
The increased wealth and expansion of Mycenae was coupled with its growing
military power: unlike Crete, the Mycenaeans were “outward looking and often
aggressive” (Freeman 2004, 125), with a warrior-aristocratic culture that was more
violent and war-prone than the Cretans (Levi 1966, 32-36). As Mycenae became the
“metropolis of Greece” and the “first major efflorescence of civilization in Hellas”
(Stubbings 1973, 629), Crete underwent much decline, reasons for which possibly range
from natural disasters, internal decay, and external Mycenaean pressure. As such, while
the specifics as to why Crete fell cannot be substantiated through the archeological
evidence, one fact remains undisputed: by 1400 BC Crete was dominated by Mycenaean
Greeks, perhaps having “been conquered by Mycenaean Greeks,” due “to Mycenaean
arms” (655-657). Mycenae’s unipolarity was perhaps unique, in that usage of the term
Mycenae and Mycenaean might lead to some confusion with regard to analysis of power
configurations: Mycenae refers to the political unit, existing in the form of a citykingdom, while Mycenaean refers to the culture and civilization that dominated the
Greek world after the fall of Cretan Minoan Civilization. Within this context, Mycenae
was the most powerful political unit in the system, with the following sub-system
hegemons: Pylos (who were also Mycenaean, but a separate, independent political unit),
Elis, Mycenaean Crete (dominated by Mycenaean Greeks, but perhaps politically
independent from Mycenae), Tiryns, and possibly Athens and Sparta. The interesting
feature of Mycenae’s unipolarity, however, is that none of the sub-system hegemons were
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revisionist, but rather, they engaged in bandwagoning or shirking. In this sense, relative
strength remained somewhat moot, for almost all of the sub-system hegemons displayed
complementary, reciprocal, or neutral relations with the unipole.
As the archeological evidence suggests, only the Peloponnese, Crete, Cyclades,
and eastern Asia Minor, within the Mediterranean System, were developed civilizations
during this period with functional political units. As such, Mycenae’s domination of
Peloponnese, Crete and the Cyclades led to an expansionist attention toward the east,
primarily Cyprus (where Mycenaean settlements were observed) and Asia Minor. These
eastward expansions led to tense relations with the Hittites, only to be diffused by the
disintegration of the latter, while Mycenae’s interest in Asia Minor gave way to the
Trojan War. While the historical evidence is rather murky, two general assumptions have
been substantiated: Troy was destroyed and the endeavor was undertaken by a joint
Greek contingent led by Mycenae (Stubbings 1975b, 342-350). The general outcome,
then, until the 12th century BC, appears Mycenaean Greece’s domination of the eastern
Mediterranean, with Mycenae as the leading system-wide hegemon.
1100 BC – 850 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
By 1100 BC, the Mycenaean Civilization had pretty much been eradicated, with
Mycenae, along with Pylos, Tiryns, regions of Argolid, Messenia, Achaea, Corinthia,
Phocis, and Boeotia being destroyed, great portions of their population migrating, and
new patterns of settlements taking place by non-Mycenaean culture (Desborough 1975,
659-660; Stubbings 1975b, 352-354). This was soon followed by the desertion and
destruction of the Cycladic centers of trade, such as Melos, Naxos, and Rhodes, while
Miletus, on the coast of Asia Minor, was also destroyed (Desborough 1975, 666-667).
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The reasons for these developments remain rather obscure. Historical evidence
unquestionably proves that these developments did in fact take place: the problem,
however, is lack of archeological evidence to explain these developments. Three general
theories have been suggested: over-exhaustion of military resources in a war in Asia
Minor (possibly the Trojan War); over-population growth, resource scarcity, drought, and
internal instability; and the invasion of people from the north unto rest of Greece (the
presumed Dorian invasion) (Hammond 1975, 681-701). Regardless of the reasons for the
collapse of Mycenae’s system-wide dominance, one outcome remains rather clear: “the
break-up of the central political power” and the “flight from affected areas” by the
Mycenaean Greeks. The outcome, then, was the complete disintegration of the
Mycenaeans, with the Mediterranean System restructuring into a nonpolar configuration,
as no coherent or system-wide political units seemed to appear, with much of the
dominant city-kingdoms being destroyed, along with mass desertion and migrating, and a
general conception of chaos prevailing within the macropolitical structuration of the
system. The diffusion of power during this period appears to have been extensive, as the
collapse of an entire civilization gave way to the destruction of the existing centers of
power, with the outcome being some 300 years of nonpolarity: their remained no centers
of power, but rather, secluded concentrations of pockets of small political units.
During this nonpolar period, three important developments took place that came
to shape much of the future Greek world. First, migrations into Attica and Euboea
provided the population basis for the future resurgence of this region, especially Athenian
Attica (Thomas and Gognat 1999, 61-66); while migrations into the Aegean islands, and
further east to Cyprus, provided the initial basis of Greek colonization on the eastern
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periphery of the system. Second, while the ethno-racial identity of the northern invaders
remains controversial, their settlement in the south of the Peloponnese remains
undisputed. And third, toward the end of this nonpolar period, consolidation of power
slowly began to take form regionally, especially in the formation of the four ethnē with
their distinct dialects: Aeolian (Thessaly, Magnesia, Boeotia, Thebes), Achaean
(Arcadians, Cyproits); Ionian (Athenians, Euboeans, Milesians), and Dorian (Sparta,
Macedonia, Crete, Rhodes, Epirotes, Aetolians, Locrians). Within this context, much of
the Greek settlements in the eastern Aegean and Asia Minor became defined by the
colonizing group’s ethnē: Aeolic settlements in the Aegean north-east and Asia Minor,
Ionian settlements in much of the eastern coast of Asia Minor and Cyclades, and Dorian
settlements in south-east of the Aegean and Asia Minor (Cook 1975, 776-796).
Concomitantly, ethnē relations gave way to two general phenomena: the tendency of
nascent city-states with the same ethnē and dialect to ally together (Thomas and Gognat
1999, 83-84), and the consolidation of regional power based on such structurations.
850 BC – 750 BC Continuation of Nonpolar Structure
While the Mediterranean System continued its nonpolar epoch, important regional
consolidations, or sub-system hegemonic conflict for regional hegemony, took place in
many parts of the Greek world. This, in turn, was supplemented by the continued
colonization of rising sub-system actors seeking system-wide status. Within this context,
three general developments gave way to increased concentration of power within the
system: nascent city-states began establishing both regional and system-wide presence;
Greek colonization, initially eastward, now turned west, primarily to the Italian Peninsula
and the Western Mediterranean, thus expanding the Mediterranean System; and, the
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Phoenicians displayed their presence in the Western Mediterranean and North Africa by
establishing trading posts and nascent cities, thus further expanding the Mediterranean
System (Freeman 2004, 147-156). Concomitantly, relative consolidation during this
period created observable centers of power that were non-existent during the initial
nonpolar epoch: however, since the centers of power remain numerically high, the
structure of the system continues to be defined as nonpolar, since multipolar structural
attributes remain absent. The centers of power during this period constituted the
following sub-system actors: Argos and Sparta in the Peloponnese; Elis west of Arcadia;
Corinth and Megara on the land-bridge connecting the Peloponnese to central Greece;
Athens in Attica; Orchomenus and Thebes in Boeotia; Phocis north of Boeotia; Thessaly
in northern Greece; Eretria and Chalcis in Euboea; and Miletus in Asia Minor (Sealey
1976, 15-18).
750 BC – 690 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure
The consolidation of regional spheres of influence during the latter stages of the
previous nonpolar period gave way to the development of sub-system hegemons
competing for system-wide dominance. Two general events reify this process: the First
Messenian War and the Lelantine War. The First Messenian War between Sparta (with
allies Elis and Corinth) and Messenia (with allies Argos and Arcadia), was part of
Sparta’s endeavor to attain system-wide status, as expansion to the west and north
solidified Sparta’s dominance of much of Peloponnese. This, in turn, gave way to the
weakening of Argos as potential system-wide actor, along with the attainment of Spartan
suzerainty over the region (Coldstream 2003, 142-143). The Lelantine War was between
the two power states of Euboea, Erteria and Chalcis, with Corinth, Samos, and Pharsalos
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(Thessaly) siding with the latter, while Megara and Miletus sided with the former
(Freeman 2004, 156-158). The outcome was an unclear victory for Chalcis, but
nonetheless, both actors were exhausted and severely weakened by the war.
Consequently, the allies of the given sides attained further relative power in relation to
such developments (Coldstream 2003, 181-182). The power configurations of the system,
then, appeared to be as followed: Spartan dominance of southern Greece; Corinthian
dominance of central Greece, along with the presence of Megara; Chalcis and Erteria as
weakened yet centers of power in Euboea; and Thessaly in northern Greece. Chalcis and
Erteria after the war may be reduced to sub-system hegemons, joining Elis, Argos,
Athens, and Thebes in the mainland, along with various powerful sub-system commercial
island-states such as Aegina.
690 BC – 650 BC Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure
The Second Messenian War altered the Mediterranean System from a multipolar
configuration to unipolarity, as the Peloponnese became engulfed in a war that
temporarily weakened all parties involved, while much of mainland Greece lost relative
strength to Corinth, which managed to position itself as the singular system-wide
hegemon. The Messenian revolt against Spartan suzerainty was coupled by revisionist
Argos, which sought to re-establish itself as a system-wide actor, thus challenging both
Sparta and Corinth by supporting the latter’s enemy Megara. Thus, the Messanian pole
(Argos, Sicyon, Arcadia, and Elis) clashed with Sparta (who received assistance from
Corinth), giving way to a twenty year conflict that resulted in Spartan victory, yet a much
weakened Peloponnese. Concomitantly, Corinthian dominance over central Greece
became a reality, as Megara was reduced to sub-system status, while much of Attica,
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Boeotia, and Thessaly remained incapable of challenging or counter-balancing Corinthian
unipoalrity. In this context, the Lelantine War made Corinth the “leading city of Greece”
(Freeman 2004, 156), and while the Second Messenian War reduced previous systemwide hegemons to sub-system status, Corinth had “become the foremost commercial
power in Greece” (Coldstram 2003, 147), hence re-structuring the Mediterranean System
into a unipolar configuration (Sealey 1976, 43-44). Corinthian unipolarity, however, was
supplemented by the presence of several sub-system hegemons, one of which expanded
the Mediterranean System into north Italy. Sparta and Argos remained competitive
regionally, with Sparta eventually gaining the upper hand; Megara, Athens, Thebes,
Thessaly, and the usual mainland players remained at the sub-system level; colonies in
Ionian Asia Minor and Euboean Balkans preserved the status quo; while Spartan
Tarentum, Achean Croton, Corinthian Syracuse, and Euboean settlements in Italy came
into contact with the two new sub-system hegemons of the region: the Etruscans of North
Italy (Ridgeway 1988, 667-675) and the Carthaginians of North Africa.
650 BC – 490 BC Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure
The resurgence of Sparta, after the Second Messenian War, as the most powerful
system-wide hegemon, altered the Mediterranean System into a multipolar power
constellation, as Corinth also maintained its system-wide status, along with an aggressive
Argos, a rising Athens, and a powerful Carthage that had not only recently established
suzerainty over Phoenician settlements, but also had established its system-wide
hegemonic status by dominating North Africa, much of the Western Mediterranean, the
Mediterranean coast of the Iberian peninsula, and the islands of Sardinia and, for a
limited time, Sicily. This multipolar period, then, may be best organized into five
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overarching themes. First, the balancing, counter-balancing, and inter-hegemonic
competition in the Greek mainland over system-wide positioning had important
implications. Second, process of polarization and alliance formation that took place
between system-wide hegemons and sub-system hegemons, thus contributing to much
instability. Third, the developing conflict between Carthage and Greek colonies in the
West Mediterranean proved to have important consequences upon both the structure of
the system and its unitary actors. Fourth, rise of Rome as sub-system challenger to a
declining Etruria for sub-system hegemony in Italy magnified the importance of this subsystem. And fifth, the incursion of the Persian Empire into the Mediterranean System via
conquest of Ionian Asia Minor laid the groundwork and the potential incentive for the
Mediterranean System to absorb the Near East-Middle Eastern System.
The conquest of Messenia gave Sparta control of all the southern part of the
Peloponnese and most of the territories up north not controlled by Elis, Arcadia, and
Argos (Sealey 1976, 61). By 590 BC, however, Sparta turned its attention north, seeking
to conquer Arcadia and subdue Argos. The Tegean War lasted until 560 BC, which pretty
much brought the entire Peloponnese under Spartan control (with the exception of
Argos), but this control was no so much based on conquest, but rather through alliance
and loose polarization: the Peloponnesian League. Headed by Sparta, the League
included all of the sub-system hegemons of Peloponnese (Elis included), with the
exception of Argos and Achaea. Corinth, Sicyon, Tegea, and eventually Megara would
also join the League, thus making this the most powerful alliance in the system, with
Sparta recognized as leader, hegemon. The League itself, however, was not a tight pole,
but rather, a loose pole dominated by Sparta, and within this sense, it cannot be
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categorized as a single pole. In-fighting between the allies, for example, did occur, since
the alliance revolved around loyalty to Sparta, not each other (Jeffery 1988, 352-353)
Furthermore, Corinth, for example, was the most important and perhaps powerful
member after Sparta, yet it was, itself, a system-wide hegemon, and while recognition of
Spartan superiority in the alliance was noted, Corinth still remained powerful in its own
right, as it openly voiced its disagreement with Sparta by counter-balancing and checking
Spartan policies if it deemed necessary (e.g., refusing to attack Athens in 507, rejecting
Sparta’s proposal to invade Athens in 504; serving as arbitrator for Athens-Megara
conflict, as well as the Thebes-Athens disputes) (Sealey 1976, 148; Jeffery 1988, 360).
Athens’ rise to system-wide hegemon began with a methodical domination of
Attica, with a continuous attempt at extending its sphere of influence north to Boeotia,
west to Megara, and the surrounding islands of Salamis, Aegina, and the wealthy
Cycladic island-states of Naxos and Samos. This, in turn, brought Athens into
consecutive conflicts with Megara over Salamis (which Corinth arbitrated in favor of
Athens), Thebes over Plataea (over which it defeated a Theban attack), and a naval war
with Aegina (which it was able to win with Corinthian assistance) (Jeffrey 1988, 360366). In the meantime, Sparta sought to establish a sphere of influence over Attica and
central Greece as well, as it invaded Athenian ally Samos (unsuccessfully) for
undertaking a regime change, overthrew Naxos (another Athenian ally), wrestled Megara
from Athens’ sphere of influence, and even intervened in the internal politics of Athens
itself. The attempt at installing a puppet tyrant in Athens, however, failed, and Sparta led
the Peloponnesian League, along with Boeotia and Chalcis, to invade Athens. Corinth’s
refusal to commit withheld the invasion by the League, which allowed Athens to soundly
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defeat Boeotia and Chalcis (Sealey 1976,147-150; Jeffrey 1988, 361-362; Freeman 2003,
177-181).
In the Western Mediterranean, especially in Sicily, Carthage came into serious
conflict with two of the more powerful Greek colonies, Gela and then Syracuse. From
approximately 650 BC to 510 BC, Carthage had established complete dominance of
Sicily, and while it had initially tolerated Greek colonization, it defeated several Greek
expeditions in 580 BC, 540 BC and 510 BC. The rise of Gela as a sub-system challenger
to Carthaginian hegemony, followed by transfer of Greek power to Syracuse, brought
about the Greco-Punic Wars. Within this context, Carthage’s system-wide hegemonic
status was not necessarily challenged, but rather, its dominance of Sicily was only
challenged by rising sub-system actors Gela and Syracuse. While Gela and Syracuse
were Doric states, their expansive growth threatened Rhegion and Himera, Ionian states
who joined Carthage to counter-balance the Doric threat (Asheri 1988, 748-775). As
such, Carthage attained system-wide status by sustaining a commercial and naval empire
that stretched the entire Western Mediterranean, but at the same time, it had to deal with
rising sub-system hegemons that threatened its strategic interests in Sicily.
In the eastern periphery of the system, the Persian Empire made an incursion into
the Mediterranean System by conquering much of northern Thrace and Anatolia/Asia
Minor, thus reaching the coasts of the Black Sea and of the Aegean, hence assuming
suzerainty over Ionian Asia Minor around 540 BC. In 499 BC, however, the Ionian Greek
cities revolted against Persian rule, hence opening a clash between the system-wide
hegemon of the Near East-Middle Eastern System and the various system-wide and subsystem actors of the Mediterranean System. Athens, Miletus, Erteria, and other Ionian
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Greek city-states sent assistance to the revolt, hence creating a venue for a much larger
conflict (Gray and Cary 1926, 214-225). By 493 BC, however, the Persians had crushed
the Ionian Revolt: but the clash between the two world political systems was about to get
more severe, as Persia sought to expand its empire and absorb the Mediterranean System
into the Near East-Middle Eastern System (Murray 1988, 465-490).
In sum, the polar structure of the Mediterranean System during this period may be
classified as followed: Spartan system-wide hegemony and leadership of the
Peloponnesian League; Corinthian system-wide hegemony through allying and also
counter-balancing Sparta, thus preserving the balance of power within the Greek
mainland; Athenian system-wide hegemony in its dominance of Attica and expansion of
its sphere of influence into Euboea and the Cycladic islands; Theban system-wide
hegemony in Boeotia and the north; Carthaginian system-wide hegemony in the Western
Mediterranean; and Persian system-wide presence in the eastern periphery. This, in turn,
is supplemented by the presence of a high number of sub-system hegemons, ranging from
Argos to Elis to Chalcis in the mainland, to Aegina, Miletus, Samos and Naxos in the
Cyclades, to Syracuse and Gela in Sicily, to finally Rome and the Etruscans in central
and north Italy.
490 BC – 465 BC Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure
By 493 BC Persia had suppressed the Ionian Revolt, which was soon followed by
an invasion of European Greece, as the Persians crossed the Bosporus, overwhelmed
much of Thrace, subjugated Macedonia, and would soon bring Thessaly and, more
importantly, Thebes, under its control(Hammond 1988a, 493-496). Subsequently, the
Greek world united under the leadership of Sparta, thus created a bipolar power
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constellation in the system, with the Persians and their Greek allies as one pole and the
united Greek opposition, soon to be formed as the Hellenic League of 481, as the other.
Persia’s initial attempt at attacking mainland Greece began in 490 BC with its naval
conquest of several Cycladic islands, southern Euboea, and Eretria. This initial success,
however, was met with a devastating defeat at hands of the Athenians at the Battle of
Marathon (Munro 1926a, 229-254; Hammond 1988a, 502-517). This initial repulsion
gave way to a much larger expedition by the Persians, which, in turn, led the Greek cities
to form the Hellenic League in 481 (Sealey 1976, 195-196). As the leading power in the
Mediterranean System, Sparta also became the leading state in the Hellenic League,
followed by the system-wide hegemons Athens and Corinth. Polarization, then, took the
form of Sparta and the entire Peloponnesian League, Athens, Plataea, Thespia, Euboea,
Aegina, Megara, Locria, Pharsalus, and the various dependencies and colonies of the
system-wide hegemons of the League (Sealey 1976, 205-207). The League also invited
Syracuse, Gelon, and Crete to join in the effort against Persia, but conflict with Carthage
limited Syracuse and Gela to Sicily, while Crete chose neutrality. The only
Peloponnesian city-state to not join the League was Argo, whose animosity with Sparta
drove it into alliance with the Persians.
In 481 BC Persia began its second, and much larger, invasion of mainland Greece,
with the first main battle taking place at Thermopylae, as the Hellenic League sent a force
headed by Sparta stop the Persian advance. The naval forces of the League engaged the
Persian fleet at the Battle of Artemisium (Munro 1926b, 284-301). While Persia overran
the Greek contingent at Thermopylae, its losses were severe, only to be supplemented by
an indecisive outcome at Artemisium. Central Greece remained open for advance, as the
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Persians headed to Attica and destroyed an evacuated Athens (Hammond 1988b, 546591). The evacuation of Athens was a collective success of the Hellenic League, as the
population was temporarily settled in Aegina and Salamis, while the navy of the League
offered Persia an unexpected and decisive defeat at the Battle of Salamis (Munro 1926b,
303-314). The naval defeats of Persia, and its pyrrhic victory at Thermopylae, forced the
Persians to retreat back to their base in the north, while its entire naval force, heavily
damaged, retreated to Asia Minor. In 479 BC, the remaining Persian forces unleashed
another massive attack against the Hellenic League from the north, only to be crushed in
the Battle of Plataea (Munro 1926c, 331-340), hence ending Persia’s incursion into
European Greece. The League pushed across the Aegean, with powerful island-cities of
Samos, Chia, and Lesbia joining the alliance (Sealey 1976, 226-227). At Mycale the
Persian forces in Asia Minor faced off against the League, to be, once again, defeated,
with the Ionian states also joining against Persia (Munro 1926c, 341-344). The outcome,
then, was the expulsion of Persia from the Mediterranean System, which, in turn, gave
way to two developments: the rise of Athens as a superpower in the system, and the
dissolution of the Hellenic League, with Sparta returning to its leadership of the
Peloponnesian League, while Athens forming its own pole: the Delian League.
460 BC – 405 BC Continuation of Bipolar Structure
In the Hellenic League Sparta had command, while Athens was one of the
members within the pole; but this relationship, once the Persians were repelled, no longer
reflected the actual balance of power. In 478 BC, Athenian naval power had positioned
the city-state as a system-wide hegemon, and to continue Greek activities against the
Persian Empire, the Delian League was formed under Athenian leadership. Sparta
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considered this development consistent with its policy, since the Persian threat had been
alleviated and the Delian League would serve as a buffer between Persia and mainland
Greece. Within this context, the bipolar system was complementary and mutually
reinforcing: the Peloponnesian League, under Spartan suzerainty, dominated the
mainland, while the Delian League, under Athenian suzerainty, dominated the Aegean,
the Cyclades, the coast of Asia Minor, and cities on the coast of Thrace (Walker 1927,
40-45; Sealey 1976, 248-252). The structure of these two alliances were rather distinct:
the Peloponnesian League revolved around a congress, where member states would
assemble and vote, and while Sparta was the recognized leader, members of the pole had
the authority to question, debate, and propose courses of action; the Delian League,
however, became more autocratic, as Athenian dominance was absolute, with tributes
stipulated upon all members, and Athenians reserving the right to interfere in the internal
affairs of member states who questioned, challenged, or sought to leave the League.
Analogously, then, the Peloponnesian League resembled Cold War NATO, while the
Delian League the Warsaw Pact.
In the Peloponnese, sub-system hegemon Argos, in its defiance of Sparta, sought
regional expansion against Spartan allies Tiryns and Mycenae, while founding an alliance
with the newly-formed Arcadian League. Sparta’s capacity to suppress this challeng
proved fruitful, but it also demonstrated the revisionist tendencies of regional actors. In
460 BC the Messenian Revolt broke out, as the entire sub-region, traditionally under
complete Spartan dominance, revolted (possibly through Argive-Arcadian assistance).
Sparta appealed to its Peloponnesian allies, with Aegina, Mantinea, Plataea, and other
core members quickly responding. Demonstrative of the complementary nature of this
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bipolar structure, Sparta also appealed to Athens, who, complying with the precepts of
the Hellenic League, also agreed to help (Walker 1927b, 69-72). Sparta’s refusal of this
initially requested assistance, however, deeply offended Athens, thus altering the
relations of the system-wide hegemons into one of hostility. Athens abrogated its
obligations under the Hellenic League and formed an alliance with Argos (along with
Thessaly and Megara), thus placing itself in a state of war with Sparta: the First
Peloponnesian War was underway (Sealey 1976, 258-263).
Athenian naval success is noted at the beginning, as Corinth and Aegina, the two
biggest naval powers in the Peloponnesian League, where no match for Athens. Sparta
reacted by displaying its superiority on land, as it invaded central Greece, confronting
Athens, Boeotia, Argos, and Thessaly at the Battle of Tanagra, only to come out
victorious (Walker 1927b, 78-83). Around 451 BC the Five Years’ Treaty was made
between the warring parties, reasons for which are two-fold: relative Spartan exhaustion,
and dissention within the Delian League (Sealey 1976, 272). Miletus, Erythrae, Chalcis,
Erteria, Histiaea, Styra, Cythnos, Siphnos, Tenos, Paros, and Naxos (all important and
strategic Aegean island-states) sought to secede from the Delian League. The Athenian
response was swift, as given states that did not meet Athens’ ultimatum were sieged,
overcome, and placed directly under Athenian control, with confiscations of territory and
wealth being coupled with the settlement of Athenian citizens and the installation of
satellite governments (Walker 1927b, 86-88; Sealey 1976, 277). In this sense, the Delian
League had pretty much become the Athenian Empire.
Around 447 BC the Five Years’ Treaty was broken, as conflict in Boeotia, along
with Euboea’s and Megara’s rebellion against Athens, gave way to Corinth’s
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involvement in the conflict. Thus, the Peloponnesian League was once again at war with
Athens, with the former invading Attica and devastating much of the western region. The
robust show of strength by the Spartans, along with Athens’ chronic problems in the
Delian League, gave way to the Thirty Year Peace between the parties, hence ending the
first stage of the Peloponnesian War (Walker 1927b, 88-93). The terms of the treaty
preserved the relative power of both system-wide actors, as Sparta maintained dominance
of mainland Greece while Athens retained the Delian League (Sealey 1976, 291-292).
In 430 BC conflict between Corinth and its former colony Corcyra culminated in
the former’s defeat at the Battle of Leucimme: Corinth’s refusal to concede drove
Corcyra to an alliance with Athens, thus setting the stage for renewal of hostilities
between the Peloponnesian League and the Delian League. Athenian-Corinthian
animosities were also projected in a conflict over Poteidaea, a former Corinthian colony:
Athens had given Poteidaea an ultimatum for submission, yet Poteidaea refused, appealed
to Corinth, who, in turn, appealed to Sparta: the Peloponnesian League prepared for war
(Adcock 1927, 171-193). The Second Peloponnesian War thus began, with the first
period of this conflict being designated as the Archimadian War. The struggle between
the two poles resembled the same pattern from the first Peloponnesian War: Spartan
dominance on land, Athenian dominance on sea. Two important developments, however,
are to be noted. First, Thebes became a powerful player during this stage, allying with
Sparta and positioning itself as a sub-system power with system-wide aspiration. Second,
Sicily became part of the conflict, as Syracuse remained a staunch supporter of Sparta,
while Athens meddled into the sub-system by allying with Leontini and Rhegium
(Syracuse’s enemies) (Sealey 1976, 328-331; Adcock 1927b, 193-248). Around 421 BC,
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however, both parties sought cessation of hostilities with the Peace of Nicias, a one year
armistice, hence bringing an end to the Archimadian War.
The Peace of Nicias was clearly made to be broken, as Sparta established an
alliance with Boeotia (presumed Athenian sphere of influence), while Athens concluded
an alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Elis (presumed Spartan sphere of influence), what
came to be known as the Quadruple Alliance. These arrangements gave way to three
important outcomes: 1) alliances were no longer about polarization, but rather relatively
equal and mutual assistance; 2) both system-wide hegemons sought positioning at the
doorstep of the other, hence suggesting the intensification of conflict; and 3) sub-system
hegemons became important actors, thus creating the structural basis for a potential
multipolar configuration. The Quadruple Alliance invaded Arcadia, with Sparta
responding to this invasion in the renowned Battle of Mantinea: the result was a
devastating defeat of the Quadruple Alliance and its dissolution (Ferguson 1927, 261275). This appears to have been the initial turning point in the war. In response, Athenian
strategy resorted to the sea, demonstrated in the famous destruction of Melos in 416 BC
followed by the failed expedition to Sicily. Athens had demonstrated initial plans to
conquer Sicily, and a conflict in 416 BC between Selinus, a Syracusean ally, and Egesta,
an Athenian ally, provided the opening. Athenian forces in 415 BC began their attack of
Syracuse, the regional hegemon, while the Syracusans received assistance from Corinth,
Boeotia, Sicyon, and Sparta. The outcome changed the course of the Peloponnesian War:
the entire Athenian expeditionary force was destroyed (Sealey 1976, 353-355; Ferguson
1927b, 285-311). Sparta capitalized on these developments by invading Argos and
devastating the Athenian ally, only to be followed by an invasion of Attica itself.
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Concomitantly, the weakening of Athens gave way to a large number of Aegean islandstates, along with subject Ionian city-states in Asia Minor, to rebel against the Delian
League.
Athens’ loss of influence in the Aegean offered Sparta the opportunity to move in
and establish satellite governments among former Delian League members. This was
coupled by the Peloponnesian League advancing to the doorsteps of Athens, thus
blockading Athens by land and sea. The Athenians sued for peace and the Peloponnesian
War was over. The terms of peace ended the Athenian Empire, as Athens gave up claims
over its Aegean and overseas possessions, surrendered its fleet to Sparta, and recognized
Sparta’s preponderance over the system. In return, Athens was permitted to keep its
territories in Attica, thus being reduced to its former size (Ferguson 1927c, 359-365).
Elsewhere in the Mediterranean System, two regional structural changes are
observed. First, Carthage’s defeat by Syracuse in 480 BC had reduced the former systemwide hegemon to sub-system status, as it exited from Sicily as a power player, and
remained to its regional sphere of influence in North Africa and its commercial interests
west of Sicily (Miles 2011, 115-117). As such, the most powerful actor in Sicily became
Syracuse, whose status as sub-system hegemon remained unquestioned for much of the
century (Hackforth 1927, 162-164). Second, the macropolitical developments on the
Italian Peninsula remained specific to that region, as Rome sought expansion northward
at the expense of Erturia, thus solidifying its status as sub-system hegemon. At the
system-wide level, however, Rome remained a non-actor, for it lacked influence even in
the south of the Peninsula, as Syracuse’s sphere of influence checked nascent Rome to its
central and northern borders.
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405 BC – 385 BC Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure
Spartan positioning after achieving victory in the Peloponnesian War was not an
attempt at unipolar preponderance, but rather, a multipolar balance of power with
relatively weaker system-wide hegemons. The rational for this appears to be three-fold.
First, considering the revisionist tendencies of sub-system hegemons in the
Mediterranean System, the preservation of a unipolar structure would be extremely
difficult. Second, should unipolar preponderance be the objective, Sparta would have to
subjugate all relevant sub-system hegemons, thus, undertake continuous warfare until it
remains unmatched and unchallenged. Third, the structure of the Mediterranean System
presents a more diffused system with respect to power, and in this sense, concentration of
power was utilized via alliances, for no single actor possessed the resources to singularly
concentrate sufficient power to position itself as unchallenged system-wide hegemon that
cannot be counter-balanced. For these reasons, Sparta’s system-wide positioning created
a multipolar system that would balance itself out, and as such, preserve Sparta’s systemwide status.
This is best observed during the formation of the peace treaty with Athens. Allies
Corinth and Thebes staunchly demanded the destruction of Athens, for they viewed
Athens as a potential challenge even after having been defeated. Sparta’s refusal is quite
telling: since Athens was no longer a rival, Sparta had to position itself in relation to its
powerful allies, and in this sense, Athens must be preserved as a check to Corinthian and
Theban system-wide ascendance. Strategically, Sparta remained the most powerful actor
in Greece with its Peloponnesian League, and in order for this position to remain safe, a
multipolar system was instituted to balance out revisionist system-wide actors. This was
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played out in the Corinthian War, were former Spartan allies turned against their once
recognized hegemon.
Conflict between Phocis and Locris led to Theban involvement on the Locrian
side, which, in turn, led Phocis to appeal to Sparta. Sparta gathered the Peloponnesian
League and sought to humble revisionist Thebes, while Thebes turned to Athens (the
same Athens whose destruction it had sought few years back) and formed an alliance.
The outcome was an initial defeat leveled against Sparta, followed by inconclusive
engagements (Cary 1927a, 44-48). Presumed Spartan unipolarity, then, appears to never
have had a chance. This was followed by a quadruple alliance between Boeotia (led by
Thebes), Athens, Argos, and Corinth (who had left the Peloponnesian League). The
objective was to confine Sparta to the Peloponnese and thus counter-balance its systemwide presence (Sealey 1976, 388-391). Chalcidice, Euboea, and Acarnania also switched
to the newly-formed quadruple alliance. Sparta, in turn, showed up with its contingent of
allies: Mantinea, Tegea, Elis, Achea, Sicyon, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, Halieis, and
parts of Arcadia. The engagement occurred in two confrontations, Battles of Nemea and
Coroneia, out of which Sparta emerged victorious. Inconclusive and intermittent fighting,
however, continued in the Corinthiad and at sea for several more years. The balance of
power struggle reinforced the impasse.
Fearing possible Spartan envelopment of the Mediterranean System, Persia once
again interfered, hoping to preserve the Ionian coast of Asia Minor as buffer against
presumed Spartan/Greek incursions. A joint Persian-Athenian naval expedition defeated
the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean, thus removing Sparta’s initial dominance of the
Aegean that it had wrestled from Athens. This, in turn, provided Athens the opportunity
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to re-establish its loss of sphere of influence in the Aegean, and as such, the multipolar
structure became shaped as followed: Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Persia. Persia,
in turn, wanted the multipolar structure in the Mediterranean System to be preserved, for
a balance of power struggle between system-wide hegemons would divert attention from
any Greek incursions into the Near East-Middle Eastern System. For this reason, Persia
switched sides and sought peace with Sparta, fearing a weakened Sparta would give way
to a resurgent Athens. Collectively, then, the multipolar struggle continued until the
Peace of Antalcidas was reached in 386 BC (Cary 1927a, 52-54), thus seeking to preserve
the status quo, as Corinth was forced to return to the Peloponnesian League and Persia
retired from the Mediterranean System.
385 BC – 360 BC Continuation of Multipolar Structure
The outcome from the previous epoch was the restructuring of the power players
in the multipolar power configuration, with Sparta, Athens, Theban Boeotian Federation,
and Syracuse as system-wide hegemons. As the stronger of the system-wide hegemons,
Sparta sought to reassert itself, targeting several of its allies and forcing them to harsh
terms in service to Sparta. In 382 BC it decided to become involved in the complications
of the Chalcidian federation in the east of Macedonia, and on its march north, Sparta also
managed to occupy Cadmea, the citadel of Thebes. This act of hubris greatly shook the
peace terms under which the balance of power was sustained. However, Spartan forces
continued north, defeated and subdued much of Chalcidice, bringing it into an alliance
that recognized Spartan preponderance (Sealey 1976, 405-407). In 379 BC Thebes
attacked the Spartan garrison at Cadmea, with Sparta responding by sending an
expedition against Thebes. Athens remained neutral, thus preserving the status quo, while
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Thebes managed to wrest Cadmea away from three years of Spartan occupation.
Diplomatic relations between Athens and Sparta, however, had turned sore, and when
Sparta sent another expedition against Thebes in 378 BC, the Athenians sent forces in
support of the latter. The Spartan forces were soundly defeated, and Thebes reasserted
itself in Boeotia, thus counter-balancing Spartan irredentism (Cary 1927b, 55-69). To
placate further Spartan aggression, however, Thebes sent an embassy to Sparta asking for
terms.
This led the Athenians to fear isolation, and so in order to counter-balance Sparta
on its own, it formed the Second Athenian Sea League, consisting of Chios, Byzantium,
Rhodes, Mytilene, Chalcis, Erteria, and other island-states (Sealy 1976, 410). But it soon
managed to also bring Thebes into the alliance, to both neutralize Thebes as an
unmatched center of power in Boeotia, as well as to strengthen a counter-balance against
Sparta. Sparta responded by sending several expeditions against Thebes, and a united
Theban-Athenian presence induced Sparta to extend the conflict into the sea, only to be
defeated by Athens at the Battle of Naxos. The next year the Athenian Sea League
convinced Corcyra, on the coast of the Peloponnese, to join the League, inciting another
naval battle with Sparta, with the latter being defeated again (Cary 1927b, 64-78). By this
point, Sparta’s relative strength was weakened, while Athens had established superiority
over the seas surrounding the Greek Peninsula, while Thebes, after destroying Plataea
and absorbing Thespiae in 372 BC, had become a powerful system-wide hegemon by
forming the Boeotian Federations. The growing power of Thebes greatly alarmed Athens
and by 371 BC Sparta and Athens where ready to make peace. But Theban conflict with
sub-system hegemon Phocis (allies of both Sparta and Athens), brought the Spartan army
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into battle against the Theban led federation, resulting in the famous Battle of Leuctra,
where Sparta was thoroughly defeated and its system-wide hegemonic status reduced
(Cary 1927c, 80-84).
During this period, Syracuse had also positioned itself as a system-wide hegemon, for
after having reducing Carthage to a sub-system actor, it had previously repulsed and
destroyed the Athenian expedition to Sicily, while having also expanded from Sicily to
southern Italy, hence dominating both the island of Sicily and the entire region of the
Italian Peninsula south of Tarentum. In the mainland of Greece, it allied itself with
Athens after the fall of Sparta, while having good relations with Epirus and much of
northern Greece (Bury 1927, 108-132). In this sense, Syracusean influence was extensive
at the system-wide level, as was its military and economic power.
360 BC – 345 BC Transition from Multipolar to Nonpolar Structure
The “collapse of Athenian and Spartan hegemony left a world of small scattered
Greek communities,” as years of warfare had sapped the resources of the Greek world,
while many cities experienced civil unrest (Freeman 2004, 305-306), along with
extensive warfare between sub-system hegemons failing to attain system-wide status.
Within this context, the centers of power in the Mediterranean System were numerically
high, with concentration of power quickly shifting from one alliance to the next, while no
single or set of actors were capable of attaining positioning at the system-wide level.
Leuctra put an end to Spartan system-wide hegemony, reducing it to sub-system
status, as Sparta became embroiled in conflict with other sub-system hegemons of the
Peloponnese: the Arcadian League, Argos, and Elis. A Theban contingent, with Phocian,
Locrian, Euboean, Acarnanian, and Thessalonian allies marched into Peloponnese to aid
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the anti-Spartan forces, and not only did they defeat Sparta, but also freed Messenia from
Spartan control and established it as an independent city. Sparta was now relegated to a
weak sub-system actor: the Peloponnesian League was disbanded, and many of its
member concluded separate peace (Cary 1927c, 87-95). Presumed Theban ascendency
realigned the power configurations of the system by drawing the Athenians to the Spartan
cause in an attempt to counter-balance Thebes as sub-system hegemon limited to Boeotia
(Sealey 1976, 424-426). In this sense, conflicts primarily consisted of sub-system powers
struggling for regional hegemony, which, in turn, led to shifting alliances with other subsystem hegemons, hence creating a diffused power structure in the system, where centers
of power remained dispersed and, generally, inchoate.
In 362 BC, conflict in the Arcadian League led to a split between Tegea and
Mantinea, as the former allied with Thebes, while the latter aligned with Athens and
Sparta. The Boeotian Federation under Thebes brought its allies Argos, Messenia, and
Megalopolis to face off against Mantinea, Elis, Achaea, Sparta, and Athens. The outcome
was indecisive, and the two coalitions dispersed (Cary 1927c, 97-102), as the power
constellations of the system remained unchanged: no single state was able to dominate,
and as such, dominant sub-system hegemons, like Thebes and Athens, failed to attain
system-wide positioning. At the same time, Macedonia entered the picture by established
suzerainty over much of northern Greece by invading Illyria, expanding to Thrace by
winning the Olynthian War, wresting Ampipolis from Athens (Pickard-Cambridge 1927,
200-212), and thus consolidating regional power and positioning itself as sub-system
hegemon.
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In 357 BC the Second Athenian Sea League disintegrated, as Athens’ loss of
system-wide positioning led Chios, Rhodes, Cos, Byzantium, Euboea, and other
important allies to succeed. Athens’ attempt to overcome this disintegration led to the socalled Social War, where the Athenian fleet was consecutively defeated in two major
battles. Athens recognized its loss of system-wide influence through set of treaties that
ended the Social War (Cary 1927c, 103-107), hence assuming sub-system status within
its regional sphere of influence. The Third Sacred War further elucidated the inchoate
power structure of this nonpolar period, as what was initially a religious conflict decreed
by the Amphictyonic League12 led to a wider war between several sub-system hegemons
over influence in central Greece. Phocis, the condemned state, refused the ruling of the
League, which led the Locrians, Thessalonians, and Thebes to declare war.
Concomitantly, Athens, Sparta and several Peloponnesian states offered support to
Phocis. While initially being defeated in battle, the Phocians refused submission and
continued their defiance, while the ephemeral alliances shifted or disintegrated. At the
same time, internal conflict in Thessaly led to one party appealing to Phocis for
assistance, while the other party appealed to Macedonia, thus adding another center of
power to an oversaturated sub-system struggle. While Macedonia initially proved
successful, it was soon defeated in two consecutive battles, thus retreating back to the
north. Phocis then turned against Thebes and defeated the sub-system hegemon at
Coroneia, only to face a returning Macedonia, which decisively defeated Phocis (PickardCambridge 1927, 213-220). Within this larger framework, three general attributes of this
nonpolar epoch stand out: 1) well-organized, hegemon-led Leagues became replaced with
12

Pan-Greek religious council comprised of member states that determined and shaped policies pertaining
to religious shrines, sanctuaries, and sacred land, with the power to sanction punishments against states for
violations
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ephemeral, shifting alliances; 2) sub-system hegemons primarily remained active within
their regional theatres, thus demonstrating continued need to solidify regional power in
relation to other sub-system challenges; and 3) no actor remained relatively powerful
enough to sustain dominance for a given period of time, as the ebb and flow of victory
and defeat, ephemeral expansion and immediate retreat, and the overall inability of any
single actor to elevate beyond regional dominance to the system-wide level attests to
degree of power diffusion and inchoateness characterizing the Mediterranean System.
345 BC – 320 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Unipolar Structure
By 346 BC Macedonia’s ascendancy is noted, for after having attained subsystem hegemony in the north, it proceeded south to challenge Thebes and Athens,
assumed control over strategic Thermopylae, and arbitrated the end of the Third Sacred
War (233-243). Macedonia next proceeded west, establishing spheres of influence in
Epirus and Ambracia, only to head east toward the Aegean coast of Thrace and all the
way to the border of Chersonese. Developments in Euboea provided Macedon with
another opportunity for expansion of its sphere of influence, as Erteria requested
assistance, which led to the installment of pro-Macedonian governments in Erteria and
Oreus. Macedonia’s positioning as system-wide hegemon greatly concerned Athens,
especially the former’s infiltration of Euboea, followed by aggression toward Perinthus
and Byzantium (Pickard-Cambridge 1927b, 244-255). Unable to counter-balance
Macedonia, Athens opened negotiations with Persia, since the sub-system hegemon also
recognized Persia’s ambivalence toward the idea of the Mediterranean System being
unipolar. During this time Macedonia, for all practical purposes, had assumed dominance
of the Amphictyonic League, which allowed it to declare sacred war as a pretext for
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expansion. Athens and Thebes, the only sub-system hegemons in central Greece capable
of mustering an alliance to stop the Macedonians, brought together Boeotia, Euboea,
Achaea, Corinth, Megara, Leucas, and Corcyra (Sealey 1976, 490). At the battle of
Chaeronea, Macedonia’s victory was absolute: it subsequently forced the disbanding of
the Boeotian Confederacy, installment of Macedonian troops in the Cadmea, and the
disbanding of the Athenian Sea League. Having secured northern and central Greece,
Macedonia proceeded south into the Peloponnese, taking territories from Sparta and
distributing them among Tegea, Messene, Meglapolis, and Argos (Pickard-Cambridge
1927b, 256-267). Macedonia’s dominance of the Mediterranean System had become
absolute, and this was cemented with the League of Corinth: an alliance of Greek states
south of Macedon (except for Sparta), headed and dominated by Macedonia, allowing the
system-wide hegemon to not only control Greece, but also to draw on Greek manpower
for military purposes (Sealy 1976, 491).
Macedonia quickly turned north to placate the Balkans and much of Illyria, which
provided Thebes the opportunity to engage in revisionist behavior: attaining assistance
from Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Sparta, and Aetolia, Thebes sought to challenge Macedonian
suzerainty of central Greece. The outcome was a complete destruction of Thebes and the
reification of Macedonian unipolar preponderance, as “every Greek state hastened to
submit” (Tarn 1927a, 355-356). In 334 BC Macedonia crossed the Aegean into Anatolia,
taking the first step of what would lead to two major developments: the destruction of the
Persian Empire and the absorption of the Near East-Middle Eastern System into the
Mediterranean System.
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Macedonia secured mucho of Aegean Asia Minor after the Battle of Granicus,
managing to move into central Turkey, and assume dominance of Cappadocia and down
south to Cilicia (Dodge 1890, 234-284). The Persian Empire sought to placate the
Macedonian advance at the Battle of Issus, resulting in the severe defeat of the former
and the continued expansion of the latter. This was followed by Macedonia’s seizing of
much of Syro-Palestine, the destruction of Tyre, and the absorption of Egypt (Tarn
1927a, 361-383; Dodge 1890, 295-353). Macedonia’s preponderance now stretched from
mainland Greece, across the entire eastern Mediterranean, and included almost every
political unit west of Babylonia. The Battle of Gaugamela marked the end of the Persian
Empire, as Macedonia’s victory gave way to its absorption of Babylonia, Susa,
Persepolis, and all the way to the periphery of the Near East-Middle Eastern System:
Bactria and Sogdiana. Macedonia’s incursion into the Indic System was ephemeral, for
after its seizure of Bactria, Sogdiana, and various Indian kingdoms of the Hindu Kush,
the unipole retreated and exited the Indic System (Tarn 1927b, 390-417; Dodge 1890,
387-591). The absorption of the Near East-Middle Eastern System into the Mediterranean
System, however, was now complete, with Bactria and Sogdiana serving as the peripheral
buffer between the newly expanded Mediterranean System and the Indic System.
Concomitantly, Macedonia’s hegemony over the Mediterranean System covered the
entire system with the exception of sub-system actors in the regions west of Greece:
Italian Peninsula, North Africa, Sicily, and Iberian Peninsula.
320 BC – 270 BC Transition from Unipolar to Nonpolar Structure
Macedonia’s unipolar preponderance of the Mediterranean System swiftly
disintegrated after the death of Alexander the Great, as the concentration of power in the
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system was thoroughly diffused to numerous centers of power due to the so-called
Partition of Babylon, with sets of military-political leaders struggling for dominance over
these centers of power, thus re-structuring the system from a unipolar configuration to a
nonpolar structure. The centers of power were as followed: Macedon (much of mainland
Greece and Illyria), Thrace (along with Chersonese), Greater Phrygia (much of central
Anatolia, including Lycia and Pamphylia), Hellespontine Phrygia, Cappadocia (including
Paphlagonia), Lydia, Cilicia, Caria, Syria (including Phoenicia and south Mesopotamia),
Babylonia, North Mesopotamia, Parthia, and Persia (Tarn 1927d, 464-504; Will 1984,
23-61; Will 1984b, 101-117). These would also be supplemented by the following centers
of power west of mainland Greece: Epirus, Sicily, Rome, and Carthage. The extensive
dispersion of power reified the nonpolar configuration of the Mediterranean System by
virtue of four specific aspects: 1) the system was defined by an inchoate power structure,
as the multitude of centers of power engaged in nearly 50 years of warfare in order to
consolidate some form of system-wide positioning; 2) no single actor managed to attain
system-side positioning, as the high number of sub-system actors consistently switched
alliances and re-altered the probability of a single actor attaining system-wide status; 3)
consistent fusion of various centers of power and then the disintegration of this attempted
consolidation further contributed to the inchoate diffused structure; and 4) the chronic
revisionist policies of almost every political actor within this Hellenistic world, which
had come to define the Mediterranean System, made system-wide positioning impossible.
This systemic diffusion of power initially led to the disintegration of the League
of Corinth, as Athens immediately broke off and orchestrated a counter league, the
Hellenic League, with sub-system actors Thessaly and Aetolia. The direct challenge was
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against Macedon’s sub-system dominance of Greece, giving way to the Lamian War.
While Macedon managed to defeat the revisionist aspirations of the Hellenic League, it,
nonetheless, relied on other sub-system hegemons that the new nonpolar structure had
created (Tarn 1927c, 454-460). In this sense, even powerful sub-system actors remained
limited in their capacity to solidify regional hegemony. This became indicative of the
internecine warfare that engulfed the entire Mediterranean System, which came to be
known as the War of the Diadochi. From 322 BC to approximately 275 BC, endless
warfare defined the power struggle between the various centers of power that had formed
after the disintegration of Macedonian unipolarity, as sub-system hegemons sought
consolidated of their respected regions, only to come into consistent and destructive
conflict with neighboring sub-system hegemons. The overly complex nature of this
inchoate system may be reduced to four general theaters of conflict for the sake of
simplification: much of Mainland Greece, Thrace, and the Hellespont; Aegean Coast of
Asia Minor and Central Anatolia; eastern Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia; and, Egypt,
Syro-Palestine, and Cyprus (eastern Mediterranean) (Tarn 1928, 75-107). In each of these
theatres of conflict, complex internecine warfare, alliances and counter-alliances, and
shifting victories and losses slowly gave way to some form of regional consolidation. By
270 BC, the outcome from the War of the Diadochi had given way to relative
concentration of power, with the former Macedonian Empire being replaced by 3 systemwide hegemons and a powerful sub-system hegemon: Egypt under the Ptolemies
(Rostovtzeff 1928, 109-129; Turner 1984, 119-123); Macedonia under the Antigonids
(Tarn 1928b, 197-223); the Seleucid Empire covering much of Mesopotamia, Persia,

221

Syria, Cilicia, and Cappadocia (Rostovtzeff 1928b, 155-196); and western Asia Minor
under sub-system hegemon the Kingdom of Pergamum.
Elsewhere in the system, four sub-system hegemons further compounded the
diffused power structure of this nonpolar epoch. Rome had established itself as a subsystem hegemon by 340 BC, having expanded its sphere of influence from the Tiber to
the bay of Naples. Its sub-system hegemonic status was regionally challenged by an
alliance of the Samnites, Etruscans, Celts, and Umbrians, which Rome managed to defeat
and subdue by 295 BC (Adcock 1928, 581-616; Cornell 1989, 351-377). Having
solidified its sphere of influence over central and northern Italy, Rome turned south
toward the Greek cities, most powerful of which was Tarentum. Tarentum appealed to
Epirus, sub-system hegemon across the Adriatic Sea in north-western Greece. The inter
sub-system hegemonic conflict between Rome and Epirus resulted in consecutive defeats
leveled against the former: but the result was a pyrrhic victory for the latter (Franke 1989,
456-472). In 275 BC Epirus withdrew from the Italian Peninsula, and by 272 BC Rome
had conquered Tarentum and assumed complete dominance of the Italian Peninsula, thus
assuming positioning as system-wide hegemon (Frank 1928, 638-657). Epirus, on the
other hand, had demonstrated its sub-system dominance by not only consolidating
regional power, but also assuming an important role in the quagmire that was the War of
the Diadochi: Epirus served as temporary ally of Macedon, during one point its King
Pyrrhus even assumed lordship, only to be soon driven out and once again embroiled in
inter sub-hegemonic conflict (Walbank 1984, 221-231). This was further supplemented
by Epirus’ involvement in Sicily prior to its conflict with Rome: seeking suzerainty over
Sicily, it had invaded and challenged Carthage for sub-system dominance. While initially
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successful, it nonetheless had to abandon Sicily and thus content itself as a sub-system
actor (Franke 1989, 479-485). Epirus’ conflict with Carthage also brought to light the
latter’s positioning as powerful sub-system hegemon: it had absorbed much of northern
Africa, maintained a foothold in Sicily, extended into the Iberian Peninsula, and
functioned as a thalassocracy in much of the western Mediterranean (Schulten 1928, 769784). Sicily, during this nonpolar period, also attained sub-system status under
Syracusean dominance, and until 289 BC, it had acted as a regional power that
consistently clashed and limited Carthaginian influence within its sphere (Cary 1928,
617-637; Meister 1984, 384-411). Within this context, between the dispersion of power
and the inter sub-system hegemonic conflict that defined much of the Hellenistic world,
and the multitude of rising sub-system actors west of the Hellenistic world, the
Mediterranean System during this period witnessed an extraordinarily high number of
sub-system actors, with no single actors possessing the resources and the capability to
assume system-wide status, thus classifying the power configurations of this period as
nonpolar.
270 BC – 170 BC Transition from Nonpolar to Multipolar Structure
The newly expanded Mediterranean System had now transitioned from a nonpolar
structure to a multipolar power constellation, with three theatres of conflict primarily
defined through counter-balancing, balance of power, and expansionism. The first theater
was mainland Greece, with Macedonian system-wide hegemony being challenged by
revisionist sub-system actors in a set of proxy conflicts supported by Egypt. The second
theater was in Asia Minor, the entire eastern Mediterranean, Syro-Palestine (hereafter
referred to as Coele-Syria), and Egypt: a balance of power struggle was initiated between
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system-wide hegemons Egypt and Seleucid, with Macedonia selectively siding with the
latter (primarily due to Egypt’s infringement against Macedonian interests in the first
theater of conflict). The third theater of conflict was in the western Mediterranean, as
system-wide hegemons Rome and Carthage came to clash over Sicily and suzerainty over
the western half of the entire system. The system-wide hegemons during this multipolar
period are as followed (with each theater that the given superpowers operated also having
several sets of sub-system actors): Macedonia, Seleucia, Egypt, Rome, and Carthage.
Of the three theaters, the situation in the Greek mainland was perhaps the most
complex: Macedonia’s system-wide status remained absolute within its sphere of
influence, yet this sphere consistently shifted due to the aspirations of revisionist subsystem hegemons, along with Egypt’s endeavor of counter-balancing Macedon through
diplomacy, proxy wars, and continuous support for anti-Macedonian sub-system actors.
In 267 BC Egypt incited an anti-Macedonian alliance of Greek city-states headed by subsystem actors Athens and Sparta, who sought to limit the hegemon’s presence to the
north, and thus establish regional autonomy in what came to be known as the
Chremonidean War. The outcome reinforced Macedonia’s system-wide positioning:
Athens was reduced to a dependency, Sparta thoroughly humbled, and Egyptian
objectives repulsed (Tarn 1928b, 218-220; Walbank 1984, 236-242). During this period
two powerful sub-system hegemons had consolidated power: the Aetolian League in
central Greece and the Achaean League in the northern Peloponnese.
In 245 BC inter sub-system hegemonic conflict between the two became a reality,
as Aetolia allied with Macedon while Achaea received Egyptian assistance: the latter
reigned victories. This was followed by Achaea’s revisionist endeavor of directly
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challenging Macedonia by taking Corinth, a crucial interest of the system-wide hegemon,
and incorporating it into its League. Egypt’s objective of creating a weaker Macedon
through sub-system buffers was beginning to prove fruitful, especially when Aetolia and
Achaea formed an alliance to check Macedonian suzerainty of central and southern
Greece in 238 BC. By 233 BC Macedonia managed to humble the revisionist actors, thus
limiting their positioning at the sub-system level and demonstrating their inability to
counter-balance Macedonian hegemony (Tarn 1928c, 733-746; Walbank 1984, 243-256).
Around 229 BC semi-barbarian tribes from the north made incursions into Macedonia,
occupying the hegemon’s attention, which in turn allowed Aetolia to capitalize by taking
Thessaly and thus dominating central Greece, while Achaea also took advantage and
assumed dominance of the Peloponnese. Achaea’s sub-system status was soon challenged
by a resurgent Sparta, who managed to defeat and reduce Achaea’s regional status.
Achaea appealed to Macedonia, and the system-wide hegemon responded, while Aetolia
remained neutral due to its agreement with Macedonia. The outcome was the defeat of
Sparta, reification of Macedonian system-wide hegemony, and the imposition of limits on
the revisionist aspirations of the sub-system actors. In 219 BC a relatively powerful
Aetolia attempted to challenge this status quo, in what came to be known as the Social
War, with Sparta and Elis joining Aetolia: the latter was once again humbled, and
Macedonian system-wide status preserved (Tarn 1928c, 747-768). Macedonia’s systemwide positioning, however, would soon bring about a conflict with the rising system-wide
hegemon to its west: Rome. In a set of conflict, the so-called Macedonian Wars, Rome
would succeed in reducing Macedonia to a sub-system hegemon subject to Roman
policy, that is, an ally of Rome, but on unequal terms.
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In the second theater, four general observations may be made. First, Egypt’s
ambitions as system-wide hegemon brought about a conflict with both Seleucia and
Macedonia, as the former sought to preserve dominance of the Aegean against
Macedonia, while establishing suzerainty over Coele-Syria, Phoenicia, and the coast of
Asia Minor against Seleucid. Second, while Macedonian presence was selective, much of
the hegemonic conflict was between Egypt and Seleucid, taking over 100 years in six sets
of conflicts known as the Syrian Wars. Third, while the system-wide struggle was
primarily defined by the given hegemons, rising sub-system hegemons also played a
crucial role in this multipolar structure. Fourth, the continued inter-Hellenistic conflict
led to the weakening of both system-wide hegemons, thus providing Rome the
opportunity to eventually transition the Mediterranean System into a unipolar structure.
The First Syrian War began in 274 BC between Egypt and the Seleucids over
parts of Syria and western Asia Minor, with the outcome being a success for Egypt, who
managed to conquer much of Asia Minor, the Aegean, parts of Syria, and all of Phoenicia
(Tarn 1928d, 702-704). In 263 BC, Egypt helped Pergamum establish its independence
from Seleucid in the so-called War of Eumenes, thus creating a powerful sub-system
actor and ally (709-710). In 260 BC Seleucid and Macedonia initiated conflict with
Egypt, beginning the Second Syrian War, with the objective of counter-balancing
continued Egyptian gains. The result was favorable to the aggressors, as Egyptian naval
power was thoroughly weakened in the Battle of Cos, thus strengthening Macedonia,
while the Seleucids managed to take Cilicia, Pamphylia, and much of Ionia (Heinen
1984, 418-420; Tarn 1928d, 710-715). The Third Syrian War (also known as the
Laodicean War) began in 246 BC, with extensive success for the Egyptians, as Seleucid
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power was thoroughly weakened both in Anatolia and Syria. This, however, was
supplemented by Macedonia’s continued involvement against Egyptian naval presence in
the Aegean: in the Battle of Andros Macedonia seized the Cyclades from the Egyptians
(Heinen 1984, 420-421; Tarn 1928d, 715-719). While the tripartite system-wide
hegemonic conflict continued in this theater, it is crucial to note the presence of several
important sub-system hegemons that helped shaped the system: Galatia in northern
Phrygia (the Celts had invaded into Thraco-Macedonia, crossed the Hellenspont, and
established themselves in central Anatolia, selectively serving as important military ally
to given system-wide actors); Bithynia in the north coast of Asia Minor (consistently
allied with Egypt against Seleucid due to its fears of the latter’s western expansion);
Pontus (Seleucid ally that counter-balanced sub-system actors Bithynia and Pergamum);
Pergamum (the more powerful of the sub-system actors, Egyptian ally, and regional
challenger to Seleucid) (Rostovtzeff 1930a, 590-612); Cappadocia (traditional Seleucid
ally, important strategic player); Rhodes (economically powerful with one of the more
powerful navies in the Aegean, it was respected by the system-wide hegemons for its
neutrality and important role in trade) (Rostovtzeff 1930b, 619-641; Heinen 1984, 421432); and Parthia (expelled Seleucid presence from its region and positioned as the most
powerful sub-system actor in the east).
The Fourth Syrian War broke out in 219 BC, as a rejuvenated Seleucid sought to
reclaim Syria from a relatively weakened Egypt, capturing much of Phoenicia, including
Tyre. At the Battle of Raphia, however, Egypt emerged victorious, thus preserving its
control over Coele-Syria: but Seleucid kept much of its previous gains. The status quo
was reified (Heinen 1984, 433-440; Tarn 1928d, 728-731). The Fifth and Sixth Syrian
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Wars are primarily defined by one variable: Rome’s influence in the east of the system.
In 202 BC, internal decay in Egypt provided Seleucid another opportunity to reduce
Egypt to sub-system status, with Macedonia joining along to share the spoils. The joint
endeavor proved rather successful, as Egypt was handed a crippling defeat at the Battle of
Panium, thus leaving the entire kingdom open for invasion. Roman diplomatic
intervention, however, stopped this development: Rome was fundamentally reliant on
Egyptian grain, and any disruption would create severe complications, and as such, both
Macedonia and Seleucid were warned not to invade Egypt. The two system-wide actors
complied, but Seleucid had already assumed control of Coele-Syria, along with Caria and
Cilicia: Egypt was no longer a system-wide hegemon, but rather, a sub-system actor.
The third theater, initially defined by the Roman-Punic hegemonic conflict, would
soon give way to Roman intrusion into both the first and second theaters, thus explaining
Rome’s restructuring of the Mediterranean System into a unipolar configuration. In 265
BC, conflict over the city of Messana in Sicily offered room for Roman intervention,
which wass immediately challenged by Carthage and sub-system hegemon Syracuse. The
First Punic War was underway, and lasting until 241 BC. Carthage’s system-wide
presence stretched from parts of Sicily to Sardinia to the rest of the western
Mediterranean, reaching the Iberian Peninsula, while North Africa remained its base. Its
primary interest was the preservation of its commercial empire. In 260 BC and 256 BC
Rome shocked Carthaginian naval power with two victories, followed by landing of
troops in Africa. The latter endeavor proves fruitless, and in 249 BC Rome is handed a
serious defeat at the Battle of Drepana. By 242 BC, however, the First Punic War had
become a war of attrition, with both system-wide hegemons reaching exhaustion. In a
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final sea battle, around 241 BC, Rome destroys much of the Carthaginian navy, thus
ending the first Punic War (Scullard 1989a, 539-565). Sicily became an independent ally
of Rome, thus entering Rome’s sphere of influence: in few more years, Sardinia and
Corsica will also follow the same path (Frank 1928b, 804-805). After the First Punic War
relations between the two system-wide hegemon became rather cordial: Carthage turned
its attention away from maritime commercial expansion (the primary cause of its
continued conflict with both the Greeks and Rome) and instituted a new policy of
acquiring a land empire in Africa and Spain. The imposition of this policy, and the reconquest of resource-rich Spain, preserved Carthage’s status as system-wide hegemon
(Frank 1928b, 786-789; Scullard 1989b, 17-31).
Two developments in the 220’s BC allowed Carthage to reposition its policy
against Rome: the Gallic invasions from the north preoccupied Rome, and, Rome’s
absorption of Illyria into its sphere of influence. These two developments allowed
Carthage, under Hannibal, to undertake the conquest of Rome. By 230 BC Illyria had
established itself as sub-system hegemon by proceeding south, subjugating Epirus, and
counter-balancing Aetolia and Achaea. Concomitantly, it had also begun to infringe upon
Rome’s sphere of influence in the Adriatic. In the First Illyrian War, Rome took action,
thus submitting Illyria and assuming control of the Adriatic coast of the Balkans. Rome’s
foothold on the Greek Peninsula also set the stage for a new conflict: Macedonia
suspected a threat to its traditional sphere of influence. Seeking to diplomatically counterbalance Rome, Macedonia formed an alliance with Illyria, and 10 years after the first
conflict, Illyria, once again bolstered, became a concern for Rome. In the Second Illyrian
War in 219 BC Rome quickly and methodically defeated the Illyrians (Holleaux 1928,
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831-851). The Illyrian Wars, however, in reality, had become more of a proxy conflict
between Rome and Macedonia (Errington 1989a, 85-106). But Rome had to turn its
attention west, for Carthage had attacked Rome’s ally Seguntum in Spain, and by 218
BC, the Second Punic War was under way (Briscoe 1989, 44-61). The Carthaginians
approached Rome from the north, heading in from northern Spain, crossing southern
France, and entering the Italian Peninsula. Rome, in turn, sent forces into Spain to
counter-balance Carthaginian ambitions. Initially, Carthage handed Rome three severe
defeats: Battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae (Hallward 1930a, 36-56).
Carthage, however, was not able to capitalize, as Rome methodically turned the tide of
war, and by 212 BC Carthage was on the defensive. A large Carthaginian relief force
marching from Spain was met and defeated at the Battle of Metaurus in 207 BC. At the
same time, Rome also opened a theater of war in Spain: from 209 BC to 206 BC, Rome
removed Carthaginian suzerainty from Spain. In 204 BC Rome opened a third theater of
war by directly invading Africa. Carthaginian forces evacuated Italy to meet the Roman
threat: at the Battle of Zama in 202 BC Rome crushed Carthage, and the Second Punic
War was over (Hallward 1930b, 83-106). Also over was Carthage’s position as systemwide hegemon: it had now been reduced to sub-system status. By 200 BC, Roman power
extended from the Italian Peninsula all the way to Spain, dominating the western
Mediterranean.
While the inter-hegemonic conflict of the Second Punic War was playing out,
Macedonia, seeking to capitalize on an overwhelmed Rome, formed an alliance with
Carthage in 215 BC, thus siding the two system-wide hegemons against Rome and
initiating the First Macedonian War. Rome, in turn, allied itself with sub-system
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hegemon Aetolia to counter-balance the Macedonia threat from the east (Holleaux 1930a,
116-126). Further, Rome formed an alliance with Pergamum and Rhodes, two powerful
sub-system hegemons who were leveraged against Macedonia, while Macedonia
maintained its alliance with the Achaean League. Within this context, Rome was fighting
a hegemonic war with Carthage on one hand, and another hegemonic war with
Macedonia, yet also utilizing its sub-system allies on the other hand. While the outcome
of the conflict was indecisive, it served the Roman objective of curbing Macedonian
assistance to Carthage. Upon its defeat of Carthage, Roman system-wide dominance
sought out Macedonia, whose aggression toward Roman allies Pergamum and Rhodes
were cause for concern.
The Second Macedonian War broke out in 205 BC, resulting in a crushing defeat
for the Macedonians at the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC (Holleaux 1930b, 155178; Errington 1989b, 244-273), with the result being two-fold: Macedonia was no longer
a system-wide hegemon, but reduced to a regional actor in northern Greece; and, with
Macedonia, Egypt, and Carthage, by this time, being reduced to sub-system status,
Seleucid remained the only system-wide hegemon standing in the way of Roman unipolar
preponderance. Roman intrusion and terms of ultimatum during the Fifth Syrian War had
created much discomfort among Seleucid, and with the conclusion of the Second
Macedonian War, a cold war of sorts had developed between the two remaining systemwide actors. Seleucid expansion westward, after having reduced Egypt, had made the
system-wide hegemon an extensive power, covering territories from Thrace, across Asia
Minor, and the entire east of the system up to Parthia. In this sense, Rome controlled the
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entire west of the Mediterranean System, while Seleucid dominated the east, with wide
array of sub-system actors strategically contributing to this balance.
The Aetolian League’s break from Rome offered Seleucid the presumed
opportunity to upset the balance, as the former invaded Greece in alliance with Aetolia,
hoping to bring Macedonia and the Achaean League to its side. The two sub-system
hegemons refused, while Rome sent an invasion force against Seleucid: the so-called
Roman-Syrian War had begun. A defeat at the Battle of Thermopylae forced the
Seleucids to retreat from Greece, only to be followed by Rome across the Aegean, where
at the Battle of Magnesia Seleucid was soundly defeated. Seleucid lost all of its territory
west of the Taurus Mountains, that is, most of Anatolia, thus being limited to Syria and
Mesopotamia: it too had been reduced to sub-system status (Holleaux 1930c, 1999-233).
Pergamum and Rhodes assumed much of the Seleucids’ territory, thus serving as
powerful buffers and reliable allies of Rome. By 170 BC Roman unipolar dominance of
the Mediterranean System had been established: Macedonia was reduced to a Roman
province after the Third Macedonian War (Benecke 1930a, 259-275), while Seleucid and
Egypt conceded Roman dominance by abiding Rome’s demands during the Sixth Syrian
War. The Mediterranean System, then, was defined by a single unipole that was neither
challenged nor counter-balanced, with several powerful sub-system actors that were
either allied with the unipole, thus bandwagoning, or conceded the unipole’s suzerainty.
170 BC - 395 Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure
The macropolitical attributes of the Mediterranean System during the initial
period of Roman unipolarity were primarily defined by Rome’s direct control over Spain,
western Mediterranean, and the Italian Peninsula. Much of North Africa, the Greek
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world, Asia Minor, Seleucid east, and Egypt, while not under direct Roman control,
nonetheless recognized Roman suzerainty. While sets of powerful sub-system hegemons
remained in the system, none possessed the relative capabilities to either challenge or
counter-balance Roman preponderance: these actors were either allied with Rome or
assumed neutral, non-aligned policies. In instances where sub-system hegemons engaged
in revisionist behavior, Roman response was severe: Roman unipolarity did not tolerate
any challenges to its singular dominance of the Mediterranean System. This was evident
in 146 BC, when a challenge by the Achaean League led to its swift defeat and the
complete destruction of Corinth; while a perceived threat from Carthage led to the Third
Punic War and the complete destruction of Carthage as well (Derow 1989, 303-323;
Benecke 1930b, 296-305; Hallward and Charlesworth 1930, 479-484).
In 133 BC Rome inherited Pergamum, thus expanding its direct control into Asia
Minor after having done the same a decade before in Greece. From 111 BC to 104 BC
Rome pacified North Africa after defeating revisionist Numidia whose sub-system
positioning had attempted to challenge Roman dominance of the region. By 90 BC
Pontus had become the most powerful sub-system hegemon in Anatolia, and its
aspirations of system-wide status led to the Three Mithridatic Wars, which Rome soundly
won by 63 BC, thus ending Pontus as sub-system actor. This expansion eastward also
resulted in absorbing the already decaying Seleucid state, while at the same time forming
an alliance (vassalage?) with Armenia (Freeman 2004, 405-415). Rome’s preponderance
of the system had reached new heights: it extended from the Iberian Peninsula all the way
to Mesopotamia, with sub-system hegemon Parthia at its eastern-most periphery. It
exercised dominance over the entire Mediterranean civilization, North Africa, Egypt,
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Anatolia, Syria, and the Levant: Rome had absorbed the Hellenic Kingdoms. From 59 BC
to 50 BC much of Gaul was also conquered and absorbed, thus expanding Roman
dominance up north all the way to the British Island.
Rome’s internal conflicts, ranging from the Social Wars, to the Civil Wars
(Charlesworth 1952a, 13-30; Tarn 1952, 43-65), to the ending of the republic (Tarn and
Charlesworth 1952, 90-111) and the formation of the empire (Jones 1952, 127-158), are
excluded from analysis, for these developments did not affect systemic outcomes at the
macro level: Roman system-wide hegemony remained unchallenged. For the next 450
years, no single sub-system actor managed to position itself at the system-wide level and
challenge Roman unipolarity. This is primarily due to two general factors: Rome’s policy
of aggressive expansion, and, Rome’s intolerance of any challenges to its perceived
spheres of influence, which, in essence, included the entire Mediterranean System with
the exception of Persia.
Within this context, Rome came into conflict with Germanic political units to the
north due to its expansionist policies (Syme 1952, 358-368), or, it came into conflict with
Parthia due to its irredentist aspirations. As such, neither of these actors sought to
challenge Roman system-wide dominance, but rather, especially for Parthia, to preserve
its own regional positioning. This is best attested by Rome’s continuous conflict with
Parthia over Armenia, which Parthia considered to be in its sphere of influence as
neighbor, while Rome sought to control Armenia as a client kingdom (Anderson 1952a,
254-278; Anderson 1952b, 747-772). For nearly 400 years, Rome consistently infringed
upon Parthia’s sphere, usually getting the upper hand in battle, but stopping short of
absorbing the sub-system actor, but rather, keeping it just that. Concomitantly, Parthia,
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and then Sassanid Persia, never sought system-wide dominance or expansion beyond
their regional sphere: the objective appears to merely curtail Roman infringement. In this
sense, the Roman-Parthian/Persian Wars were not system-wide conflicts, but rather, a
struggle over a regional sphere of influence between an expansionist system-wide
hegemon and a defensive sub-system hegemon.
By 60 AD Rome had continued its expansion by annexing Thrace, Noricum
(modern-day Austria), Pamphylia, Lycia, Judea, and Mauretania (modern-day Morocco)
(Charlesworth 1952b, 674-679). This was topped off by the conquest of Britain (Syme
and Collingwood 1952, 794-802). The next several decades were defined by revolts,
suppression of such revolts, conflicts over succession, and re-solidification of imperial
policies (Stevenson and Momigliano 1952, 842-865). Within this context, Rome was
preoccupied with preserving its direct control and expansive sphere of influence, as
opposed to expanding or facing challenges at the system-wide level. Macropolitically, the
Mediterranean System remained stagnant.
By 100 AD, Rome sought expansion into Dacia (Syme 1954, 168-177),
conquering much of modern-day Eastern Europe. By 116 it had expanded into Parthia,
taking Babylon, Susa, and the capital of Ctesiphon, followed by the absorption of
Mesopotamia as a Roman province (Longden 1954, 226-252). The Roman Empire had
reached its maximum peak, extending from Britain all the way to the Persian Gulf. By
160 Rome had returned to its previous boundaries in the east, returning much of
Mesopotamia back to Parthia and thus sustaining the sub-system hegemons sphere of
influence. Between this period and 180 Rome fought the Marcomannic Wars against
invading German tribes from the north: similar to setting the eastern periphery at the
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border with Parthia, Rome had also set its north eastern periphery in Europe at the
Danube River (Weber 1954, 349-364). The outcome was Rome’s successful defense of
this border and an acceptance of the limitations of its expansion.
The greatest threat to Roman unipolarity came around 260, but this was not due to
external invasions, but rather, to internal decay: the Empire was temporarily divided into
three, in what became known as the Crisis of the Third Century. In the north the Gallic
Empire was formed, which included the provinces of Britain, Gaul, and for a brief period,
Hispania. In the East the Palmyrene Empire was formed, which primarily included
eastern Anatolia, Syro-Palestine, and Egypt (Alfoldi 1961, 169-192.). With the exception
of these breakaway regions, the rest of the Empire remained centered on Rome. By 275,
however, the breakaway empires had been subdued and reincorporated into Rome
(Mattingly 1961, 297-308), and as such, the ephemeral period during which these
developments occurred do not constitute a restructuration of the power configurations of
the system. Between this period and the mid-400s, Roman unipolarity was under serious
decline.
Multitude of factors, ranging from overexpansion, internal decay, splitting of the
empire (East and West), wars of succession, conflict with Persia, and endless incursions
from the north by Germanic tribes, were incrementally decaying the only system-wide
hegemon. In 395 the Roman Empire was officially partitioned into two centers of power,
Rome and Constantinople, with the outcome being the decline and fall of Western Rome
by 476, while the Eastern Empire continued on in history as the Byzantine Empire.
Within this framework, Rome ceased to exist as the unipole after 395, for the
development of two centers of power introduced two sub-system actors, which, in turn,
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was supplemented by the presence of a high number of sub-system actors that would give
way to the end of Roman unipolarity and the end of the Mediterranean System. A new
period of nonpolarity was in the horizon.

Analysis
The collection of data for the Mediterranean World Political System produces a
sequence of 15 codings that provide configuration observations of polar structures. The
collected data offer non-obvious information on the transitional attributes of polar
structures and the formulation of modes of polarity. Consistent with the study of previous
world political systems provided in this work, four schemes of evaluation are provided:
1) distribution of polar structures; 2) transitional patterns after unipolar periods; 3)
durability of polar epochs; and 4) probabilistic outcomes of power constellations after
unipolar transitions. Five assumptions may be culled from the collected data at the outset.
First, the traditional conception prominent in Western-centric scholarship that
multipolarity is the system’s norm is refuted. Second, unipolarity is not only more
prevalent, but also displays longevity and sustained durability, thus limiting the
multipolarity-versus-bipolarity-stability-debate common among International Relations
scholars (see Chapters 1 and 2). Third, tripolarity appears to be unfit for the
Mediterranean System, as the system displayed tendencies of unipolar bandwagoning,
bipolar polarization, or multipolar diffusion and balance. Fourth, nonpolar power
configurations are not only common in this system, but they also tend to form after
transitions from unipolar periods. And fifth, multipolarity is the least stable polar
structure with respect to system’s durability.
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In relation to other world political systems, the Mediterranean System has a
relatively equal distribution, as the system displays a balanced development between the
modalities of polar structures. As Figure 7.1 displays, the distribution of the 15
observation points demonstrate unipolarity as the most occurring polar structure, as 5 out
of the 15 polar periods in the dataset are coded as unipolar. Multipolarity is the second
most occurring power configuration, being the system’s structure 4 out of 15 data points.
Bipolarity and nonpolarity, respectively, defined the polar periods of the system 3 times
each, while tripolarity never became a system’s structure. Cumulatively, for the 2,395
years that the Mediterranean System existed, 33 percent of the time the system’s structure
assumed a unipolar power constellations, followed by multipolarity with 27 percent of
the time, bipolarity with 20 percent, and nonpolarity defining the polar epochs with 20
percent of the time.
The relatively equal distribution of the polar periods is quite telling: concentration
of power in the Mediterranean System was relatively weaker in relation to other world
political systems, since 47 percent of the time (multipolar and nonpolar periods
combined) the concentration of power in the system was quite diffused, while in the
bipolar periods (20 percent of the time), power was relatively more concentrated, yet
reliant on polarization and alliances/leagues. Concomitantly, in instances of unipolar
preponderance, the system still possessed a consistently high number of sub-system
hegemons, which may perhaps explain the absence of complete system-wide hegemony
(with the exception of Rome for a given period of time).

238

FIGURE 7.1 DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES OF MEDITERRANEAN
SYSTEM
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The longevity and durability of polar periods demonstrate the coherence of
fittidness as it pertains to structural power hierarchies within a system: the longer a power
configuration lasts in a system, on average, the more stable the system’s structure
remains. Within this context, while the distribution of occurrence offers interesting
insight into polar structures, just as important is the measurement of longevity for such
polar occurrences. Due to the extraordinarily long period of Roman unipolarity (565),
unipolarity, on average, remains the most durable polar structure with 216 years. The
second most durable structure is bipolarity, averaging 177 years, followed by nonpolarity
with an average of 138 years. The least durable polar structure is multipolarity, which
averages 91 years. Within this context, as Figure 7.2 shows, at the macro level, the
systemically most stable power configuration is unipolarity, for it takes approximately
216 years for a structural transition to take place.
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FIGURE 7.2 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR PERIODS
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The relative instability of the multipolar structure is also quite telling, for its
average lifespan of 91 years suggests weak longevity in relation to a relatively more
concentrated structure found in bipolarity (lasting 177 years), or in relation to a relatively
more diffused power structure found in nonpolarity (lasting 138 years). For this reason,
multipolarity is not only refuted as the distributive norm within the Mediterranean
System, but also, the least durable: of the 2,395 years of this world political system,
multipolarity existed for only 365 years, that is, only 15% of the historic space. This is
quite limited in relation to unipolarity with 1,080 years (45% of historic space), bipolarity
with 530 years (22% of historic space), and nonpolarity with 415 years (18%).

240

FIGURE 7.3 HISTORIC SPACE OF MEDITERRANEAN SYSTEM
Percentile of Historic Space Occupied by Polar Periods
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The structural transformations following unipolar periods offer important
observational patterns in forming probabilistic assessments with respect to outcome.
Since the dataset coded 5 unipolar periods, this allows for similar number of postunipolar structural transitions. After unipolarity, as Figure 7.4 demonstrates, the
distribution is as followed: one period of bipolarity, one period of multipolarity, and three
periods of nonpolarity. Interpreting the post-unipolar data probabilistically, the
Mediterranean system displayed a 20% chance of transitioning to a bipolar structure after
unipolar periods, a 20% chance of transitioning to a multipolar structure, and a 60%
probability of transitioning to a nonpolar configuration after unipolarity.
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FIGURE 7.4 POST-UNIPOLAR OUTCOMES
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The post-unipolar transitions may be better situated through two analytical
frameworks: in cases where the concentration of power within the system was relatively
limited with respect to the system-wide hegemon’s preponderance, the system
transitioned into either bipolar or multipolar configurations; while in cases where the
concentration of power within the system was relatively extensive with respect to the
system-wide hegemon’s preponderance, the system transitioned into a diffused nonpolar
configuration. The cases of the former are rather obvious: Cretan system-wide hegemonic
status was not as concentrated, allowing revisionist Mycenae to restructure the system
into a bipolar constellations; similarly, Corinthian unipolarity (650 BC-690 BC) was
supplemented by the presence of several powerful sub-system hegemons, and within this
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context, concentration of power within the unipole was limited, thus giving way to a
multipolar structure after Corinthian unipolarity. With respect to the second analytical
framework, the relationship between power concentration and subsequent diffusion has
the inverse effect. During Mycenaean system-wide hegemonic preponderance,
concentration of power was quite extensive, and as such, the transition after Mycenaean
unipolarity gave way to a highly diffused, nonpolar structure. The pattern appears to be
the same with both Macedonian unipolarity, after absorbing the Near East-Middle
Eastern System, and Roman unipolarity. In both instances, the concentration of power
was rather extensive with both system-wide hegemons, thus creating a severe vacuum
after the unipolar period, which gave way to a diffused, nonpolar configuration.
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CHAPTER 8
THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM
The Global Political System encompasses the political interactions, inter and intra
civilizational relations, and competition for system-wide hegemonic status between
political units/entities/actors throughout the globe. The conceptualization of the Global
Political System is better explained through three developments. First, as the world
political systems absorbed or fused into one another, a more integrated, globalizing
political system defined the macropolitical landscape. Second, the Global Political
System is the byproduct and the outcome of the growth and expansion of the European
System, as this world political system expanded and absorbed much of the known world,
thus allowing for the fusion and integration of political actors within a single, global
system. Third, data collection and analytic legitimations for criteria-designation begin
around the 1500’s, as the European Age of Exploration and immediate colonization
provides the historical demarcation point where a world political system expands into
other world political systems and brings about the integration of separate world political
systems into a single global system. The European “discovery” and colonization of the
Western Hemisphere, expansion into the African continent, establishment of sustained
and non-ephemeral relations with political actors of the civilizations of Asia (for the
inclusion of the Indic System and Far East System into the Global Political System, see
chapters 5 and 6), and extension into Oceana and South East Asia (East Indies) gave way
to an international political system that integrated and encompassed the entire globe. As
such, power configurations of polar periods no longer remained confined, generally
speaking, to specific, relatively isolated world political systems, since system-wide
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hegemons started functioning at the wider global level, thus altering the macropolitical
composition of the entire globe.
Four general attributes also appear quite unique to the Global Political System.
First, whereas in the specific world political systems of the previous historic space
economic considerations were extremely important in the expansion and positioning of
system-wide actors, economic attributes, however, remained secondary to military might.
Nonetheless, this attribute underwent a form of evolutionary development in the Global
Political System, as economic power came to serve as an important mechanism in
challenging and counter-balancing other system-wide actors. Simply put, relative to
previous historic periods, due to the interactions, interdependence, and the globalization
of the world economy, economic power came to matter even more in the new global
system: this relevance, however, did not usurp the role of military power, but rather,
complemented and reinforced it (example of Venice of the 16th century is a case in point:
perhaps the richest of European states, yet militarily limited, it failed to attain sub-system
hegemony). Second, military power no longer became defined so much by size, but
rather, through the intense technological advancements that allowed smaller, bettertrained, efficient, and well-equipped armies to defeat or challenge much larger, yet
technologically deficient armies. Third, this being the case, designations of system-wide
hegemonic status, in the Global Political System, does not seem much concerned with
physical control of territories, but rather, with spheres of influence, where relatively
smaller territorial states, with powerful economic and military attributes, can exercise
extensive influence through their spheres: the success of the Dutch and the British, for
example, in relation to Russia or the Ottomans. And fourth, diplomacy became a source
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of power in and of itself, as the quality and strength of state policy and diplomacy played
a crucial role in observing the behavior and distinction between system-wide and subsystem actors: Austrian perseverance, for example, in comparison to Russian stagnation
and eventual decline. Collectively, then, the new Global Political System gave birth to a
evolved form of system-wide hegemonic behavior, where dominance and preponderance
was not merely about controlling vast territories, peoples, and their economies, but also,
about regulating a world order that served and reinforced the interests of the said systemwide hegemon(s). In this sense, technological advancement, robust economic growth, and
well-refined diplomacy became extraordinarily important to the ability of actors to attain
positioning at the system-wide level, or, for revisionist states, to challenge and counterbalance the existing system-wide hegemon(s), that is, the existing regulated world order.
1500 AD – 1590 AD Unipolar Structure
The Global Political System during this unipolar period may be defined as
followed: a single system-wide actor, and a set of relatively powerful sub-system actors
that were in the process of consolidating power. France and Britain had recently
concluded a near century of internecine warfare over regional preponderance, and as
such, their sub-system conflict had equally weakened both actors, and by the 1500’s, both
were recovering from exhaustion. At the system-wide level, then, both actors remained
absent, as Britain was in the nascent stages of establishing a maritime presence and
recuperating, while France, after having secured its northern borders against Britain, was
preparing to counter-balance an ambitious Spain. The Ottomans, in the east, were in the
process of consolidating sub-system status, as their regional conflict with Safavid Persia
over Mesopotamia limited its capacity to attain positioning at the system-wide level. At
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the same time, it remained limited to the eastern Mediterranean after having been
repulsed by Venice, while attempting to conquer Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula in the
Near East. Spain remained the more ambitious of the sub-system hegemons, a revisionist
actor that had begun its colonial expansion into the Americas, while on the European
continent, jockeying with a recovering France over influence in northern Italy. Due to
these developments, the unchallenged system-wide actor remained Portugal, who had
initiated the European Age of Exploration and had established an impressive reach across
much of the globe. Thus, while the sub-system hegemons were seeking regional
positioning, Portugal had attained system-wide status as a global actor.
By the 1500’s Portugal had established a presence on the Indian subcontinent,
thus assuming dominance of the Indian Ocean and making inroads into the Red Sea.
From Calcutta to Goa to Ceylon (Sri Lanka) to Macau, Portuguese preponderance was
established. This was followed by controlling the entire coast of the Arabian Peninsula,
from modern-day Yemen to Oman to Bahrain. The African coast was also fortified, from
Mozambique to Mombasa: Portuguese system-wide dominance was unmatched. In 1509
the Ottomans attempted to challenge the system-wide hegemon’s position in the Indian
Ocean, resulting in the latter’s defeat. The Ottoman-Portuguese Naval Wars resumed
intermittently, with the latter consistently preserving its spheres of influence (Padfield
1979, 48-51). Portugal continued its expansion into Southeast Asia, establishing presence
in Malaysia, Indonesia, Timor, and New Guinea (Boxer 1969). This was supplemented
by its colonization in South America, with Brazil becoming an important source of
wealth for the system-wide hegemon. Portuguese system-wide hegemony, then, may be
attributed to several factors: expansive reach throughout the globe, from South America
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all the way to Southeast Asia; its dominance of the Indian Ocean, along with its presence
in Africa, India, China, and the Arabian Peninsula; accumulation of immense economic
might by dominating the spice trade, along with the strategic routes connecting trade
between the East and Europe; and, its South American colonies (Diffie and Winius,
1977).
By 1530, however, revisionist Spain had assumed status of system-wide
hegemon, thus eclipsing Portugal and reducing the latter to sub-system status: while
Spain came to control vast territories both on the European Continent and throughout its
overseas colonies, Portugal remained limited to its overseas colonies, displaying no
relevance with respect to the power politics in Europe. Thus, as the sub-system hegemons
during Portugal’s unipolar period consolidated power and came to potentially act at the
system-wide level, Portugal lacked the resources to exercise system-wide preponderance,
nor did it seek to curtail the behavior of revisionist states. As such, it found itself reduced
to sub-system status. Spain stood out as the preeminent power in Europe, and by
extension, in the global system, as it controlled, by 1530, primarily through dynastic
inheritance, Austria, Burgundy, Netherlands, Sardinia, Sicily, Naples, and of course,
much of the Americas (Kennedy 1987, 33-35). It possessed a formidable army and navy,
along with a growing mercantilist wealth flowing from its colonies. During this early
period of Spanish unipolarity Britain remained in the same position as it had during
Portuguese unipolarity: developing a maritime presence and consolidating its sub-system
hegemonic status (Wernham 1968, 209-233). France, on the other hand, had grown both
suspicious and uncomfortable with Spain’s rise to system-wide dominance, and fearing
its encirclement, with Spain dominant to its west and to its east, it sought to preserve its
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sphere of influence in Northern Italy (primarily over Burgundy and Milan), thus bringing
about war with the unipole. Lacking the capability to singularly challenge Spain, France
allied with the Ottoman Empire, but to no avail. In 1559, the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis
brought the Franco-Spanish conflict to an end (Braudel 1995, 945-948), as France
remained content as sub-system hegemon, while Spain granted Austria independence (but
the two remained extremely close allies) (Mamatey 1978, 8-12), in order to turn its
attention against the Ottomans. In the conflicts over Djerba (1560), Malta (1565),
Lepanto (1571), and Tunis (1974), Ottomans were kept limited to their eastern and North
African spheres, hence failing to dislodge Spain’s preponderance over the western
Mediterranean (Braudel 1995, 973-1103), nor present a challenge at the system-wide
level. The containment of Ottoman Turkey, from that point, became the responsibility of
Austria, as continuous victories by the latter methodically weakened the Ottoman’s
capacity to attain system-wide status (Parry 1968, 360-363). In 1580, in the so-called
Iberian Union, Spain assumed dynastic control of Portugal, thus annexing all of
Portugal’s overseas territories: Spain had reached the apogee of its system-wide
dominance.
Spain’s decline from system-wide hegemonic status came about with the revolt of
the Netherlands, as the Dutch sought independence from Spanish control. A presumed
local conflict, it now assumed international dynamics, especially as Britain came to the
aid of the rebels. This was coupled by Spain’s involvement in France’s religious civil
wars, which had further weakened France and limited its capacity for system-wide
positioning. In 1588 and 1590, Spain unsuccessfully attempted the invasion of England
itself, resulting in the former’s defeat: Spain’s unipolar system-wide preponderance was
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over (Koenigsberger 1968, 234-318). Britain had elevated itself to system-wide status by
both expanding its colonies as well as being an important actor in the power politics of
Europe: it had successfully counter-balanced Spain and was now its equal at the systemwide level. France’s recovery after the civil wars also elevated France to system-wide
status, as it also sought colonization overseas, while attaining Spain’s recognition of its
new importance in Europe in the Treaty of Vervins (Braudel 1995, 1204-1221). The
success of the Dutch against Spain would soon bring about the United Provinces of
Netherlands, an economic and naval power that would also become one of the more
powerful system-wide hegemons. Austria, in the meantime, would remain a sub-system
actor, as it merely sought domination of the German states, while closely allying itself
with Spain, thus allocating system-wide policies to the Spanish (Ramsay 1968, 326-334).
Ottoman Turkey’s potential for system-wide status was also curtailed, for its defeat by
the Spanish and Austrians was compounded by the sub-system challenges brought forth
by Safavid Persian (Parry 1968, 357-360), forcing Turkey to turn its resources from
system-wide positioning to consolidating regional dominance. Within this context, by
1590, the Global Political System had transitioned to a multipolar configuration.
1590 AD – 1660 AD Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar Structure
The considerations of this multipolar period are three-fold. First, the system
witnessed four system-wide hegemons and a high number of relatively powerful subsystem hegemons. Second, a sub-system hegemonic conflict, The Thirty Year’s War,
turned into an international system-wide conflict, with potential consequences to the
structure of the system. Third, the outcome of The Thirty Year’s War would give way to
a potential restructuring of the Global Political System, as France would capitalize on the
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relative weakness of the other system-wide actors brought about by the conflict, thus
reducing these actors to sub-system status and assuming unipolar preponderance.
By 1605 a set of peace treaties had established a balanced, multipolar structure in
the Global System: Spain, United Provinces, England, and France serving as system-wide
hegemons, with the Ottoman Empire (embroiled in regional conflicts), Austria (seeking
regional consolidation of the German states), Russia (rising and expanding), the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth (covering the Baltics and north east-central Europe, while
countering Russia to the east) and Sweden (dominating Scandinavia and displaying
revisionist tendencies) functioning as sub-system hegemons. Spain remained a
formidable power, both on the continent and at the global scale, and while other systemwide actors were now able to counter-balance and check Spanish aspirations, it
nonetheless remained one of the more powerful global actors (Trevor-Roper 1970, 265282). Britain had assumed system-wide positioning by establishing one of the more
powerful navies in the globe, as well as successfully challenging Spanish unipolarity,
while at the same time beginning the process of establishing a massive colonial empire.
France’s entrance into the club of superpowers is also quite telling: possessing perhaps
the biggest army, it competently counter-balanced any threat to its system-wide position,
while at the same time formulating its own colonial empire throughout the globe. By
1610 the United Provinces of Netherlands had pretty much established their
independence from Spain, and in the process, had grown into a global power. Its most
unique attribute was that the basis of its strength was primarily hinged on trade (its
overseas expansion ranged from South America to the East Indies), industry (it
established factories and trading posts throughout the Indian Ocean), and finance (it
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served as the center of international finance, functioning as Europe’s leading shipper,
exchanger, and commodity dealer): it was an economic powerhouse. At the same, it had
perhaps the most powerful navy in the world, one which eclipsed the British during this
earlier period (Kennedy 1987, 66-69; Wilson 1968, 26-35).
In 1618 the estates of Bohemia revolted against Austrian sub-system dominance,
ushering in The Thirty Years War (Tapie 1970, 513-523), as Spain came to the aid of its
ally Austria, while the Dutch, Danes, and Sweden came to challenge Austria’s dominance
of Germany (Beller 1970, 306-356). France interjected itself into the conflict as well,
finding the opportunity to further weaken Spain, as the Dutch and the Danes invaded
Germany from the north, only to be followed by the powerful Swedish army in 1630,
with France offering financial and diplomatic support (Wedgwood 1938, 269-330). This
was followed by a direct French invasion in 1635: Swedish and German troops were
pressing Austria from the north, while the Dutch and French were confronting the
Spanish presence (335-461). This was supplemented by the Dutch attacking Spanish
colonies overseas, especially in Brazil, Angola, and Ceylon (Parker 1979, 54-73). Overexhaustion, depletion of resources, and a general impasse gave way to secret negotiations
to a final peace settlement: The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Economically, the situation
had become dire: Germany had been destroyed, Austria and Spain were at the verge of
bankruptcy, with the Dutch also suffering severe restraints on their enormous economy,
while sub-system hegemons such as Sweden where in an even worse situation. Systemwide hegemons were quickly learning that prolonged warfare was inherently
incompatible with the growing nature of globalized economics: some form of a balance
was necessary. By virtue of such developments and the Treaty of Westphalia, Spain fully
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recognized the independence of the Dutch, while the Austrians accepted the regional
status quo and thus brought tranquility to Germany (Wedgwood 1938, 505-528). While
The Thirty Years War had come to an end, the conflict between the French and the
Spanish, however, continued: with a weakened Dutch ally, an absentee Britain going
through civil conflict, an exhausted Austria, along with much weakened sub-system
actors who had partaken in the war, France sought the opportunity to further press and
weaken Spain. Concomitantly, in 1640, the Portuguese revolted against Spanish
suzerainty, thus beginning the War of Portuguese Independence (1640-1688) (Elliott
1970, 468-472), which further weakened an already over-stretched Spain (Stoye 2000,
74-86).
Two further developments in the 1650s set the stage for French ascendancy. First,
from 1652 to 1654, the First Anglo-Dutch War broke out, as the two most powerful
maritime powers undertook a commercial war (Wilson 1978, 61-126). The outcome was
mutual exhaustion, with Britain failing to overtake the Dutch as the preeminent maritime
power with respect to trade and commerce. Second, France’s continued war with Spain
led to a Franco-British alliance, which severely beat the Spaniards, forcing the latter to
sue for peace, with the conflict being resolved in the Treaty of Pyrenees in 1659
(Kennedy 1987, 40-41; Stoye 2000, 88-91). Spain recognized all of French gains from
the Treaty of Westphalia, thus expanding French influence throughout the continent,
while cutting of Spain at the Pyrenees; France agreed to stop aiding the Portuguese War
of Independence, which France indirectly continued, thus making France a powerful
arbiter of continental politics (Livet 1970, 412-434). In sum, the Thirty Years War and its
consequences thoroughly exhausted and weakened all of the parties involved, with the
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exception of France, which walked out of that period as the most powerful country on the
globe.
1660 AD – 1715 AD Transition from Multipolar to Unipolar Structure
The restructuring of the power constellations from multipolar to a unipolar
configuration may be attributed to one specific factor: the previous system-wide
hegemons, by virtue of collective weakness and relative decay, found themselves reduced
to sub-system status, while France, which had grown relatively more powerful,
positioned itself as the only system-wide hegemon. Austria’s capacity to possibly rise up
to system-wide status was thoroughly curtailed by the devastation it underwent through
the Thirty Years War, which was soon, in turn, augmented by intermittent warfare against
a decaying Ottoman Turkey: from 1663-1791, inter sub-system hegemonic conflict over
Hungary, Croatia, and the Balkans continued between the two actors (Betts 1961, 487499; Kurat 1961, 508-516). Spain found itself profoundly exhausted and weakened, as it
lost its possession of Portugal, remained weak in relation to France on both the European
continent and in global affairs, and thoroughly struggled to rebuild an economy that
became even more reliant on exploitation of resources from its colonies (Coleman 1961,
26-27): Spain had been reduced to a sub-system hegemon (Regla 1961, 369-382).
Britain’s position was also quite limited with respect to the macropolitics of this period:
having recovered from its civil wars, it competed with the Dutch for dominance of the
global sea trade (losing the Second War of 1665-1667, and starting the Third War 16721674 to assist France, but only to disappoint), failing to attain maritime dominance, thus
undertaking a process of consolidation and growth, while choosing a position of
neutrality toward the unipole, as opposed to seeking positioning at the system-wide level
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(Ogg 1961, 306-329). The Anglo-Dutch Wars, although giving way to Dutch success,
nonetheless had a detrimental effect on its capacity to position at the system-wide level
(Kossmann 1961, 281-300), that is, to challenge and counter-balance France. Primarily a
maritime power, the Dutch lacked the capability to challenge France’s unipolar
positioning, but rather, only assumed a defensive posture, as sub-system hegemon,
against French infringements upon its territory (McKay and Scott 1983). As Paul
Kennedy (1987) summarizes:
To the south, Spain was still exhausting itself in the futile attempt to
recover Portugal. Across the Channel, a restored monarchy under
Charles II was trying to find its feet, and in English commercial
circles great jealousy of the Dutch existed. In the north, a recent
war had left both Denmark and Sweden weakened. In Germany,
the Protestant princes watched suspiciously for any fresh Habsburg
attempt to improve its position, but the imperial government in Vienna
had problems enough in Hungary and Transylvania, and slightly
later with a revival of Ottoman power. Poland was already wilting
under the effort of fending off Swedish and Muscovite predators.
Thus, French diplomacy…could easily take advantage of these
circumstances, playing off the Portuguese against Spain, the Magyars,
Turks, and German princes against Austria, and English against the
Dutch—while buttressing France’s own geographic position” (100-101).

In 1667 France invaded southern Netherlands, reifying its system-wide
hegemonic status through irredentism. Fearing France’s new position, England and the
Dutch quickly made peace, joining Spain and Sweden to check French expansionism.
The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1668 temporarily stoped the hostilities, which France
used to further entrench its unipolar status: it diplomatically brought Britain back to its
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camp, secured Swedish neutrality, and appeased Austria and the German states (Zeller
1963, 210-213). Within this context, France’s power remained unmatched, and only a
collection of a multitude of sub-system hegemons remained able to undertake defensive
posturing against French aggression: but no single actor possessed the capability to either
challenge or counter-balance France. In 1672 hostilities were re-initiated, with now-allied
England attacking the United Provinces, only to be defeated and hence exit the war: its
sub-system limitations became exposed. Unable to meet the French challenge by itself,
the United Provinces utilize their economic might, via subsidies, to desperately form a
coalition against France: the German principalities, Austria, Spain, and Denmark joined
the anti-French coalition (214-218). This “coalition of states,” however, “was not strong
enough to overwhelm France,” but rather, merely to stop France’s expansionist endeavors
(Kennedy 1987, 102). France further displayed its global power by not only having the
largest and most powerful land force, but also a navy that fully challenged the Dutch: the
French navy had established control of the Mediterranean, with the Dutch and Danish
navies holding the Baltics, while neither side was able to prevail in the West Indies. The
maritime theater of the war greatly harmed the commerce and trade of both France and
the Dutch, which, indirectly, would come to serve the benefits of Britain. In 1679 the set
of Nymegen peace treaties brought the open fighting to an end, but France continued as
the “arbiter of Europe,” neither being challenged nor confronted by Germany,
Netherlands, Spain, or England (McKay and Scott 1983, 32-34; Kennedy 1987, 101-102).
In 1688 France invaded Germany, which, once again, brought together a
defensive anti-French coalition of all the sub-system hegemons in Europe: A Grand
Alliance of England, United Provinces, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Savoy, and the

256

German states. The land battles created, as previously, an impasse, as the coalition of
sub-system hegemons limited France’s objectives, while the battle at sea turned into a
mutually ruinous war against trade: France sought to raid and harm the commerce of the
opponent states, while the Anglo-Dutch navy sought to weaken the French economy by
instituting a commercial blockade. By 1697 both sides agreed to end the conflict,
bringing about the Treaty of Ryswick, which allowed France to keep some of its gains,
but generally maintain the initial geopolitical structure (Clark 1970, 225-253).
In 1700, conflict rose anew which would come to be known as the War of the
Spanish Succession: France made dynastic claims over Spain, thus assuming exclusive
concession from Spain’s large overseas empire. Spain, by itself, capitulated, but Britain,
the Dutch, Portugal, German principalities, and a resurgent Austria, after having defeated
the Ottomans, once again joined the anti-French alliance. Until 1714 the conflict
continued both on land and at sea, with the anti-French alliance first making headways,
only to be followed by sets of retreats, thus making it a war of attrition (Veenendaal
1970, 410-445). As powerful as France was, it had basically assumed a policy of pretty
much fighting the world, that is, with the exception of the sub-system hegemons of the
east, almost every actor in Europe. This continuous policy of expansionism and warfare
created two conditions that ended French unipolarity: first, it had profoundly harmed
France’s economy, while diminishing its once unmatched military (Meuvret 1970, 320325); second, the war had played to the advantage of Britain, for it now found itself in a
position to challenge a relatively weaker France at the system-wide level. Thus, the
treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt proved rather beneficial for Britain: it gained Gibraltar,
Minorca, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Hudson Bay, while securing that Spain and
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France will remain two separate kingdoms (Pitt 1970, 446-479; McKay and Scott 1983,
63-66). The final outcome of the French unipolar period is as followed: a thoroughly
weakened United Provinces lost its maritime dominance to Britain, hence remaining a
sub-system actor; Britain rose to the system-wide level, being the unchallenged power of
the seas; and Austria positioned itself as a powerful sub-system hegemon, exercising
control in northern Italy, Naples, and Sardinia (Stoye 1970, 590-598).
1715 AD – 1740 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
The power constellations of the Global Political System during this period is one
of bipolarity, as a resurgent Britain established itself the most powerful maritime nation
in the world, while France had already established itself as a system-wide hegemon. The
Anglo-French dominance of the system was augmented by the presence of the usual subsystem hegemons: a declining United Provinces; a rising, yet non-revisionist Austria; a
growing Russia that recently defeated Sweden and assumed control of the Baltics
(Anderson 1970, 719-739); Spain with its overseas empire, yet too weakened and limited
to function at the system-wide level; and a recently defeated Ottoman Turkey that
sustained its sphere of influence in the Near East (Kurat 1970, 632-643). A period of
relative peace, as the system-wide hegemons undertook a policy of détente, the global
system remained balanced between Britain’s naval power and overseas colonies on one
hand, and France’s powerful land force (with also a formidable navy) and its own
overseas colonies on the other. The first two decades of this period demonstrated a
concerted effort by the system-wide hegemons to preserve the status quo, as the two
displayed a coherent tendency to cooperate on multitude of policies and issues (Lindsay
1957, 191-204). Further, a consensus appears to have been reached between the two vis-

258

à-vis spheres of influence: Britain’s continued dominance of the sea, while France’s
dominance of continental politics, with each, respectively, not interfering in the colonial
interests of the other. This was best demonstrated by France’s aggressive policies within
Europe by the 1730’s: unlike the previous epoch where anti-French alliances were
formed to check its advances, when France attacked Lorrain and Milan, Austrian
possessions, and further moved into the Rhineland, Britain remained indifferent and nonreactive. Within this context, the sub-system hegemons recognized the suzerainty of
France on the continent: Spain formed an alliance, the Dutch showed deference, and
Austria complied (as evident in the Peace of 1738) (Kennedy 1987, 108). France’s
diplomatic superiority was further recognized when it negotiated an end to the AustroRussian sub-hegemonic conflict against the Ottomans.
The dynamics of the Franco-British bipolar structure, however, changed as
France’s expansion in overseas trade became a concern and a perceived challenge to
British maritime suzerainty. This, in turn, was further compounded by the conflict
between Britain and French ally Spain over colonial possessions, trade, and expansionism
in the western hemisphere (Savelle 1974, 124-134). This gave way to the Anglo-Spanish
war in 1739, with France choosing to support the efforts of its ally in the colonial
struggle. The conflict, however, did not escalate into an inter-hegemonic war, as Britain
lacked the capability to conquer the Spanish colonies, while Spain, even with the aid of
France, remained far too weak to challenge Britain’s system-wide hegemonic status. By
1740, however, the developing dynamics in Europe will come to change the power
configurations of the system, as rising sub-system hegemons will attain system-wide
status, thus giving way to a multipolar period.
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1740 AD – 1790 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure
By 1740, as apparent with Britain’s war with Spain, the former’s system-wide
hegemonic status was not as strong, while on the European continent, with France in the
previous epoch succeeding in succumbing such sub-system hegemons as Austria and the
Dutch Republic, its preponderance was now challenged and counter-balanced by the
positioning of the sub-system hegemons at the system-wide level. Britain and France
were joined by the following actors at the system-wide level: a rising Spain, a resurgent
Austria, an ambitious Russia, and a revisionist Prussia. In 1740 Prussia seized Silesia
from Austria, thus bringing about conflict within the continent, as Britain immediately
allied itself with the latter, while France (along with Spain) offered support to the former,
only to soon involve formal and direct hostilities between all the parties. The continental
war also spread to the colonies of the respective actors, as naval conflicts and commercial
clashes were observed from the West Indies to the eastern Mediterranean (Thomson
1957, 416-435). Russia also joined the conflict on the Anglo-Austrian side, as Britain’s
growing wealth offered immense subsidies to its allies, while the Dutch remained reliant
on British assistance against an advancing France (Horn 1957, 446-461). The relative
stalemate of the conflict gave way to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, which
temporarily halted the hostilities and sought to preserve the status quo: Austrian
conquests in Italy were given to Spain; France gave its conquests back to the Dutch in
return for given colonies taken by the British, while France also returned captured
colonies to Britain (especially Madras in India); and Prussia kept Silesia, while the
remaining conquests were returned to Austria (Thomson 1957, 437-439).
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In 1755 hostilities resumed, in what would become a global conflict between the
system-wide hegemons: the so-called Seven Years’ War. Theaters of war ranged from
North America (French and Indian War) to Central America, India (Third Carnatic War),
Philippines, West Africa, and, of course, the European continent (Pomeranian War and
Third Silesian War) (Robson 1957, 465-477). After the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, both
France and Britain had bolstered their armed forces in preparation for prolonged conflict,
which was also complemented by similar measures taken by Austria, Prussia, and Russia:
each of the actors had built considerably powerful armies, which, in turn, was
supplemented by the growing economies of all actors. The global powers were utilizing
their resources to basically restructure the Global Political System. The strategic
partnerships and alliances had also shifted: Prussia and various German states now
aligned with Britain, while Austria sided with France, with Russia also joining the latter
(only to switch sides in 1762): Spain and Netherlands initially sought to maintain
positions of neutrality, but this would also not hold. The Franco-Austrian alliance proved
quite successful at the outset, as advances against the Anglo-German alliance reified
Austria’s system-wide positioning, while France’s gains overseas against the British
presented the possibility of structural shift in the system.
By 1761, however, the tide was turning, as Britain’s naval power proved to be too
much for the French, giving way to continuous British conquests of French colonies,
while Prussia’s land forces on the continent systematically defeated the Franco-Prussian
forces. The biggest game changer, however, was Russia’s switch, as it aligned itself with
the Anglo-German group in 1762, bringing much relief to an over-pressed Prussia (479480). Spain’s involvement in the war in that same year did not produce favorable results:
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unable to match British naval power, it fell victim to British conquests of its colonies. By
1763 three developments brought the global conflict to an end: Austria was bankrupt and
at the verge of collapse; Prussia’s successes were matched by its own exhaustion, only to
be coupled by Russia switching sides again in 1763; and France, faced with continued
British success, sought to limit its loses as Britain itself faced concern with the situation
of its continental allies. Similar to the previous continental conflicts, the Treaty of Paris
preserved the status quo ante (483-486); but the results overseas were not a return to the
status quo. While a great deal of conquered territories were returned back and forth,
Britain, however, came out of the conflict as the beneficiary. It kept most of what it took
from the French in North America, made headways in West Indies and West Africa,
eliminated French influence in India, while gaining Florida from Spain. While lowintensity, intermittent conflict between Britain and France will continue over colonial and
commercial competition, the status quo would nonetheless be preserved until the French
Revolution, after which a resurgent and revisionist France will seek to restructure the
system’s polar configurations. In sum, the end of this multipolar period may be
summarized as follows: Britain’s overseas success solidifying its system-wide status,
while France, still a hegemon, losing relative strength and influence both overseas and in
Europe; exhausted and broke, Prussia, Spain, and Austria were reduced to sub-system
status, while Russia, regardless of its ambitions, lacked the capability to sustain a systemwide presence.
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1790 AD – 1815 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure
The structural transition from a multipolar to bipolar power constellation may be
attributed to four general explanations. First, a powerful Britain continued its dominance
of the seas, while advancing and strengthening its colonial possessions, which, in turn,
led to a policy of limited engagement within Europe itself. Second, a France recovering
from the Revolution of 1789 proved to be far more revisionist and ambitious than
expected, thus creating a serious counter-challenge to British system-wide hegemonic
positioning. Third, France’s endeavor to alter the polar structure of the system into a
unipolar constellation further intensified the bipolar struggle between the two systemwide hegemons. And fourth, due to the developments in the third case, most of the subsystem hegemons sided with Britain to curtail French ambitions. What came to be known
as the First Coalition, lasting from 1793 to 1795, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Russia, and
Britain aligned to curtail France’s attempt at ascendency, only to fail in this objective
(Kennedy 1987, 121). By 1796 Prussia had sued for peace, leaving much of Germany in a
state of vulnerable neutrality that favored France; the Netherlands was conquered; Spain
forced to re-align with France in its traditional anti-British posturing; and PiedmontSardinia, along with ally Austria, defeated, thus removing Italy from the latter’s sphere of
influence (Bruun 1969, 254-255). Britain remained incapable of checking France’s
expansionism, as it was overwhelmed by the subsidies it had to provide its sub-system
allies on the continent, while lacking the resources to challenge the new French
hegemony in Europe. This bipolar system, then, was caught between two general
strategic dilemmas: Britain’s dominance’s of the seas was not sufficient to defeat or
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curtail French hegemony of Europe, while France’s unmatched power on land remained
incapable of reducing Britain to sub-system status.
A failed invasion of Egypt by the French, and an attempt to remove the
Mediterranean and the Levant from British sphere of influence, gave way to a Second
Coalition of sub-system hegemons joining Britain to curtail French successes (Markham
1969, 309-311). The outcome, again, was rather unsatisfactory: by 1800 Russia, Demark,
Sweden, and Prussia had been forced into an Armed Neutrality League, while Austria
had recognized, through suing for peace, France suzerainty (Bruun 1969, 256-260).
Britain managed to defeat the French incursion into Egypt, while taking much of French
and Dutch possessions in the West Indies. In this sense, French advances on the continent
were matched by British advances overseas. Between 1805 to 1808, a resurgent French
navy sought to challenge Britain’s maritime preponderance, only to be soundly defeated;
while Britain’s subsidization of massive Austro-Russian armies to challenge France
resulted in the complete defeat of the former by the latter (264-269). France’s hegemony
over all of continental Europe, with the exception of British allies Portugal (Carr 1969,
444-445) at one end and Sweden (Derry 1969, 489-490) on the other, gave way to the
Continental System, where a continent-wide embargo was placed against British trade:
British economic ties with all of Europe was severed (at least in policy) (Markham 1969,
326-330). Two policy moves by the French would bring about the structural transition of
the Global Political System: an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, which would give way
to a war of attrition and severe weakening of French resources, and France’s failed
invasion of Russia, which would bring about the decimation of France’s army. By 1815
France would be thoroughly defeated by the continental sub-system hegemons and
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Britain, thus bringing about the Treaty of Vienna and the multipolar structure that came
to be known as the Concert of Europe (Gulick 1969, 639-667).
1815 AD – 1840 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure
The continuous growth and inclusive nature of transcontinental trade provided a
hospitable environment for the rise of an integrated global economy, drawing both
system-wide and sub-system hegemons into larger world-wide trading and financial
networks. This was further coupled with immense growth in manufacturing,
technological innovation, and the general erosion of tariff barriers. Encouraged to
formulate a more harmonious global order following the Napoleonic Wars, system-wide
hegemons, supplemented by powerful sub-system actors, sought long-term commercial
and industrial relations, thus giving way to a more integrated global economy and the
assumption that this will bring about peace and stability, that is, the absence of systemwide wars. The underlying structure which sought to preserve these developments at the
macropolitical level was the so-called Concert of Europe, a multipolar power
constellation that prioritized the preservation of the status quo over relative power or
inter-hegemonic conflict: the collective desire for stability sought to usurp and curtail
revisionism at the system-wide level (Crawley 1969, 669-690). At its inception, it
included the five Great Powers: Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France. While
Britain, in relative terms, was perhaps the more powerful system-wide hegemon, it did
not, at this stage, seek system-wide dominance, but rather, reified the multipolar
structure. In this sense, Britain’s behavior, during this period, was more consistent with
being an important pillar of the Concert System, as opposed to utilizing its relative
strength to alter the power configurations of the system into a unipolar constellation
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(Thomson 1960, 323-349). By 1840, however, its growth into an unmatched global
power would change the polar structure of the global system. Until that point, however,
Britain endeavored to partake in the Concert of Europe as a mechanism of stability that
preserved the new Global Political System.
One of the more defining attributes of this multipolar period was the level of
attention applied by the system-wide hegemons to internal issues, and as such, interhegemonic relations fundamentally sought to preserve the relative strength of each
system-wide hegemon: revisionist behavior remained limited (Craig 1960, 246-266). The
spheres of influence for each of the system-wide hegemons, which was strictly preserved
through extensive and highly-refined diplomacy, may be gauged as followed: Prussian
dominance of Northern Germany and the Rhineland; Russia’s preponderance of pretty
much everything east of Austria, with Poland and the Balkans under its watch; Austria
stretched across east-central Europe, with much of the Italian Peninsula also under its
sphere of influence; France maintained its traditional position in the continent (with Spain
selectively part of its sphere of influence), with its system-wide status being further
reinforced through its extensive colonies; and Britain’s positioning remained similar to
Frances, as it extended from the British Isles in Europe (with Portugal consistently in its
sphere of influence) and across much of the globe through its growing colonies. By the
1840’s, however, social upheavals and growing complications between the continental
powers would deem the Concert System obsolete (Pouthas 1960, 389-409; Craig 1960,
269-273). This would give way to a structural transformation: Britain’s global power
would maintain and elevate its system-wide status, while the former system-wide actors
will be reduced to regional preeminence, thus serving as sub-system hegemons. Simply
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put, once the preservation of the status quo became incoherent, Britain assumed the
mantle of unmatched unipole: the Pax Britania was under way.
1840 AD – 1890 AD Transition Multipolar to Unipolar Structure
As defined in this work, what constitutes the designation of unipole, vis-à-vis a
singular system-wide hegemon, is the absence of challenges or a counter-balance to the
unipole’s positioning at the system-wide level. The extensive balancing mechanisms of
the previous multipolar period had limited the capacity of any single actor to remain
unchallenged, for the very nature of the Concert System presupposed balancing and
counter-balancing. Two developments allowed for the alteration of the Concert System,
thus giving way to a unipolar restructuring: 1) previous system-wide hegemons reduced
themselves to sub-system status by becoming embroiled in regional conflict, thus
neglecting system-wide positioning and hence becoming primarily preoccupied with the
European Continent; and 2) this first development allowed Britain to further expand its
global reach, thus functioning at the global level, for as the previous powers mainly
functioned at the regional, this left British system-wide dominance without a challenge or
a counter-balance. Britain’s system-wide hegemonic status, then, was a byproduct of both
its growing power (especially economic and colonial might) and the fact that inter subsystem hegemonic conflict hindered the presence of any revisionist actors. As such,
neither challenged nor counter-balanced, British unipolarity dominated the Global
Political System.
Within this context, British unipolarity may be categorized by the following
attributes: naval mastery, financial credit, commercial expertise, successful diplomacy,
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and shirking. Its financial, commercial, and economic might is best summed up as
followed:
[T]he United Kingdom produced 53 percent of the world’s iron and
50 percent of its coal and lignite, and consumed just under half of the
raw cotton output of the globe…It’s energy consumption from modern
sources (coal, lignite, oil) in 1860 was five times that of either the United
States or Prussia/Germany, six times that of France, and 155 times that of
Russia! It alone was responsible for one-fifth of the world’s commerce,
but for two-fifths of the trade in manufactured goods. Over one-third of the
world’s merchant marine flew under the British flag (Kennedy 1987, 151).

Diplomatically, Britain assumed a position that invited shirking: sub-system
hegemons neither engaged in revisionist behavior nor did they seek to challenge British
unipolarity, but rather, relied on Britain’s prolific ability to regulate the global political
and economic system. Concomitantly, Britain either played arbiter when sub-system
hegemonic conflicts took place, or refrained from any involvement, thus leaving regional
powers to appeal for British assistance or diplomatic influence. Three important subsystem wars demonstrate the unipolar structure during this period: Crimean War, War of
Italian Unification, and the War of German Unification. In all three of these regional
conflicts, Britain’s role was both selective and limited, yet the outcome was the same: the
weakening of the given sub-system actors and the continued strengthening of British
preponderance.
The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a sub-system conflict between Russia and a
much weakened Ottoman Empire, with France, Austria, and Britain getting involved to
curtail Russian expansionism (Curtiss 1979; Seaton 1977). A Russian victory in the
Crimean War, and thus its assumption of extensive Ottoman territories, could have
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inevitably elevated Russia to system-wide status, hence challenging British unipolarity.
In this sense, Britain’s involvement in the Crimean War (with several of its shirking
allies) was a pre-emptive check on possible Russian revisionism at the system-wide level.
The outcome of the conflict, then, was profoundly consistent with British objectives: a
thoroughly weakened Russia and a more balanced distribution of power among the subsystem actors (Ramm 1960, 469-492).
The Wars of Italian Unification (1848, 1859, 1866-1871) were set of complex
conflicts that involved the objective of Sardinia-Piedmont to unify the Italian peninsula
into a single kingdom, which was, in turn, curtailed by Austria’s dominance of the
Peninsula, along with continuous French intrusion into Italian affairs (Smith 1960, 552576; Macartney 1960, 539-540). The struggle of the Italians against Austria’s dominance
of the region was supplemented by France’s assistance to the former, which, in turn,
implied one thing: French ambitions over the region. Continued failures by the Italians
eventually led, however, to success by 1871. Austria had been entirely weakened through
its wars with Prussia, while also being pressed by France, which allowed the Italians to
push out much of Austria’s influence from the Peninsula. Similarly, French ambitions in
the region were curtailed by France’s involvement in the Franco-Prussian war, which
allowed Sardinia-Piedmont to seize the opportunity and establish a unified Italian state.
The outcome of these sub-system wars was three-fold: Austria (became AustroHungarian Empire in 1867) was undermined and kicked out of Italy, its traditional sphere
of influence; France was also weakened and removed from establishing a sphere in Italy;
and a new sub-system hegemon was added to the macropolitical structure, as a united
Italy became an important actor in European, and eventually, global politics. Within this
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context, these sub-system conflicts led to both the weakening of existing regional actors
as well as to the increase of an actor, which, in turn, provided Britain further room for
diplomatic influence as potential arbiter.
Of the three major regional conflicts addressed in this section, the War of German
Unification is perhaps the most important, for the outcome would be a powerful German
state that would give way to a restructuring of the system’s power constellations. The
German Wars of Unification were a set of three wars fought by Prussia against Denmark
(1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870), with the result being an unquestioned victory
for Prussia and the establishment of the German Empire (Foot 1960, 577-602). While the
Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War had important impacts on the Italian
Wars of Unification, the intertwining nature of regional conflict pretty much came to an
end with the establishment of Germany as the most powerful sub-system hegemon in the
continent (Taylor 1954). After having lost Italy and its influence among the German
states, Austria was reduced to weak sub-system status, soon to accept German suzerainty.
While initially a continental powerhouse at the beginning of this polar period, France was
also reduced to a much weaker position, as Germany’s methodical defeat and even
conquest of Paris signified the presence of a new, and regionally unmatched, power
(Howard 2001). At the macropolitical level, then, Germany had consolidated regional
power by defeating all of the continent’s sub-system actors, and hence positioning itself
as a potential challenger to British unipolarity.
With the limited exception of the Crimean War, Britain did not intervene directly
in the sub-system wars during this epoch, and as such, it did not view Germany, at this
stage, as a revisionist actor. The reasons for this are three-fold: 1) after unification,
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Germany’s policy was one of preserving the status quo; 2) Germany did not display any
attempts at challenging or counter-balancing Britain, but rather, assumed a policy of
shirking; and 3) Germany’s role as honest broker in the Congress of Berlin in 1876
proved its commitment to the status quo and the preservation of stability (Kennedy 1987,
188-191). All of these developments were supplemented by Germany’s refusal to
challenge Britain, and more explicitly, not to contradict or upset British policies:
Germany’s possible designs against France in 1875 were immediately stopped by Berlin
when London issued a warning. Heeding to London’s warning displayed Germany’s
refusal, at this stage, to challenge British system-wide hegemony. By 1890, however, the
dynamics would be quite different, as Germany’s military-industrial growth, and its
endeavor to question the existing global order, would bring about a bipolar power
configuration.
1890 AD – 1915 AD Transition from Unipolar to Bipolar Structure
By 1890 the power constellations of the Global Political System had transitioned
into a bipolar structure, supplemented by the usual set of powerful European sub-system
hegemons, along with the presence of two new sub-system hegemons: the United States
(establishing sphere of influence in much of the Western Hemisphere and proceeding to
push out the Spanish) and Japan (defeating the Chinese and Russia and establishing
regional dominance in East Asia and expanding into Southeast Asia) (Davidson 1968,
329-337). Germany’s extraordinary growth, coupled with its extensive positioning
throughout the globe, elevated the former sub-system power to system-wide status, as it
sought to both solidify its global positioning and challenge British suzerainty (Bury 1960,
300-302). Germany’s approach at the outset appeared to have been three-fold: its
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merchant and naval buildup strategically targeted British weaknesses; its banking and
finance both challenged and undercut British endeavors in Asia, Africa, and the Near
East; and, German industry, along with scientific and technological advances, threatened
Britain’s continued global superiority in proliferating its industry and culture (Frederick
1999, 307). By 1900 German naval and territorial expansion threatened British interests
in the North Sea, the African Cape, the Mediterranean, and the land routes to India.
Globally, Germany expanded to every prosperous market in the commercial sphere where
which Britain had dominance, thus directly challenging British commercial interests. The
policy of shirking, which had given Britain a piece of mind during Pax Britania, was now
over, as Germany challenged Britain in every aspect: industry, finance, commerce,
technology, science, transportation, and military capability. Concomitantly, German
advances methodically diminished British relative power, an inherent attack upon the
global British system.
In the Far East, Germany made inroads into China and Singapore, traditional
British spheres of influence, as it opened ports and entered markets at the expense of
British interest. In the Near East-Middle Eastern region, Germany managed to squeeze
out British dominance of the Turkish markets, establishing itself as the most prominent
European influence in the Ottoman Empire (Bury 1960, 604-306). This German advance
was viewed with great suspicion by Russia, France, and Britain, thus setting the stage for
anti-German alliance formations. In the African continent, Germany challenged British
political and commercial interests in South Africa, further infringing upon traditional
British sphere of influence (306-307). Collectively, Germany’s rise to system-wide
status, and its direct counter-balance to Britain’s position, suggests a two-pronged
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approach: methodical challenge to the British economic/commercial/trade system
throughout the globe, and, an arms race in the form of a naval buildup to establish
superiority over the seas.
During this bipolar period three important sub-system hegemonic conflicts took
place: the Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish-American War, and the Russo-Japanese War.
The Boar War, which included Britain’s attempt to maintain control over its South
African colony (Bury 1968, 118-119), was relevant to the extent that the Germans
displayed sympathy with the Boers, thus reifying its continued counter-balance of
Britain. The Moroccan Crisis of 1906-1907 further intensified the split between German
interests and those of the British (with French interests also being harmed by the
Germans) (Bury 1960, 317-327). What all these conflicts led to, in essence, was the
development of rigid alliances, possible modes of polarization: the Triple Alliance
comprised of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy (the Ottomans will also partake in the
near future), and the Triple Entente, comprised of Great Britain, France, and Russia. The
stage for World War One was set (Vyvyan 1960, 329-354).
1915 AD – 1945 AD Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar Structure
The outbreak of World War One, and its subsequent outcome, thoroughly altered
the polar structure of the Global System, as the German-British bipolar system
transitioned into a complex multipolar system, with system-wide hegemons at times
being reduced to sub-system status, but soon recuperating and thus altering the dynamics
of multipolarity. The Triple Alliance was primarily centralized on Germany’s unflinching
support for Austria-Hungary, while at the same time obstructing and curtailing the
interests of British allies France and Russia of the Triple Entente. While the specific
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causes of WWI are not relevant to the analysis at hand, three important factors must be
considered.
First, Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war against Serbia, and Russia’s
subsequent declaration of war against Austria-Hungary suggested the initial
restructuration of the polar system. Second, Germany’s recognition of the alliance
structure, or the level of polarization between the alliances, led it to immediately unleash
war against France, since France’s involvement to support its ally Russia was a foregone
conclusion, as was Germany’s swift involvement in support of Austria-Hungary. Third,
British involvement also became inevitable with Germany’s invasion of France, since
Britain, regardless of alliance obligations, cannot stand by and allow an extraordinarily
powerful Germany the chance to dominate the continent (Atkinson 1960, 359-382).
These three developments, in turn, were supplemented by the actions of important subsystem actors: Italy switched its allegiance to the Triple Entente and primarily maintained
neutrality; Japan, because of its Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, offered support to the
Triple Entente in the Far East (Davidson 1960, 416-419); and the United States, in its rise
to system-wide status, joined against the Central Powers in support of Britain and France.
The macropolitical outcome of the war, for approximately the next 20 years, may
be gauged as followed: Britain, while relatively weakened due to the exhaustion and
attrition of war, maintains its system-wide status; France, victorious with Britain, elevates
itself to system-wide status, both enjoying regional and global prominence; United States,
similar to the victorious states, assumes system-wide status, regardless of lingering
policies of isolationism; Germany, while profoundly weakened, and symbolically
reduced to tributary status based on the indemnities it must pay under the Treaty of
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Versailles (Butler 1960, 448-455), nonetheless remains a system-wide force to reckon
with, possessing not only a powerful army, but also much technological and economic
global reach (although Britain, France, and Japan did assume most of its overseas
colonies); Russia’s military losses and early exit from the war, followed by internal
revolution, reduced it to sub-system status (Deutscher 1968, 403-431); the defeat of the
Ottomans and the subsequent collapse of its empire reduced Turkey from a relevant subsystem actor to a minor regional player (Kedourie 1968, 269-272); Italy maintained its
sub-system status, while possessing revisionist objectives of becoming a system-wide
actor; the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed after WWI, ending the Habsburg presence
in Europe and relegating Austria to the status of non-factor; and Japan only found itself
strengthened as sub-system hegemon in the east, with similar revisionist aspirations, like
the Italians, of attaining system-wide positioning.
By the 1930’s the multipolar structure of the system had not much altered, with
Britain, France, Germany, and the United States as system-wide hegemons, and Japan,
Italy, and Russia as sub-system hegemons. The relative power capabilities of the given
actors, however, had changed: Germany began a massive rearmament and
industrialization process that would allow it to exceed, in both economic and military
terms, any other actor on the European continent; the United States had also grown into a
global economic behemoth, with a growing military might that was yet to be tested;
Japan also had been undertaking extraordinary economic and military progress through
industrialization, developing one of the more advanced navies in the world; Italy, while
economically semi-developed in relation to other world powers, had nonetheless began
forming a massive army and one of the bigger navies in the Mediterranean, thus seeking
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system-wide positioning; Britain, meanwhile, had maintained its economic might, while
its military capabilities had remained stagnant, as the British had sought a global policy
of preserving the status quo; and France, on the other hand, had generally remained
dormant, lacking the level of industrial and economic growth observed in other rising
powers. Collectively, then, the macropolitical structure of the Global Political System,
until World War Two, remained reified by the existing actors, with the only difference
being the continued strengthening of revisionist actors whose potential objective was to
alter the polar structure of the system.
Similar to the analysis provided for WWI, the causes and stages of the Second
World War are not relevant to the macropolitical assessments at hand. The relevant
factors, however, may be gauged in five general developments. First, the formation of the
Axis Powers and Japan’s rise to system-wide actor altered the dynamics of the multipolar
system, while Italy’s incompetence and continued reliance on Germany negated its
endeavor of being a global power. Second, France’s swift capitulation demonstrated its
growing weakness during the inter-war period, and France found itself reduced to a subsystem status. Third, the involvement of the Soviet Union in the conflict introduced a
new system-wide actor, as the previously weakened Russian state had resurged into a
global actor under the new Soviet state. Fourth, hesitant system-wide hegemon America
overcame its isolationist tendencies and reasserted itself as one of the more powerful
system-wide hegemons. And fifth, Britain reified its position as system-wide hegemon by
countering the Axis Powers even when France had been occupied and the United States
had not yet entered the war: Britain’s extraordinary military and economic might was
singularly displayed at its best. In this context, the multipolar structure during the Second
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World War possessed five system-wide hegemons: Germany, Japan, Britain, United
States, and the Soviet Union. The outcome of WWII, however, ended the multipolar
epoch, as the defeated Axis Powers were reduced to sub-system status, while the
victorious allies found themselves split into two dominant poles. The United States
assumed the leadership of one pole, while the Soviet Union of the other, and while
polarization took place in the forms of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Global Political
System, in essence, was defined by the counter-balancing behaviors of the United States
and the Soviet Union, with respective allied states acting accordingly. The bipolar
structure, defined by the Cold War, was under way.
1945 AD – 1990 AD Transition from Multipolar to Bipolar Structure
The end of the Second World War restructured the polar configurations of the
Global Political System, as the traditional great powers who had maintained system-wide
status during the previous multipolar period were reduced to sub-system status, while two
relative newcomers to the macropolitics at the system-wide level, historically speaking,
reinforced the bipolar structure. Germany was initially reduced to a political non-factor,
as the Allies divided the country initially into four occupation zones, and then during the
Cold War, into two zones, hence creating two countries. Concomitantly, much of German
industry came under Allied control, while stringent regulations were enforced upon its
capacity for rearmament. While West Germany would undertake impressive economic
growth in the next 30 years, the German state, as a global actor, would not attain relevant
sub-system status until its unification at the end of the Cold War. Within this context,
(West) German relevance, at the macropolitical level, remained defined by three
variables: it was either an extension of the European Community, remained reliant on
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US/NATO military protection, or assumed status of prestige second to Britain and France
at the sub-system level. Similarly, Japan was stripped of its overseas acquisitions,
reduced to control and dominance by the United States, limited in its capacity for
armament, and until its impressive economic growth within a 30 year time span,
remained a sub-system actor heavily reliant on American military protection.
France initially sought to position itself as a system-wide hegemon, accepting an
occupation zone in Germany, receiving permanent membership in the UN Security
Council, and reinforcing its dominance of such overseas colonies/protectorates as
Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and minor islands in the Pacific (Smith 1981, 85137). France’s grand strategy, however, was untenable: it lacked the economic
capabilities of functioning at the system-wide level; it heavily depended not only on
American economic aid but as well as military assistance; and finally, its capacity to hold
on to its colonies proved to be a failure, as it already had lost its mandates in Syria and
Lebanon, while Indochina was not only lost but became a nightmare for the US in the
form of the Vietnam War, and not to mention the horrors of the Algerian War which
eventually supplemented the losses of Tunisia and Morocco. France had become a subsystem actor with dreams of being a great power, yet it lacked the capability to either
challenge or counter-balance the two existing poles, instead choosing to engage in either
shirking or bandwagoning with the United States as an important NATO member.
Analytically, the case of Britain remains the most difficult in the initial stages of
the Cold War with respect to taxonomical considerations of macropolitical status. In
Europe it remained the most powerful country, both economically and militarily, having
played a most important role in winning the war and reifying its global status.

278

Furthermore, its global reach remained immense, since the structure of its empire had
sustained itself, and British status was respected by both the United States and the
Soviets. The problems, however, were several: it was over-extended and exhausted after
having won the war; its gold and dollar reserves were almost diminished, while its
domestic economic situation was immensely dire; it continued to rely upon American
assistance both during and after the war (e.g., Marshall Plan); and, it realized its empire
was no longer maintainable, as it slowly withdrew from India and the Middle East.
Within this context, Britain became a sub-system hegemon, but perhaps the most
powerful of the sub-system actors, becoming both dependent on the United States for
security and yet also serving as its most useful ally (Kennedy 1987, 387-388). In this
sense, British policy selected shirking and bandwagoning at the sub-system level instead
of challenging and counter-balancing at the system-wide level: that is, while it had the
capabilities to possibly function at the system-wide level, it nonetheless made the
decision to bandwagon as a NATO member, thus placing much of the burden on the
United States.
That the European age had been eclipsed in terms of economic and military power
was not open to debate. By 1950 the total gross national product of the United States was
$381 billion, while the Soviet Union’s was $126 billion: each thoroughly surpassed the
$71 billion of Britain, the $50 billion of France, and $48 billion of Germany. Militarily
the numbers were also telling: United States spent $14.5 billion with 1.38 million military
personnel, the USSR with $15.5 billion for whopping 4.23 million military personnel,
while Britain ($2.3 billion for 680,000 military personnel) and France ($1.4 billion for
590,000 military personnel), respectively, remained far behind (Kennedy 1987, 369). By
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1970, in terms of military spending, it is quite obvious that the European states had truly
assumed a position of bandwagoning: US defense expenditure was $77.8 billion, USSR’s
was $72 billion, while France, West Germany, and Britain, respectively, only spent $5.9
billion, $6.1 billion, and $5.8 billion (384).
Important to note during the bipolar balance of power was the possible
consideration of China as a third pole, suggested through three general developments:
Sino-Russian tensions and border disputes; policy of détente and US attempt to introduce
China at the system-wide level as an extra counter-balance to the Soviets; and, China’s
growing military expenditure ($23.7 billion by 1970), military size, and perceived
potential. These considerations, however, were countered by four important limitations.
First, economically, China was not only underdeveloped, but trailed much of the
developed world, and as such, its capability to function at the system-wide level was not
tenable; second, militarily, while it had size and potential, it lacked the technology and
the ability to coherently challenge either of the poles in the system; third, considerations
of Chinese system-wide hegemonic status appears to have been inherently premature,
since China had not even established regional sub-system hegemony; and fourth, China’s
own policy never sought system-wide positioning, and as such, its position was one of
neutrality and shirking, refusing to either bandwagon or engage in revisionism.
The development and continuation of the Cold War not only further polarized the
Global Political System, but also created a complex web of counter-balancing between
the two poles, ranging from arms race, to ideological expansionism, to proxy wars.
America’s endeavors in the Korean War and the Vietnam War proved to be relatively
fruitless and quite damaging to its capabilities, yet it neither weakened nor limited
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America’s positioning as system-wide hegemon. Meanwhile, with the exception of the
Afghanistan invasion in the 1980’s, the Soviets did not embroil themselves in external
wars like the Americans; but, rather, had to deal with internal turmoil: the Hungarian
uprising in 1956, Prague Spring in 1968, and the Velvet Revolutions of the 1980’s. By
1980 America’s gross national product doubled that of the USSR, while Japan and West
Germany nearly matched the latter. Militarily, US spending had also thoroughly eclipsed
Soviet spending, yet the Soviet bloc remained more than capable to counter-balance and
preserve the bipolar structure. The attributes giving way to the collapse of the USSR is
beyond the scope of this work, but the outcome remains unchallenged and singular: US
unipolarity. Thus, by 1990 the Soviet Union existed in all but name, as the Warsaw Pact
collapsed with the Velvet Revolutions and the attainment of political independence for
the Eastern and Central European countries, while the 16 republics within the Soviet
Union itself had also begun the process of succeeding. The Cold War, along with the
bipolar epoch, had come to an end.
1990 AD – Present Transition from Bipolar to Unipolar Structure
The transition of the Global Political System into a unipolar structure brought
about three unique outcomes. First, the United States, as the unipole, was not only
unmatched nor challenged, but also attained friendly relations with all the political units
that had opposed the American pole during the Cold War. Second, as a consequence, all
Warsaw Pact satellite states formed alliances with the unipole (joined NATO), while
former Soviet states, Russia included, either assumed a position of friendly neutrality, or
sought closer relations. Third, with previous challengers to American system-wide
hegemony now on friendly terms, the Global Political System remained absent of any
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revisionist actors that sought to either challenge or counter-balance the United States.
Concomitantly, the only actors during this early period capable of engaging in such
behavior where in fact the unipole’s close allies: the Europeans (primarily Britain,
France, and Germany). To this end, American suzerainty was not a subject of debate.
The current unipolar system may be defined by American preponderance (Layne
1993), where potentially rising powers, instead of engaging in revisionist behavior, are
persuaded to bandwagon (Schweller 1994). Many of these states, however, at the same
time engage in “leash-slipping,” where they do not fear the superpower and build their
own capabilities to conduct their own policies (Layne 2006). The policies of France,
Germany, China, Russia, and Brazil are examples among many. Within this context, none
of these states seek system-wide positioning nor do they pose a counter-balance to the
unipole, but rather, they selectively refrain from bandwagoning, and in cases of China
and Russia, seek regional, sub-system consolidation. This assumption is consistent with
the claims of Nye (2002), Walt (2005) and Ikenberry (2011a), who contend that the
preponderance of the unipole is not temporary, that contingent on its international
obligations, alliances, and institutional arrangements, its system-wide hegemonic status
may be preserved. As such, the lack of counterbalancing, continued international
cooperation, and absence of any foreseeable hegemonic rivalry suggests the reification of
the American unipolar system (Wohlforth 1999).
Furthermore, the strength of American unipolarity is not only dependent on
material capabilities, but also on the social system that the unipole constructs, where its
values and hegemonic status are legitimated (Finnemore 2011). This is somewhat
consistent with the treatment of the contemporary unipolar system as being
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cosmopolitanized (Held 1996; Cabrera 2004; Appiah 2007), legalistic (Goldstein et al
2001), constitutionalist, and defined by liberal values (Ikenberry 2011a), where the
system-wide hegemon engages in strategic restraint as opposed to overt aggression
(2001). This strategic restraint, however, assumes that revisionist actors are absent from
the system, and as such, powerful sub-system actors either shirk, as is the case with China
or Russia, or bandwagon, as is the case with European and Asian actors, such as South
Korea and Japan. Concomitantly, opposition to the policies of the unipole does not
constitute a challenge or a counter-balance, since no sub-system actor has managed to
challenge the United States at the global level.
Whether considering Russia’s current complications with Ukraine, Iran’s
positioning in the Middle East, China’s behavior in the Far East, or leash-slipping in
Latin America: none of these are challenges or acts of counter-balance against American
system-wide positioning, but rather, the endeavors of regional actors seeking
consolidation as sub-system hegemons. To this end, until powerful sub-system hegemons
refrain from shirking and/or bandwagoning and seek to challenge the United States at the
system-wide level, the current Global Political System is likely to maintain its unipolar
structure. The more interesting question, of course, is what will happen if the existing
system-wide hegemon’s decline is not initiated by any challengers, but rather, of its own
making? What would be the structural consequences for the Global Political System after
the end of American unipolarity?
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Analysis
The Global Political System provides 12 observation points of polar periods
within a timespan of approximately 500 years of world history. The collected data
provide sufficient information for gauging four general analytical considerations: the
distribution of polar structures, assessment of the formation of polar structures after
transitions from unipolarity, calculating the duration and longevity of the polar periods
within the data, and computing the probabilistic outcomes of polar structures after
unipolar periods. Five general comments may be made with respect to the data at hand.
First, tripolarity remains absent from the Global Political System, as the power
configurations of the system either assumed bipolar configurations or multipolar
configurations, with the system failing to observe the presence of three system-wide
hegemons. Second, none of the polar periods are designated as nonpolar, with the number
of actors in multipolar structures never surpassing 5, hence the system consistently
observing the presence of one, two, four, or five system-wide hegemons during their
respective polar periods. Three, there is an equal distribution between unipolar, bipolar,
and multipolar periods, indicating that the Global Political System, regardless of
structural transitions, consistently observed the presence of several and continuously
active system-wide actors. Fourth, unipolar preponderance within the Global Political
System never demonstrates extensive concentration of power as observed in previous
world political systems, that is, even in cases of unipolarity, powerful sub-system
hegemons always remained present in the system, hence the tendency of the system to
assume post-unipolar structures that are either bipolar or multipolar. And fifth, the
absence of nonpolarity may be attributed to this factor, for the Global Political System
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never observed extreme concentration of power within a single actor, or an extensive
diffusion of power without any system-wide actors. Within this context, periods of
nonpolarity, primarily after unipolar periods in other world political systems, usually
formed when extraordinarily powerful unipoles, with extensive concentration of power,
collapsed, hence leading to a similar extensive diffusion of power with no sub-system
actors having sufficient power to assume system-wide positioning. To this end, since the
distribution of power, vis-à-vis concentration, remained within several European actors,
with shifts in relative power reducing or raising an actor from sub-system to system-wide
positioning, the system never underwent extensive concentration or diffusion of power.
The equal distribution of polar structures between unipolarity, bipolarity, and
multipolarity is consistent with such observations.
The distribution of polar structures within the Global Political System is as
followed: four periods of unipolarity, four periods of bipolarity, and four periods of
multipolarity. As such, unlike other world political systems, the Global Political System
presents a unique phenomenon of exact and equal distribution of polar periods. Within
this context, of the 500 years that the system consumed historic space, each of the three
polar structures defined the system 33% of the time, respectively.
Considering the system’s structural stability, the longevity of the polar period is
quite telling. Stability, however, pertains to the maintenance of a single power
configuration for a given duration, as opposed to treatments of stability and instability
being gauged by conflict and war. On average, the most durable polar structure within the
Global Political System is unipolarity, lasting approximately 56 years. The second most
durable polar structure is multipolarity, with an average longevity of 42.5 years. The least
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durable of the three configurations is bipolarity, with an average lifespan of 30 years.
Unipolarity, then, remains the most stable polar structure within the system, with a total
lifespan of 225 years between 4 polar epoch, followed by multipolarity with 170 years for
4 polar epochs, and bipolarity with 120 years for 4 polar epochs. The analytical
considerations here are quite obvious: bipolar periods simply do not last for a very long
time, as a 30 year average within a 500 year timespan is quite short, while unipolarity is
quite stable with an average lifespan of 56 years, clearly suggesting that bipolar and
multipolar structures transition far quicker than unipolar structures. The relative longevity
of unipolarity is quite interesting, considering the fact that power concentration within the
Global Political System remains rather limited, yet the unipole succeeds in having a
longer presence as a singular actor as opposed to being a system-wide hegemon sharing
the macropolitical scene with other actors.
The transitional patterns of the system after unipolar transitions remain
analytically limited, since the number of observations is quite low at 4, with the final
unipolar period being in its current form, hence lacking data on what its post-polar
structure would be. As such, 3 observations are left from the dataset, with the system
transitioning to a bipolar system after unipolarity twice, and transitioning to a multipolar
system once. Probabilistically speaking, then, after unipolar periods in the World Political
System, there is a 50 percent chance that the system will assume a bipolar configuration,
while a 25% chance of multipolarity, with the remaining 25 percent still to be seen. With
a limited time span of only 500 years, as opposed to the 2800 years of the Far Eastern
System, or the 2400 years of the Mediterranean System, for example, the existing data
remains relatively limited when attempting to gauge the post-unipolar probabilities. To
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this end, it becomes rather imperative to rely on the cumulative data and patterns
ascertained from the other world political systems to be able to cogently engage in
calculative predictions and analysis of the structural form that the post-American unipolar
period might possibly take.
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CHAPTER 9
After Polarity: Findings and Aftermath
If modesty was a scholarly virtue, complacency would usurp innovative ideas,
original constructs, and unprecedented challenges to the stagnation and repetitiousness
that defines the field of International Relations as it pertains to the study of great powers,
hegemonic behavior, and polar structures. The endeavor at hand, then, is not a homage to
modesty, but rather, is an attempt, at its most basic level, to neutralize two general and
severe deficiencies within the field: chronic ahistoricism and the givenness of
Eurocentrism (Teschke 1998; Buzan and Little 2000; Zhang 2001). Within this
framework, the study of hegemonic states and polar formations cannot be limited to the
post-Westphalia system or the myopic historical space of the Greco-Roman world. By
formulating and applying the concept of world political systems, the project at hand has
attempted to broaden and advance the study of great powers and polarity, offering novel
theorization coupled with empirical data collection that allows for hypothesis testing,
probabilistic predictions, and knowledge-accumulation through the unearthing of nonobvious facts.
Each of the world political systems, as presented in their respective chapters,
demonstrates the following features: an anarchic system comprised of hegemonic actors
(or absence of hegemonic actors), that is, a system encompassing autonomous,
territorially-based political units that interact and seek positioning within the power
structure of the system; a spatial and territorial designation of the system’s parameters;
explanatory considerations of the shifts, transitions, and the formations of polar
structures; and, accountability for the behavior of system-wide hegemonic or sub-system
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hegemonic actors in shaping and transforming the power constellations of the system.
The aggregate data of the findings suggest potential breakthroughs in gauging systemic
transitions, post-transitional predictions, accountability for structural shifts, hegemonic
behavior vis-à-vis unipolar configurations, structural longevity vis-à-vis system’s
maintenance, and an analytical and probabilistic treatment of nonpolarity as a polar
configuration.
The scientific study of polarity began with the hope and assumed promise that the
accumulation of data and historical evidence and its systemic analysis would give way to
a more robust and conclusive understanding of the overarching factors associated with
hegemonic state behavior, polarity formation, and observable transitional patterns.
Having utilized, collectively, some 10,200 years of political history, this project seeks to
present perhaps the most complete treatment of designating, classifying, and qualifying
the criteria of historical time and space in assessing and analyzing the formation of polar
structures and transitions. What is of greater significance is the consideration that the
critical mass of evidence procured may constitute and provide the basis for a conceivable
paradigmatic shift in how polarity is conceptualized, spatial-temporally categorized, and
systemically analyzed. Since the great body of research on polarity has been fixated on
the post-Westphalian European system, observational data points have been inherently
limited and simply confined to a 500 year history, offering very little data collection and
documented information with respect to polar periods and transitional patterns.
Concomitantly, power configurations have been confined to either considerations of
bipolarity or multipolarity, since the limited data of the post-Westphalian European
system offers no other alternatives or body of evidence to suggest otherwise (until

289

American unipolarity). By broadening the breath and scope of polarity research to the
wider historical process through the inclusion of several world political systems, the
myopism of Eurocentrism and the problem of data limitation have been attenuated.
The research at hand is not simply preoccupied with data collection, where which
data analysis has been delayed or marginalized; rather, the methodological approach has
been mutually complimentary, as data analysis has proceeded in close association with
data collection. To this end, this project has concentrated on conducting empirical
research as opposed to merely formulating a data set for polarity studies. While the case
of the latter is nonetheless true, the objective is much greater than that, for the given data
has been collected to address specific research questions and puzzles that International
Relations scholars have not attempted to answer in the study on polarity. This, in turn,
brings about another objective of this project: the marriage of the theoretical with the
empirical. Propositions and research questions must have well-developed, robust
theoretical and explanatory foundations before they are tested, otherwise the results will
primarily be a mass of disconnected findings that are deficient in theoretical quality and
explanatory strength. Thus, accumulating data, formulating research questions, and
testing these questions with the goal of solving important puzzles remains a unidimensional and insufficient approach. This is most prevalent in the measurement and
quantification of state behavior within intra-polar research, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Namely, the findings produce quantified results, but very little explanatory capabilities,
thus contributing to more confusion and controversy: knowledge-accumulation remains
stagnant. At the same time, robust theoretical models and concise propositions, attained
through deduction and dense analysis, also do not suffice. That is, regardless of how
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powerful and appealing a theory is, or how though-provoking its propositions may be,
they remain just that: untested propositions. The objective, then, necessitates the marriage
of the two approaches: a robust theory with explanatory powers, and empirical research
that produces data and evidence which allow for the testing and analysis of the given
theory and its propositions. As such, if the scientific study of polarity is to be vindicated,
and thus escape the controversy and stagnation that surrounds it, a set of empirical
generalizations must be produced that are verifiable and corroborated, which, in turn,
may be justified by the explanatory strength of its underlying theoretical model.
At the outset of this work, the following sets of research questions were posed.
After each unipolar period, what power configuration does the structure of a system take?
Does the system become bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or nonpolar? Which polar structure
has numerical advantage of becoming formed after unipolarity? What are the
probabilistic relations between each possible mode of polarity after unipolar periods? Can
consistent patterns be observed that produce non-obvious facts and observations into the
historic process of polar structuration after unipolarity? Based on the potential quantified
results, can it be predicted, even probabilistically, how long US unipolarity will last, or,
what the post-American global system will look like? Prior to the research at hand, these
questions could not have been answered because the body of evidence and the necessary
data that may allow for the investigation of such questions remained absent. As such, the
field of International Relations lacked both the necessary data and the theoretical models
to even address such questions and propositions. Simply put, the knowledge was lacking,
and for this reason, the puzzle remained unanswered.
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That this project proposes to answer such questions suggests three things. First, by
expanding the universe of observations, and thus engaging in extensive data collection, a
body of evidence is produced that allows for important probabilistic and analytical
conclusions. Second, the scope and depth of such an expansion necessitated a wellrefined theoretical model, for criteria, designation, and conceptual categorizations must
first be legitimated before the endeavor may be undertaken. Third, by formulating such a
theoretical model and utilizing paradigm-building, not only is an explanatory theory
developed, but also the necessary paradigmatic tools are formulated to help acquire the
empirical data in order to substantiate the theory. As such, the introduction of the concept
of world political systems, for example, allowed for the expansion of the universe of
observations, since scholarship was no longer limited to the stagnant treatments of
polarity that strictly have been confined to the post-Westphalia European system.
In this sense, by covering the macropolitical developments of various systems
throughout world history, a more inclusive and robust body of data was ascertained. This,
in turn, was supplemented by the utilization of such conceptual tools as system-wide and
sub-system hegemons, along with the designation of polar structures defined and
legitimated by the theoretical model at hand, including, of course, the application of
nonpolarity. To this end, whereas traditional studies of polarity rely on approximately 12
observation points (polar periods from the 1600’s to the present), with inconclusive,
controversial results that defy consensus (see chapter 3 for a discussion of the
measurement trap and the contradictions and general lack of consensus in the study of
polarity), the project at hand presents 109 observation points, with clearly developed and
defined criteria of what constitutes the mode of polarity, system-wide hegemon, sub-
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system hegemon, and world political system. This perhaps explains why the scientific
study of polarity has primarily been restricted to intra-polar studies: the stability of
bipolarity in relation to multipolarity, the magnitude of war in relation to alliance
formation and polarization, and in general, state behavior in relation to systemic
characteristics and outcomes. With such a limited universe of observations, traditional
scholars have concentrated on the intra-polar developments, since patterns, shifts, and
transitions of polar structures cannot be coherently studied, observed, analyzed, or tested
with so few observations. Simply put, limited to intra-polar considerations, and
constrained by merely a dozen observations, the existing paradigmatic tools utilized by
scholars of polarity restricts their ability to address the above posed questions: what do
we know about observational patterns and probabilistic assessments of polar transitions
and structural shifts?
That hegemonic actors seek to advance their interests and thus engage in behavior
at the systemic, macropolitical level to reify such aspirations should be accepted as
axiomatic. In relation to other actors in the system, powerful actors with system-wide
aspirations seek positioning that either solidifies their relative power or insulates and
protects their interests from relatively equal powers. The tactics of realpolitik appears to
be the pervasive norm among system-wide hegemons, as preservation and advancement
of interest necessitates behavior that is consistent with military build-up, economic
expansion, alliance formations, establishment of spheres of influence, and the attempt to
curtail revisionist actors that seek to challenge the established and perceived interests of
the given hegemon(s). These considerations, however, are not claims that possibly
suggest whether tactics of realpolitik lead to war or peace, stability or instability, success
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or failure: these considerations, rather, are empirical observations into the behavior of
states that seek system-wide preponderance. Within this context, it should not be
presupposed that the project at hand argues that power politics offers sufficient
explanations for state behavior. Rather, it is contended that power politics is a type of
state behavior, and the extent to which given system or sub-system hegemons utilize
power politics at the macro level is contingent upon the set interests and policies of such
actors.

Results and Analysis
The produced data set contains a total of 109 observation points that generate
findings which pose important and serious challenges to generally held assumptions,
hypotheses, and propositions presented by traditional studies of polarity. First, contrary to
the research espoused by structural realists, along with the quantitative findings of
behavioralists, neither bipolarity nor multipolarity is the norm in the formation of polar
structures. Rather, as the evidence suggests, unipolarity is the model power constellation
in world history, and as such, assumptions that state behavior, shaped by systemic
attributes, inevitably give way to either bipolar or multipolar structurations is unfounded.
Unipolarity, it appears, is a perfectly normal and persistent structure for the system to
assume.
Second, while the concepts of balancing and counter-balancing are crucial in
observing, gauging, and understanding state behavior at the system-wide level, the
assumption that the balance-of-power doctrine is a truism is inherently challenged by the
findings of this research. Namely, whereas states challenge, counter, and aspire to
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balance the relative power or the perceived threat from other actors; they engage in such
behavior as extensions of policy that reifies their endeavor to preserve their interests at
the system-wide level. In this sense, states selectively engage in such behavior, as
opposed to such balancing behavior being an inevitable outcome, a perceived necessity,
or a deterministic byproduct of the structure of the system itself. This is better explained
by the fact that since unipolarity is the norm, and not bipolarity or multipolarity, the
concept of balance-of-power remains a form of state behavior, and not a given.
Third, as the first proposition suggests, not only is unipolarity the norm, but it is
also far more stable, as far as longevity is concerned, than any other power constellation.
As such, the assumption that American unipolarity is temporary and that the system must,
inevitably, assume a bipolar or multipolar constellation, is both challenged and
repudiated. Fourth, not only is the polar structure of nonpolarity empirically substantiated
as a historical occurrence, but it is also found that nonpolarity is far more common than
previously assumed. That is, whereas nonpolarity, traditionally, has been considered a
form of designation for the off-hand chance that it may, conceivably, assume a polar
structure, it has been generally dismissed as either non-occurring, or should it occur, a
rare-event and an outlier. And fifth, gauged probabilistically from the data at hand, the
post-American unipolar system will be neither bipolar nor multipolar, but rather,
statistically speaking, has a much higher chance of becoming a nonpolar system.
The aggregated data from the five world political systems offers a total of 109
observation points, with 23 polar periods being observed in the Near East-Middle Eastern
World Political System (Figure 9.1), 15 in the Mediterranean World Political System
(Figure 9.2), 27 in the Far Eastern World Political System (Figure 9.3), 32 in the Indic
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World Political System (Figure 9.4), and 12 in the Global Political System (Figure 9.5).
These data allow for several sets of evaluations that address the research questions posed
in this project. Within this framework, categorical demarcations between polar
structuration and subsequent transitions provide for the four general modes of analysis
that has been recurrent in this project: the aggregate distribution of polar structures within
the entire data set; system’s analysis vis-à-vis durability and longevity with respect to
polar periods; transitional patters of power configurations after unipolar periods; and the
probabilistic calculations of the possible structural outcomes after unipolar transitions.
The distribution of polar periods within the data set demonstrates unipolarity to be
the most occurring structure, as 39 out of the 109 codings for the power polarity
configurations are unipolar. This far exceeds any other mode of polarity within the data
set, suggesting consistency with the initially proposed contention that unipolarity is not
the exception, but rather, the norm and the most occurring form of polar structuration.
This is further illuminated by considering the second most common polar structure in the
data set, which is bipolarity (n=24). The fact that unipolar configurations occurred 15
times more than bipolar configurations reifies the initial assessment. The third most
common modes of polarity are nonpolarity and multipolarity, with 19 codings each,
suggesting that the persistence of nonpolar structures throughout history has been far
more common than IR scholarship has considered. Further, the fact that periods of
nonpolarity are just as common as periods of multipolarity poses severe problems to
contemporary studies of polarity. Multipolarity remains in the third tier of most occurring
power constellation. The fact that multipolar codings are barely half the codings for
unipolarity indicates important implications of polar norms and patterns of persistence.
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The least common polar structure is tripolarity (n=8), which demonstrates much
consistency with its distribution within the specific world political systems in the data set.

Figure 9.1 Near East-Middle Eastern Political System
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Figure 9.4 Indic Political System
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Figure 9.5 Global Political System
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Figure 9.6 AGGREGATE DISTRIBUTION OF POLAR STRUCTURES
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As Figure 9.7 shows, the data set breaks down as followed: 35.8 percent
unipolarity, 22 percent bipolarity, 17.4 percent nonpolarity, 17.4 percent multipolarity,
and 7.3 percent tripolarity. These findings are consistent with the challenges proposed to
the propositions held by general studies of polarity, that is, our findings indicate that
neither bipolarity nor multipolarity is the norm in the formation of polar structures. As
the evidence suggests, unipolarity is the most occurring power constellation in world
history, for it occurs approximately 13 percent more than bipolarity and some 18 percent
more than multipolarity.
This, in turn, bring under question the underlying assumption that state behavior,
shaped by systemic attributes, inevitably gives way to either bipolar or multipolar
structurations. The findings in this research repudiate such claims as unsubstantiated. In
this sense, unipolarity is a more normal and persistent structure for the system to assume
than bipolarity or multipolarity. Concomitantly, gauged within the context of
contemporary American unipolarity, it may be coherently argued that this given unipolar
period is neither ephemeral, a fluke of history, nor a transition period where which the
system will inevitably assume a bipolar or multipolar configuration. Thus, at the
systemic, macropolitical level, the continuation of American unipolarity is both normal
and compatible with system’s analysis. With unipolar structures having 15 more codings
than bipolarity and 20 codings more than multipolarity, it becomes rather difficult, in the
face of such evidence, to argue for the normalness of bipolar and multipolar
configurations in relation to unipolarity. Accordingly, relative concentration of power
within a single state cannot be deemed unnatural, that is, the current American unipolar
structure should neither be considered unanticipated nor historically rare.
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Figure 9.7 PERCENTILE BREAKDOWN OF POLAR STRUCTURES
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The numerical superiority of unipolar configuration observations also challenges
the presumed givenness of the balance-of-power doctrine: both the behavior of state
actors and systemic outcomes reject the underlying balance-of-power hypothesis that
balancing behavior inhibits the development of unipolarity. To the contrary, as
demonstrated above, singular system-wide hegemonic preponderance is far more
sustained and prevalent at the macro level than balancing behavior by two or more
system-wide actors. The evidence seriously undercuts the mainstream paradigmatic
assumption that balancing is either axiomatic or universal law. The data repudiates this
by providing the following observations points: 58 codings of polar periods where
balancing is impossible (39 unipolar structures and 19 nonpolar structures) and 51
codings of polar periods where balancing behavior is the norm (24 bipolar structures, 8
300

tripolar structures, and 19 multipolar structures). Gauged statistically, balancing behavior
is prevalent within systems for approximately 47 percent of occurrences, while in 53
percent of occurrences, balancing is absent or untenable as form of state behavior within
the system. These findings are inherently problematic for the balance-of-power doctrine,
since balancing is neither the norm nor an inevitable outcome, but rather, it only occurs
47 percent of the time, that is, for 53 percent of the polar structures in which state(s)
function, balancing behavior is nonexistent.
The argument presented here by the evidence is not a complete rejection of the
balance-of-power doctrine, but rather, a rejection of the widespread belief that balancing
is universally valid behavior that all states engage in, and as such, macro political systems
must inevitably assume multi-state structures, as opposed to uni-state structures or
structures without any dominant states (nonpolar). By virtue of this analysis, two
modifications are suggested to the balance-of-power doctrine. First, balancing behavior is
neither universal nor inevitable, but rather, it is the norm in only three specific modes of
structures: bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar. As such, if the doctrine is modified to
specifications of polar modalities, as opposed to universalistic claims for all modes of
polarity, the assessments of the doctrine may still preserve its tenability.
Second, claims presupposed on deterministic fallacy must be modified in favor of
propositions made on specific polar structures with applicable and verifiable forms of
state behavior. Namely, state behavior cannot be gauged by structural determinism or
claims of inevitability by virtue of the given polar modality. It becomes evident, then,
that structure does not shape state behavior, and for this reason, balancing, as an
inevitable and determined mode of state behavior is not substantiated. Rather, balancing

301

is a byproduct of behavior in which the state determines to engage in by virtue of its
policies, as opposed to behavior in which a state engages in by virtue of the system’s
structure. If balancing, then, is proposed as a form of state behavior, as opposed to a
structural outcome, then the tenability of the doctrine remains intact: states selectively
engage in balancing behavior in specific polar structures to reify their objective of
preserving their interests at the system-wide level.
The observable evidence also rejects the hypothesis that balancing behavior
inhibits the rise of a single system-wide hegemon, that is, unipolar preponderance. As the
data demonstrate, of the 39 unipolar epochs, the previous polar structure from which
unipolarity transitioned into are bipolar (n=13), multipolar (n=8), and tripolar (n=4). As
such, the 25 previous polar structures that gave way to the formation of a unipolar
configuration are modes of polarity where which balancing is the norm. This being the
case, the contentions that balance-of-power, as a structural attribute, shapes state behavior
that prevents the formation or the transition into a unipolar configuration is undermined.
Simply put, unipolarity is the transitional byproduct, probabilistically speaking, more of
balancing behavior than of any other form of state behavior. Consequently, there is a 64
percent probability that a unipolar structure came into being by transitioning from a
previous structure where which balance-of-power was the perceived norm. The
contention, then, that balancing prohibits the formation of a system where a single actor
dominates is rejected: balancing neither inhibits nor does it demonstrate inevitable
outcomes contrary to unipolar configurations.
The concept of stability is used interchangeably with the concept of durability
within this project, as specified several times in previous chapters, and within this
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context, the durability of polar structures allows for important findings that give way to
knowledge-accumulation with respect to system’s maintenance. Particularly, the longer a
polar structure demonstrates longevity, the better a system demonstrates fittidness vis-àvis structural power configurations as it pertains to concentration or diffusion. Thus,
when engaging in treatments of systemic stability, the following logic is utilized: the
duration of polar structures indicates the extent to which the macropolitical conditions of
the system are favorable to specific modes of polarity. In this sense, the more historic
space that a given polar structure occupies, on average, the more durable and
systemically stable it is in relation to other polar structures.
Of the nearly 10,200 years of historic space covered in this research, with respect
to all of the world political systems, the aggregate years for each mode of polarity breaks
down as followed: tripolarity with 470 years, bipolarity with 1,595 years, multipolarity
with 1,570 years, nonpolarity with 1,905 years, and unipolarity with 4, 675 years.
Analyzing these findings based on their respective occurrence vis-à-vis codings, average
durations are gauged for each polar configuration, suggesting the relative instability of
tripolarity and bipolarity, while verifying the relative stability of nonpolarity and
unipolarity. On average, the least durable polar structure is tripolarity, lasting
approximately 59 years. This is followed by bipolarity, with an average duration of 64
years, hence making bipolarity the least stable power configuration among the most
common polar structures. Multipolarity remains the third most durable mode with an
average of approximately 83 years of longevity. The second most durable configuration
is nonpolarity, lasting, on average, nearly 100 years. In relation to the remaining modes
of polarity in the dataset, unipolarity remains the most stable and durable structure with

303

respect to system’s maintenance, displaying an average longevity of approximately 119
years. Within this context, the second most occurring structure, bipolarity, is also the
second least durable structure; while the most occurring structure, unipolarity, is also the
most durable and stable structure. Multipolarity and nonpolarity, on the other hand, have
the equal number of codings at 19, yet the average duration of nonpolar periods outlast
multipolar periods by roughly 17 years, demonstrating the latter’s relative systemic
stability.

Figure 9.8 AVERAGE DURATION OF POLAR STRUCTURES IN THE DATASET
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Figure 9.9 HISTORIC SPACE OCCUPIED BY POLAR PERIODS
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Implications of the Findings
These findings tentatively suggest four important conclusions. First, the stability
and durability of unipolarity rejects the prevailing wisdom that unipolar periods are
ephemeral, rather indicating that unipolar periods normally last for much longer periods
than any of the other modes of polarity. Second, not only is nonpolarity more common
than previously perceived, but it is also quite durable, suggesting that periods where
power is extensively diffused suggests just as much fittidness with respect to the system’s
structural configurations as periods where power is relatively far more concentrated.
Thus, extensively diffused periods last approximately 100 years, while the relatively
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more concentrated structure lasts on average for 119 years. This clearly indicates that the
durability of both unipolar and nonpolar structures cannot be ignored nor deemed outliers
and historical accidents. Third, the relative instability of bipolar and multipolar structures
demonstrates that these two modes of polarity have less fittidness than the two more
stable configurations, nonpolarity and unipolarity. As such, the contention that bipolarity
and multipolarity are more normal, inevitable, or consistent with macropolitical systems
is refuted. Rather, it appears to be the opposite: bipolar and multipolar epochs are not the
norm, but rather, are relatively unfit within macropolitical systems, for they last for much
shorter periods and thus give way to transitions much quicker. And fourth, the following
arguments pertaining to American unipolarity may, to some extent, be answered by the
findings: whether American unipolarity is temporary or not, natural or unnatural,
consistent with system’s analysis or inconsistent, stable or unstable, durable or inevitably
short-lived?
As the research demonstrates, American unipolarity is neither ephemeral nor
unnatural, but rather, it is consistent with system’s maintenance and quite durable, hence
negating propositions that the American unipolar epoch will be short-lived, and due to its
unfittidness, quickly transition to what have been traditionally deemed more fit
structures: bipolarity and multipolarity. The argument, rather, may be turned upsidedown on its head and proposed in a different fashion: that American unipolarity is not
only a norm, but also, that the transition from the bipolarity of the Cold War to a unipolar
structure was the most probable outcome, since unipolarity demonstrates far more
fittidness than any other mode of polarity. Consequently, it is argued here that bipolar and
multipolar structures are, in fact, short-lived and ephemeral, while unipolar structures are
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far more stable and durable. As far as system’s analysis is concerned, the evidence
implies that American unipolarity is here to stay, and gauged probabilistically with
respect to the average duration of unipolar periods, we may suggest, based on the historic
data, that American unipolarity may well last until the end of this century. Considering
that the American unipolar period began in 1990, and with unipolar structures lasting, on
average, 119 years, it may be projected that this unipolar period has a very strong
possibility of lasting for nearly a century.
This probabilistic assessment, of course, must be further argued by presenting two
important qualifiers. First, while American unipolarity will continue to exist until the end
of the century, this does not suggest that American concentration of power will increase
or sustain itself. Rather, it is argue that even as America’s concentration of power
decreases, and even as the single system-wide hegemon declines, its relative power will
still continue to be disproportionate to such an extent that it will neither see system-wide
challenges nor counter-balancing. Second, since American unipolarity has been defined
far more by shirking and bandwagoning—with respect to sub-system hegemons and other
potential revisionist actors—as opposed to expansionism and conquest, America’s
preservation of the existing global system remains preferable for many potential systemwide challengers. To this end, the stability of the American unipolar epoch, and the
assessment of its longevity, based on the historic findings, is supplemented by the
consideration that shirking best explains the behavior of potential revisionist actors, while
bandwagoning explains the behavior of powerful allies. Within this context, it may be
predicted based on our findings that the 21st century will be defined by the preponderance
of a single system-wide hegemon.
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One of the more central proposals posed by this project concerns the ability to
probabilistically answer the following question: what power configuration does the
structure of the system takes after unipolar transitions, and, based on such calculations,
can it be predicted what polar structure the post-unipolar American system will assume?
Simply put, based on the dataset at hand and the findings produced, what happens after
American unipolarity? To address these questions, the aggregate distribution of postunipolar structural transitions is produced below to allow for probabilistic and predictive
assessments. Of the 39 unipolar codings in the data set, 35 data points offer empirical
evidence for post-unipolar transitional patterns (four unipolar structures transitioned into
absorption by another system, hence being disqualified from probabilistic assessments).
Based on these observable patterns, probabilistic outcomes are gauged with respect to
post-transitional structural formations. Figure 10.1 displays the aggregate distribution of
polar structures after unipolar transitions. After unipolar periods, the structure of the
system transitioned into the following polar structures: bipolarity with 12 codings,
triplarity with 2 codings, multipolarity with 7, and nonpolarity assuming the postunipolar structure 14 times. The considerations here are two-fold. First, after unipolar
transitions, either the system undergoes intense diffusion of power, or, the system
undergoes relatively minor diffusion of power. Second, multipolarity, with 7 codings, and
tripolarity, with 2 codings, demonstrate that post-unipolar structures have a far less
chance of transitioning to a multi-hegemonic system, thus decreasing the probability that
the post-American unipolar system will assume a tripolar or multipolar power
configuration.
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Figure 10.1 AGGREGATE DISTRIBUTION OF POST-UNIPOLAR STRUCTURES
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Analyzing these data probabilistically, the results are quite surprising, offering
serious challenges to widely-held propositions and hypothesis that predominates the
study of polarity within International Relations. Figure 10.2 displays the probabilistic
outcomes of post-unipolar structures. The post-unipolar transitional patterns support the
following findings: unipolar structures have a 40 percent chance of transitioning into a
nonpolar structure, 34 percent probability transitioning into a bipolar configuration, 20
percent likelihood of assuming multipolarity, and 6 percent possibility of formulating into
a tripolar mode of polarity. Contingent on this data and the historical evidence
accumulated, it appears that nonpolarity is the most probable post-unipolar structure,
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allowing for the prediction that there is a 40 percent likelihood that the post-American
global system will be nonpolar. Following nonpolarity, bipolarity also presents a rather
high probability, for there is also a 34 percent chance that the post-American global
system will find two system-wide hegemons exercising preponderance. Thus,
analytically, it can be expected that the post-American unipolar structure would either be
a highly diffused system or a relatively highly concentrated system, for there is a 74
percent probability that the structure of the system would either transition to one or the
other, but only a 26 percent probability, collectively speaking, of the structure
transitioning into a multi-hegemonic configuration, whether tripolar or multipolar.
The considerations here are four-fold and quite troubling for scholars of polarity
that expect the post-unipolar structure to either be bipolar or multipolar, that is, the most
probabilistically tenable polar structure remains unaccounted for. First, the postAmerican unipolar structure has the highest probability of transitioning into a nonpolar
configuration because the contemporary unipolar period has consistently displayed a high
number of centers of power, even at the regional and sub-regional/local levels. As such,
these centers of power would have a relatively easy time sustaining their capabilities even
after the structural removal of the single system-wide hegemon. Consequently, whether
multitude of centers of power are being considered in North America (U.S., possibly
Canada), South America (Brazil, Argentina, Chile), Africa (Nigeria, South Africa,
Kenya), Middle-East and North Africa (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and Egypt), Europe
(United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Russia), or the entirety of Asia and Oceana
(Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia), the inchoateness and level of diffusion of
power within the system remains difficult to deny.
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Figure 10.2 PROBABILISTIC OUTCOMES OF POST-UNIPOLAR STRUCTURES
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Second, while bipolarity presents the second highest probability of what the postAmerican structure will look like, the only tenable treatment of a bipolar structure would
have to presuppose China assuming a system-wide position, and as such, counterbalancing the US. While such a development has a 34% probability, three-factors must be
considered: Chinese policy prefers shirking over system-wide positioning; China prefers
regional preponderance as sub-system hegemon as opposed to accepting the
responsibilities of a global power; and, the remaining powers in the world, especially in
Europe, cannot be expected to assume sub-system positioning if the configurations of the
world order undergoes such transitions. As such, whereas powerful sub-system hegemons
in Europe and Asia have chosen shirking and bandwagonning by virtue of their
relationship with the unipole, this mode of behavior cannot be expected to continue if
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unipolarity ends. The multitude of centers of power from the various continents, specified
in the initial analysis, will only be reified once American unipolarity comes to an end.
Third, the importance of shirking, as a mode of behavior by sub-system actors,
cannot be analytically underestimated. Meaning, shirking has been an important reality in
the American unipolar structure, and the fact that states with the potential capability of
engaging in revisionism have refused to do so suggests that aspirations of seeking
system-wide positioning remains marginal to the existing centers of power within the
various regions in the global system. This reluctance by economically powerful countries,
such as Germany and Japan, or militarily powerful countries, such as United Kingdom
and Russia, or highly populated countries such as India and China, is indicative of the
fact that sub-system actors, even with the capacity to expand and exercise relative power,
have refrained from engaging in such behavior, that is, they are refraining from
functioning at the system-wide level. Important to note here, for example, is that Russia’s
current conflict with Ukraine (as of 2014) does not suggest Russian positioning at the
system-wide level, nor does it indicate Russia acting in a revisionist fashion. Rather, this
is an attempt by Russia to maintain its sub-system status as regional hegemon, and to this
end, it is only seeking to preserve what it considers to be its regional sphere of influence.
Russia’s lack of global reach, and both its inability and lack of desire to function
globally, demonstrates this point. Simply put, Russia is primarily concerned with its
“backyard” and neighbors, that is, the infringement of what it considers inhospitable
forces upon its regional interests.
Fourth, in relation to three of the assessments made above, the probabilistic
outcomes of the post-American structure must also be considered within the conceptual
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premise of fittidness, applied in a modified fashion and primarily borrowed from
evolutionary theory of world politics (Modelski 1990; Thompson 2001). The
evolutionary theory of world politics observes world political systems, or in the case of
contemporary research, the Global Political System, as an evolving organism, a vast
structure that develops, grows, and adjusts in relation to the development of its parts
(state actors, institutions, structural shifts and developments, etc.). Thus, for example,
whereas in ancient Greece the world political structure was defined by city-states, this
structure evolved to empires, which, in turn, evolved to the nation-state of the postWestphalia global system. The underlying argument is that city-states lacked “fittedness”
in the developing world system, and so the city-state had to evolve into an empire to
coherently function and survive in the absorption and expansion of world political
systems. As such, through the evolutionary historic process, empires became
incompatible with the evolving world political systems, and as the Global Political
System came into being, so did its systemic evolution, deeming certain modes of
behavior, state formations, or structural characteristics no longer “fit” to survive in the
new Global Political System. In this sense, nation-states, for example, were formulated in
order to “fit,” as an evolutionary byproduct, of the new global macropolitical structure.
So a system learns, innovates, and adapts by creating new forms/orders to supplement,
alter, or replace an existing order or system that is not fit. This assessment is also
consistent with considerations of unipolarity: for example, whereas system-wide
hegemons like ancient Rome, medieval Mongols, Renaissance Spain and France, and
post 16th century England each behaved in highly warlike, zero-sum policies of
colonization or conquest, the US (existing system-wide hegemon) cannot do the same
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things that these hegemons did, for the process of historical evolution altered or created
new “forms” or orders in the structure of the Global Political System that has placed
severe limitations upon the system-wide hegemon.
Utilizing this overarching theoretical model, it is argued here that whereas in the
past the Global Political System was compatible with considerations of multipolarity,
bipolarity, and unipolarity, the current macropolitical structure, however, has evolved to
such a new system where considerations of polarity, hegemonic struggle, and balance of
power no longer “fit” the Global Political System. Namely, the post-American unipolar
structure will have to be an outcome that finds fittidness within the existing global system
which has come into being through a methodical, historical, and evolutionary process.
Within this framework, as globalization, economic integration, institutional restraint, and
intense interstate cooperation have become institutionalized and embedded in the existing
global system, the system itself has evolved in such a fashion where traditional
considerations of hegemonic power, modalities of polarity, and balance of power lack
“fittedness” and are no longer coherent analytical units in the developing/evolving Global
Political System. Consistent with this assessment, and hinged on the probabilistic
considerations presented earlier, it may be contended that nonpolarity is more fit for the
existing Global Political System as it undergoes a structural transition after American
unipolarity. As argued in the first assessment above, the extraordinary high numbers of
centers of power in the world are byproducts of a systemic evolutionary process where
which state actors are either shirking, or seeking regional positioning. Within this
perceived evolutionary development, none of the powerful sub-system hegemons are
demonstrating behavior that suggests objectives of irredentism, expansionism, or system-
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wide positioning where preponderance may be exercised. The most telling factor, and the
one that thoroughly challenges traditional studies of hegemony and polarity, is that even
states with the potential capability to seek system-wide positioning or engage in
revisionist endeavors are refraining from doing so. Consequently, it may perhaps be
contended that being a system-wide hegemon does not fit the evolving Global Political
System, and as a byproduct of this evolutionary process, states are refraining from
engaging in such behavior, that is, they are engaging in behavior that reifies their
fittidness. This being the case, nonpolarity, then, appears to be the polar structure that is
more fitted to the evolving Global Political System than any of the other modes of
polarity.
The relationship between unipolar periods and subsequent transitions to nonpolar
structures may be better observed and understood by displaying the set of case studies
culled from the body of historic evidence provided in this research. Figure 10.3 does this
by presenting the data of unipolar periods that transitioned into nonpolar periods, where
the system-wide hegemon’s decline was defined by increased diffusion of power to
various centers of power throughout the system. Collectively, the findings demonstrate
consistency with the probabilistic relationship between the polar structures and the
analytical conclusion generated by this research. Important to consider, perhaps for future
research, is the magnitude of power concentration for unipolar periods that transitioned
into nonpolar structures and unipolar periods that transitioned into structures other than
nonpolarity. A very general observation tentatively suggests that the level of power
concentration was quite higher with unipolar structures that transitioned into nonpolarity,
that is, intense concentration displays a tendency to give way to intense diffusion.
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Figure 10.3 TRANSITIONS FROM UNIPOLAR TO NONPOLAR STRUCTURES
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Cursory assessments of system-wide hegemons such as Mycenae, Macedonia, Rome,
Magadha, Ch’in, Babylon, and Assyria, for example, suggest consistency with such
assessments. But at the same time, power concentration was also quite high with Gupta,
Mughal, Yuan, Ming, Egyptian, and Persian unipolar periods, yet the system did not
transition to a nonpolar structure. The ability to accurately operationalize and apply this
dynamic might provide very important explanatory results that may be applied to both
previous polar periods as well as for the post-unipolar transitions within the current
Global Political System.
Future Direction of Research
Utilization of econometrics to attain more robust, quantifiable findings may rely
on inferential statistics to primarily substantiate conceptual models that attempt to gauge
the magnitude of power dispersion in the Global Political System as formed after the
overarching absorption of all of the world political systems into a single global structure.
The Correlates of War index (Ray and Singer 1973), as suggested by Mansfield (1993),
offers the most robust formula in calculating power concentration in relation to the
number of system-wide hegemons in the system. Available statistical data for the subject
matter at hand may also be attained from the Correlates of War database, which offers
data from 1814 to the present. A time-series cross-sectional model will allow for the
tracing of the diffusion of power, among global system-wide hegemonic actors, from
1814 to the present. This will potentially allow for the establishment of much quantified,
empirically support, attained through methods of econometrics, in addressing questions
pertaining to the level of power diffusion after unipolar periods (such as comparing level
of power concentration during British unipolarity in relation to level of power
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concentration during American unipolarity), and whether an observable pattern of power
diffusion is diagnosable where which the evolution of the Global Political System may be
analyzed through.
There also remains great deal of room for research concerning the need to provide
more specific observations on the structural characteristics and attributes of nonpolarity.
This approach may be two-fold, the first relying on the work of Deutsch and Singer
(1964), and the second on the work of Schweller (2010). Replicating the two models used
by Deutsch and Singer (1964), an attempt can be made to observe if a nonpolar system is
more stable and peaceful than other modes of polar structures. Quickly, in the first model,
authors assert that the most obvious effect of an increase in the number of actors in a
system is an increase in the number of possible pairs or dyads in the total system. A
reduction in the number of possible dyadic relations produces, both for any actor and for
the totality of those in the system, a corresponding diminution in the number of
opportunities for interaction with other actors (393). As stimuli in one particular
direction increases, the system exhibits a decreasing response to those stimuli, and
increasingly exhibits tendencies that counteract them. Thus, in any given bilateral
relationship, a rather limited range of possible interactions is obtained, even if the
relationship is highly symbiotic. But as additional actors are brought into the system, the
range of possible interactions available to each actor increases, hence increasing the total
possible interactions in the system. The objective, then, is to observe the degree to which
each single increment or decrement affects the number of possible dyads, interaction
opportunities, in the system. Thus, “in a purely bipolar system, only one dyad or pair is
possible,” while a tripolar structure “produces three pairs, four actors produce six pairs,
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five produce ten possible pairings, and so on” (394). Systemically, as new actors in the
system increase, possibility/opportunity of interactive behavior between new actors and
existing actors increases, thus potentially decreasing instability in the polar
structure/system. Simply put, more interaction leads to increased stability. As actors in
the system increase, so do interaction opportunities, and more than 5 actors/poles is the
level where the stability-enhancing increment begins to rapidly grow (395).
While the authors limit their analysis to the relationship between bipolar and
multipolar systems, this method may be applied to a nonpolar structure: as the number of
actors increase in the Global Political System, so does the number of interactions between
the actors. This increase in interaction is directly correlated with stability enhancement.
So the more independent actors a system has, the more interactions it has, and as such,
the more stable it is. With the nonpolar system requiring more than seven actors (above
the 5 actor threshold), the stability-enhancing increment will exponentially increase.
Hypothetically, for predictive purposes, if one presumes an increase of a minimum of 6
global actors, as the post-US unipolar system would very likely have, the assumption is a
nonpolar global system with numerically high sub-system hegemons/actors and
numerically high interactions, with no single actor or actors dominating, and as such,
decreasing instability and having high rate of interaction opportunities between states.
Continuing with this hypothetical, in the contemporary globalizing world, with the
declining unipolar system allowing for increased interactions among rising independent
actors, the stability-enhancing capabilities of the potential nonpolar system is increased.
The second model, which may be labeled as the dispersion of resources
framework, is conceptualized as followed. In a bipolar system, one actor applies its
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attention (resource) to its opposing pole/other actor. Yet as actors increase in the system,
the existing actor must divert attention/resources to this new actor(s) (assumption is that
same level of resource/attention will not be diverted, yet nonetheless, there will be some
diversion). As actors increase in the Global Political System, so do the diversion and
diffusion of resources/attention of the actors within the system. Thus, whereas two actors
applied attention to one another, now all actors must apply attention/resources to each
other, although in different degrees (396-398). This relative dispersion of resources
decreases the probability of conflict, for it is one thing to concentrate all resources toward
one, two, or three actors, as opposed to having to concentrating resources, in complicated
stratagem, to seven or more actors. Quantified results show that three power centers in
the system sharply decrease probability of conflict, while five centers greatly decrease
probability of instability. One may begin to presume how low the probability of
instability would be with seven or more centers of power in a nonpolar system. In the
absence of system-wide hegemons, the high numbers of actors apply their resources
interchangeably to other actors in the global system. Whereas US-Soviet resource
allocation was uni-dimensional, a hypothetical multipolar US-EU-China-Russia-India
resource allocation structure will be multidimensional, while a nonpolar US-EU-ChinaRussia-Brazil-Canada-India-Iran-Japan-etc resource allocation structure will be
extremely diverse, with the distribution of resources that a state allocates to its
relationship with other actors being very diffused and complex. This is consistent with
Deustch and Singer’s contention of attention dispersion contributing to systemic stability
enhancement. Coupled with the above-assessed notion of “interaction opportunities,” it
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may tentatively be hypothesized and tested whether a nonpolar global system is more
stable than bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, or unipolar structures.
Utilizing Schweller’s (2010) treatment of entropy with respect to the Second Law
of Thermodynamics, a different approach may be taken to assess how power diffusion
can take place in a nonpolar system, and how the structure of the system will reinforce
itself without the presence of system-wide hegemons/poles. The Second Law of
Thermodynamics asserts that a system’s total energy consists of two separate parts:
energy that is available for work (useful or free energy) and energy that is unavailable for
work (useless or bound energy). Entropy measures the disorganization in a system. The
extra resources that a pole/system-wide hegemon possesses are akin to what is called
“useless energy” that is associated with entropy. The total entropy of any isolated
thermodynamic system cannot decrease; it may only remain the same or increase; and so,
by implication, the entropy of the universe tends to increase. Entropy is often associated
with disorder and chaos because random configurations have larger probability of
occurring than more ordered ones. Entropy measures change in the degree of systemic
constraints on the units: as entropy increases, constraints weaken. When systemic
constraints are high, the system will operate in a fairly predictable manner; when
systemic constraints are low or nonexistent, the system will behave in a random and
chaotic manner. This occurs because, as entropy increases, the macrostate is composed of
more and more specific configurations, and so the former reveals less and less
information about the latter. The logic is straightforward and mere commonsense: events
of higher frequency appear more often than those of lower frequency. According to the
Second Law of Thermodynamics, once the system attains maximum entropy, final
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equilibrium, entropy cannot decrease, thus, the system remains as it is. Concomitantly,
Schweller holds that once the Global Political System reaches maximum entropy, power
capabilities will be diffused to other actors and none will have any incentive to move
from this condition (147-150). In this sense, randomness can be found in virtually
unlimited combinations of specific configurations (such as in a nonpolar system),
whereas order implies a specific combination of a relatively small number of
configurations (uni-, bi-, tri-, or multi polar systems). When maximum entropy is
attained, order is replaced with randomness, disorder, and indeterminateness.
The absence of specific structural order in a nonpolar system presupposes
randomness and inchoateness, hence being consistent with considerations of entropy in
the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Disorder does not refer to incoherent and violent
behavior among actors, but rather the structure of the system itself: there are no modes of
order/polarity, no positional structure to demonstrate hierarchy or organization of power
configurations. The unitary relationship of each actor to the overarching global structure
is one of randomness and disorder, that is, there is the absence of polarity. Accordingly,
entropy may provide much explanation and characteristic attributes with respect to a
potential nonpolar Global Political System. For analytical purposes, then, entropy is
applicable in gauging disorder and inchoateness with respect to units and their relation to
the structure of the system. This unit-structure relationship provides important
explanations with respect to the nonpolar system, that is, the nonpolar system is
structurally disordered: it has no single order, or hierarchy, of powerful states.
Collectively, then, the application of these three overarching approaches would
provide both the opportunity to pose more questions concerning the study of polarity,

322

while at the same time testing given questions and propositions. Concomitantly,
employing such methodological concepts as interaction opportunities and dispersion of
resources, considerations of stability, vis-à-vis state behavior, may be better observed and
tested, thus providing potential answers to questions pertaining to the attributes of
nonpolar structures and state actors. Finally, the application of entropy to system’s
analysis will allow for a transition from using the conceptual tools of the social sciences
to perhaps utilizing the conceptual tools of the hard sciences, through which systemic
outcomes of nonpolar attributes may better be gauged and understood.
With respect to continuous future research, the finding and propositions produced
in this work may perhaps offer important lessons to IR theory. Specifically, future
scholarly work may utilize the following considerations: 1) application of the alleviation
of the agent-structure problematique to theory development and paradigm-building; 2)
criteria for evaluating and qualifying system-wide actors or superpowers in the study of
global politics; 3) employing multi-tiered analysis that escapes theory
incommensurability and allows for the formulation of theoretical and conceptual
frameworks that coherently fluctuate between second and third level imagery; and 4)
composing a methodological approach that confidently relies on an eclectic utilization of
diverse paradigmatic tools, as opposed to being limited to paradigmatic myopism. In
totality, then, future scholarly endeavors may rely on a more multifaceted and refined
approach to IR theory-building.
Conclusion
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1985) eloquently argued that the scientific
understanding of international relations requires explicit theorizing, grounded in
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axiomatic logic, from which hypotheses with empirical referents may be extracted,
“followed by rigorous empirical analysis (whether quantitative or not) in which
assumptions and procedures are explicitly stated.” Furthermore, such research must
manage to specify whether the “hypotheses stipulate necessary, sufficient, necessary and
sufficient, or probabilistic relations among variables” (121). The research endeavor at
hand undertook a concerted effort to abide by such scholarly considerations. Explicit
theorizing is provided with respect to the formulation of the various conceptual and
analytical tools utilized in this research, which, in turn, are grounded in axiomatic logic.
Thus, the concepts of world political systems, system-wide hegemons, modes of polarity,
and structural shifts and transitions remain the byproducts of explicit theorizing that is
hinged on deductive and axiomatic logic. Consequently, the formulated hypotheses,
which pertain to polar structruations and post-unipolar transitions, inherently presuppose
empirical referents, that follow a three-tiered methodological approach through which
rigorous empirical analysis has been utilized. Subsequently, the research design specifies
that the propositions and puzzles being addressed by this project stipulate probabilistic
relations among the variables being studied. In its totality, then, the theoretical model,
conceptual tools, analytical frameworks, methodological approach, and the findings of
this research project rest on strong foundations and demonstrate robust adherence to the
general standards of philosophy of science.
Among the various observations and findings produced by this project, two
overarching ones stand out, where which non-obvious facts were procured and
knowledge-accumulations substantiated. First, nonpolarity has been demonstrated to be
both an empirical reality and reified through an explicit theoretical framework allowing
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for a coherent and applicable assessment of this mode of polarity. That 19 periods in the
history of world political systems had nonpolar epochs is quite telling of the persistence
and tendency of the macropolitical system to assume such a mode of polarity. The
introduction and empirical validation of nonpolarity as both a tenable and verifiable polar
structure offers the discipline new analytical tools and data that may be operationalized to
develop better understanding of both polar structurations and state behavior vis-à-vis
structural shifts and formations within the macropolitical system. Second, body of data
has been procured through the historic evidence that has not been produced or qualified
by previous research, that is, the criteria-oriented methodology of accumulating data for
polar periods offers an expansion in both our knowledge and approach in studying
polarity and the behavior of powerful, system-wide actors. As a result, non-obvious and
original assessments have been produced with respect to polar transitions and
probabilistic predictions of post-unipolar structures. That this research may offer
calculated predictions of what the post-American unipolar structure would transition into,
for example, and what the world may look like, that is, what the expected affect may be
upon both systemic and unitary/state attributes in the Global Political System, is
demonstrative of some degree of knowledge-accumulation.
For some 50 years of research undertaken in the scientific study of polarity, we
have learned a lot, only to come to realize that, in fact, we have not learned much.
Tautology, indeed, is a very dangerous trap: but not inescapable. The circular trap that
scholars have confined themselves in, going from bipolarity to multipolarity, from
arguing over stability and instability, determinism and non-determinism, causality and
correlation, and of course, disputing whether any knowledge-accumulation has been
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attained, smacks of an overarching trap of tautology that has overwhelmed the discipline:
everyone says a lot, but in the end, no one is really saying anything. That one’s nothing is
another’s something cannot be a tenable approach to the study of International Relations.
The problem, then, as suggested earlier, appears to be one of scope: how much can a
group of people study the same 500 year history (post-Westphalia system); how much
can the same 200 hundred years of data be quantified and re-quantified, analyzed and reanalyzed, with conflicting results and conclusions; and how long can controversy and
disagreement define the inability to establish consensus in the fight over measurements,
selection of variables, and research methodology? By becoming trapped in the
ahistoricism and Eurocentrism that has come to define the study of power politics and
polarity, scholars of International Relations have become academic cannibals: they keep
fighting over the same meal, and when this does not work, they turn on each other. By
broadening the scope, extending the universe of data and empirical referents to a much
larger area of inquiry, and introducing methods of research, analytics, and scholarship
that supplement and reify this expansion, perhaps paradigmatic and methodological
myopism may be escaped. That is, perhaps more meals may be provided for the field of
study, so that instead of engaging in academic cannibalism, scholars may perhaps
actually engage in knowledge-accumulation. That Vasquez (1987) channels Kenneth
Waltz’s lamentation should not be a surprise: “nothing seems to accumulate, not even
criticism” (pg. 113).
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